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I. INTRODUCTION
"If I am remembered for anything," declared then candidate
George Bush in a 1988 campaign speech, "it would be this, a com-
plete and total ban on chemical weapons."' One year later, on the eve
of a war in which Iraq was expected to use chemical weapons against
United States troops, President Bush vetoed a bill giving him the
sanctioning power to stem the global proliferation of chemical
weapons. 2
After the war's outbreak, Israeli civilians within the range of
Iraqi SCUD missiles and allied troops in Operation Desert Storm
braced themselves for a chemical weapons attack. Despite experts' as-
sessments that Iraq possessed enough chemical weapons to mount a
devastating attack, and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's threats to use
those weapons,3 the fighting ended without a chemical attack. Presi-
dent Bush's veto and the Iraqis' restraint represent just two of the
many paradoxes surrounding the proliferation of the "poor man's
* Professor of Law at University of Richmond School of Law; J.D., University of San
Diego Law School, 1980; LL.M. Yale Law School, 1982.
** Attorney at law in Richmond, Virginia; M.Ed., D.Ed., University of Virginia, 1970,
1975; J.D., University of Richmond School of Law, 1991.
1. Richard A. Clark, Statement for the International Government-Industry Conference
Against Chemical Weapons DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1989, at 45.
2. James Gerstenzang, Bush Likely to Veto Bill on Gas Biological Arms, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1990, at A12.
3. Robert Pear, Iraq Can Deliver, U.S. Chemical Arms Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
1990, at A8.
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atom-bomb." This Article analyzes a series of paradoxes emanating
from President Bush's campaign against chemical weapons.
Part I examines the four levels of proliferation that realistic con-
trols must address. The first level is the ultimate consumer, consisting
of those nations that might use such weapons. The second level con-
sists of foreign companies providing technological assistance to such
nations. The third level is composed of United States companies sup-
plying raw materials called "precursors." The fourth level consists of
independent brokers linking suppliers with users. Powerful market
forces create this combination of unlikely suppliers whose own na-
tions have decried the use of chemical weapons.
Part II outlines the tactical and theoretical attractions of chemi-
cal agents for the conventional military and terrorist guerrilla arsenal.
A discussion of the efficacy of known chemical agents and their man-
ufacture will frame the practical problems inherent in any program to
limit proliferation. These technological problems create another para-
dox for nations wishing to balance the power in their regions.
Part III examines the Export Administration Act. 4 This legisla-
tion authorizes the United States to unilaterally sanction foreign and
domestic companies, as well as foreign nations. The tension created
by the competing goals of fostering international trade and controlling
foreign policy explains the ironic congressional struggle to add chemi-
cal warfare sanctions to the Export Administration Act. The evolu-
tion of unilateral control of chemical weapons proliferation points to
the fundamental deficiencies in United States export policy.
Part IV outlines the international initiative to control chemical
weapons through the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Verifica-
tion, the critical issue in the multilateral effort to halt proliferation,
has created unlikely coalitions within the camps favoring and oppos-
ing the multilateral global ban. The Chemical Weapons Convention
surmounted many technological impediments to achieve ratification
in January, 1993.
Part V suggests both unilateral and multilateral action to resolve
the collection of paradoxes which has emerged from the chemical
weapons controversy.
After a close call with chemical weapons in the Iraqi desert,5 the
world powers must face this issue. Whether the Iraqis were restrained
4. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-24 (1990).
5. It must be noted that some observers doubted the Iraqis' threats to use chemical
weapons in battle, stating:
[Vol. 15:521
Poison Gas Proliferation
by fear of retaliation or simply frustrated by bad weather, the threat
of chemical attack played a significant role in the allied action to liber-
ate Kuwait just as it significantly affected the lives of the citizens of
Tel Aviv. As United States Senator Claiborne Pell said in the closing
hours of the war, "We should not, however, rely on good fortune to
protect us. ''6
I. FOUR CRITICAL SOURCES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
Third world countries' production of chemical weapons depends
on a four stage economic structure. The mainstay of this structure is
the user, a customer willing to breach a long global tradition against
the use of chemicals. That customer must also possess sufficient cash
to garner any technical assistance and supplies more advanced nations
may have for the purpose. Given an enthusiastic and well-endowed
user, the "invisible hand" of unregulated economics is certain to pro-
vide suppliers. Even under close regulation, the greater the demand,
the more likely a supplier will risk circumventing regulation. By de-
pending on a specialized class of brokers in the world arms market to
bring sources to the user, the chemical industry has circumvented the
barriers of anti-proliferation regulations.
A. Users of Chemical Weapons: Libya Stands In for Iraq
Photographs suggested it, and later evidence confirmed it.7 Bod-
It is hard to see what advantage Hussein could gain from chemical weapons.
With the exception of mustard, his chemical agents would quickly dissipate -
largely by evaporation - in the desert heat. Chemical weapons work best against
unprepared ground troops. But the United States has taken extensive measures to
counter the Iraqi threat. In the event the Iraqis launch a chemical attack against
U.S. troops, our forces would simply don their chemical protective gear, pull back to
safe ground, and wait for U.S. planes and missiles to pulverize Iraq. The chemical
weapons could perhaps strike more effectively against airfields and aircraft used by
the United States, contaminating them to put them out of service.
I.. [Chemical weapons] are difficult to employ effectively on the battlefield be-
cause of their double-edge nature - they would deny areas as much to Iraq as to the
United States. Most certainly they would dramatically escalate the conflict. While
Saddam Hussein may be mad, he is not crazy, and certainly understands these
consequences.
Neil C. Livingstone & Joseph D. Douglass, Iraq Won't Try Now to Use Its Poison Gas, NEWS-
DAY, Aug. 21, 1990, at 57.
6. 137 CONG. REC. S1890 (1991).
7. For a discussion of this evidence, see Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weap-
ons: Assessing Challenges and Responses: Hearings of the Senate Comm. on Government Af-
fairs, and its Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 42-45, 204 (1989)
[hereinafter Governmental Affairs Hearings] (testimony of Drs. Robert Mullen Cook-Deegan
1993]
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ies of men, women, and children scattered about the landscape con-
vinced United Nations investigators in March 1988, that the Iraqi
military had used poison gas in Kurdistan.8 The devastating potential
of chemical weapons horrified the world during World War I, and
propelled nations to ban their use in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 9
Iraq signed that agreement in 1931. The 1988 death toll in Halabja,
calculated to be between 350010 and 5500,11 prompted the sixth com-
plaint in eight years to the United Nations about Iraqi use of poison
and Matthew S. Meselson, respectively). Professor A. Heyndricks, Chief of the Department of
Toxicology in the State University of Ghent, Belgium, and Project Director of the United
Nations International Development Organization, identified through toxicological tests of the
Kurdish victims that three agents had been used against them: mustard gas, an organic
phosphate nerve gas, and cyanide derivations. Id. at 47 (testimony of Dr. Deborah Lief-
Dienstag).
8. Isabel O'Keeffe, Flanders Fields Revisited, NEW STATESMAN & Soc., reprinted in
WORLD PRESS REV., Mar. 1989, at 12.
9. The text of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poi-
sonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T.
571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, provides as follows:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analo-
gous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion
of the civilized world, and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the ma-
jority of Powers of the World are Parties, and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of International
Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations,
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties
prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the
use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between them-
selves according to the terms of this declaration.
The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede
to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the
French Republic, and by the latter to all signatory and acceding Powers, and will
take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic.
The ratification of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the Government of the
French Republic, which will at once notify the deposit of such ratification to each of
the signatory and acceding Powers.
The instruments of ratification and accession to the present Protocol will remain
deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic.
The present Protocol will come into force for each signatory Power as from the date
of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as
regards other powers which have already deposited their ratification.
In Witness Whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.
Done at Geneva in a single copy, this seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Nine
Hundred and Twenty-five.
The Protocol entered into force on February 8, 1928. The United States Senate advised ratifi-
cation on December 16, 1974, and the President did so on January 22, 1975, almost fifty years
after the Protocol's creation. See Governmental Affairs Hearings, supra note 7, at 234.
10. Id. at 48-55.
11. The Iranian estimate was higher. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 12.
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gas. 12 Though more than 200 wars had been fought since the signing
of the Geneva Protocol, only five violations of its tenets previously
had been confirmed.13 Clearly, the Iraqis possessed a chemical arse-
nal of some sophistication, 14 and they intended to use it.1'
The world opinion turned a disinterested ear to reports of chemi-
cal weapons use during the eight year Iran-Iraq war which began in
1980.16 Likewise, reports that Libya used chemical agents in its war
with Chad stimulated little interest. During the period prior to the
United Nations' Kurdistan investigation, the spotlight of controversy
turned on the Soviet Union concerning possible violations of the Ge-
neva Protocol of 1925. The United States insisted that evidence sup-
ported the allegation that the Soviet Union was using "yellow rain"
biological agents against the Hmong tribes in Southeast Asia. 17
United States experts argued over whether microtoxins or bee feces
were the source of the phenomenon, and whether the Soviet's appar-
ent superiority in both biological and chemical warfare agents justified
renewal of the United States development program.18 Meanwhile, lit-
tle attention was paid to the activities of the two Arab nations.
Ironically, the Libyans1 9 would take the brunt of world oppro-
12. The United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute concluded the gas
which killed civilians at Halabja was a "blood agent" that the Institute has reason to believe
was employed by Iran, not Iraq. I I CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1991, at
5.
13. Id.
14. For example, in 1967:
Saddam Hussein toured U.S. chemical weapons facilities with a dozen young Iraqi
officers. At Edgewood Arsenal and Aberdeen Proving Grounds . . . they were
briefed on the design of chemical weapons. They visited the Army chemical school
at Ft. McClellan in Alabama and ended their trip at Dugway, Utah, where they
watched the firing of live nerve agent artillery shells .... He had previously visited
the massive Soviet Shikhany chemical warfare facility.
Livingstone & Douglass, supra note 5, at 57.
15. See generally Nina Bernstein, The War in the Gulf Training Ground for Terror. Now
Closed, Stasi Camp Another Link in German-Iraqi Connection, NEWSDAY, Feb. 11, 1991, at 4.
East Germany trained Iraqi terrorists in the use of nerve gas at a training center near Massow,
south of Berlin. According to former East German General Karl-Heinz Nagler, who com-
manded the project from 1975 to 1986, the East German army simultaneously set up a "defen-
sive" chemical weapons training installation near Baghdad. "The Iraqi soldiers should not be
underestimated . . . . They're trained, they're armed, they understand these weapons, and
they're ready to use them." Id.
16. Thomas Whiteside, Annals of the Cold War: The Yellow-Rain Complex-i, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 11, 1991, at 38.
17. Id. at 50.
18. The program was curtailed in 1971. Livingstone & Douglass, supra note 5, at 58.
19. The Executive Director of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee told the
United States Senate:
1993]
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brium once the industrial nations realized that a significant military
power had dishonored the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Weak attempts
to curb the export of raw materials to Iraq represented the extent of
world disapproval for the deaths of Kurdish civilians. Such flimsy
attempts to sanction Iraq were drowned in angry rhetoric prefacing
the Paris Conference on Chemical and Biological Weapons ("Paris
Conference"). 20
Instead, irate accusations were directed at Libya, which was
building what the United States claimed to be a sophisticated indus-
trial complex at Rabta to produce large quantities of mustard gas.2'
Throughout the Paris Conference, and in the months following, the
Bush Administration kept the spotlight of world opinion glued to the
plant located forty miles outside Tripoli. During that time, President
Bush insisted that the nations of the world cut off supplies of the raw
materials necessary to produce mustard gas and the more deadly
nerve gases.
B. Technology Suppliers: Imhausen-Chemie Takes the Rap
By eavesdropping on a frantic series of telephone calls from the
Libyans seeking West Germany's advice on how to handle an acci-
dental spill, the United States Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
confirmed its suspicions that a West German company, Imhausen-
Chemie of Lahr, provided significant technological assistance to the
Libyan construction project in Rabta. The sequence of events linking
Imhausen-Chemie to the Rabta facility would emerge in an unprece-
dented report to the West German Parliament, supported by specially
declassified documents. 22 By the time the report was released, how-
ever, the press had unearthed most of the details. Although the two
versions did not contradict each other, discrepancies regarding timing
Iraq, for example, is thought to be operating five chemical complexes that are capable
of producing 50 tons of Tabun and Sarin nerve gas and 720 tons of mustard gas per
year, while Libya is putting the finishing touches on a chemical weapons facility that
will be capable of producing five tons of mustard gas daily.
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat: The Urgent Need for Remedies: Hearings of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 10 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1989) (statement of Thomas S.
Dine) [hereinafter Foreign Relations Hearings].
20. This conference was called at the request of the Bush Administration in January
1989. See Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 47.
21. See The True German Export Control Policy: Profiteering at the Expense of Western
Security?, CENTER FOR SECURITY POL'Y PUB. 90-P85 (Sept. 1990) (press release).
22. See generally Report Submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many to the German Bundestag on February 15, 1989: Hearings of the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 46-108 (1989) [hereinafter Report to the Bundestag].
526 [Vol. 15:521
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and motive left most analysts perplexed by the revelations. 23 Specifi-
cally, they questioned why the West German government did nothing
once learning of Imhausen-Chemie's illegal activities in 1985. Fur-
thermore, they wondered why the West German government sud-
denly prosecuted the miscreant in 1988, while completely revamping
the West German export law with a legislative enthusiasm that its
primary critic, the United States, has so far been unable to muster.
1. Logistics of Chemical Weapons Technology Transfer
Even without the political puzzler of the West German gov-
ernment's sudden change of policy, the Imhausen-Chemie affair
resembles a cold war spy novel. Dr. Jurgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen,
the company's president, 24 insisted that:
The company had absolutely nothing to do with the allegations
.... We don't even have the know-how in this area. We have no
employees there [Rabta] .... Libyans don't have money to pay for
things like that. We totally deny any involvement in this.
The Libyans are much too stupid to run a plant like this. All
the Arabs are lazy and they call in foreign slaves to do the work. 25
Imhausen-Chemie clearly possessed the know-how. In 1985, the
company entered a dispute with the West German chemical regula-
tory agency about the production of pinacolyl alcohol, a chemical re-
quired for making the deadly nerve gas, Soman.26 The report to the
Bundestag revealed that the West German Federal Intelligence Ser-
vice ("BND") had information as early as April 1980, that West Ger-
man firms were helping Libya develop a suspicious chemical plant.27
Imhausen-Chemie was identified by name in West German intelli-
gence reports in July 1985.28 Prior to that identification, West Ger-
23. See Rabtagate: The Inside Story of German Collusion in the Libyan Chemical War-
fare Program, CENTER FOR SECURITY POL'Y PUB., No. 90-P85 (Sept. 1990) (press release)
[hereinafter Rabtagate].
24. Dr. Hippenstiel was convicted of illegally exporting chemical weapons and jailed for
five years in July 1990. Debbie Jackson, Chemical Weapons: Germans Come Under Fire,
CHEMICAL WK., Sept. 12, 1990, at 16.
25. See Michael Ledeen, The Curious Case of Chemical Warfare, 88 COMMENTARY 37,
38 (1989).
26. The New Merchants of Death, DER SPIEGEL, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., Mar.
1989, at 13.
27. Report to the Bundestag, supra note 22, at 52.
28. Id. at 54. Even more surprising, the Federal Office of Economics and the Federal
Ministry of Economics had conducted an investigation of Imhausen-Chemie which concluded
in July, 1985. The investigation was initiated because the company had never applied for any
export licenses, even for shipments to its subsidiary in Hong Kong. Id.
19931
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man intelligence had developed a comprehensive profile of the Rabta
facility's activities, confirming mustard gas as its product.29 Im-
hausen-Chemie avoided direct involvement by setting up a dummy
company in Hong Kong, called Pen-Tsao-Materia-Medica-Center
Limited ("Pen-Tsao"). 30 Though Dr. Hippenstiel organized Pen-
Tsao and a collection of other companies in Hong Kong, he trans-
ferred control to B&M Secretaries, under the direction of Daniel P. S.
Cheng, director of a jewelry and cotton cloth exporting company, Dee
Trading. Dee Trading held twenty-three percent of the stock of Im-
hausen-Chemie, a multimillion dollar corporation.3'
Pen-Tsao ordered chemicals and parts for a project called
"Pharma 150" from Imhausen-Chemie, shipping them through Ant-
werp, Belgium. 32 In route to Hong Kong, the documents for the ship-
ments were changed, as was their destination. 33 Shipments "from
Hong Kong went through Singapore to a fake end-user destination
and then [were] diverted to Libya. ' ' 34 Even more embarrassing to the
West German government was the fact that the diverted shipments
also contained goods originally ordered from a subsidiary of the state-
owned Salzgitter industrial group.35
Imhausen-Chemie employees at the Rabta production center
were contracted out to the Pharma 150 project. 36 The facility had
doors suitable for aircraft, steel floors more than three quarters of an
inch thick, glass-lined equipment piping, video surveillance, radar,
and anti-aircraft missile emplacements. Libyan leader Muammar
Qaddafi insisted that the Rabta plant was intended to manufacture
pharmaceuticals, 37 even after a mysterious fire supposedly destroyed
29. Id. at 53.
30. John Templeman et al., How Qadaffi Built His Deadly Chemical Plant, Bus. WK.,
Jan. 23, 1989, at 50. For a detailed summary of worldwide press coverage about Rabta, see
GORDON M. BURCK & CHARLES C. FLOWERREE, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON CHEMI-
CAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 277-98 (1991).
31. Templeman et al., supra note 30, at 51.
32. Interpol reported to the German Federal Criminal Police on January 18, 1989, that
Gedopt of Antwerp, a Belgian haulage contractor, was suspected of falsifying shipping docu-
ments regarding chemical supplies. Report to the Bundestag, supra note 22, at 80.
33. The New Merchants of Death, supra note 26, at 14.
34. Templeman et al., supra note 30, at 51.
35. That German Innocence, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 1989, at 45 [hereinafter That
German Innocence]. See also Report to the Bundestag, supra note 22, at 106.
36. See Report to the Bundestag, supra note 22, at 106.
37. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Intelligence Aides Say Libya is Again Making Chemical
Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1990, at A4.
[Vol. 15:521
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the plant.38 As records eventually showed (despite Dr. Hippenstiel's
efforts to conceal them in a Zurich subsidiary), Imhausen-Chemie
provided everything from computer software to liquid processing and
testing equipment3 9 for the Pharma 150 operation. 40 Israeli intelli-
gence estimated that the Rabta facility could produce forty-two tons
of mustard gas and Sarin per day.41 A second plant, Pharma 200, was
in the development stages even as Dr. Hippenstie 42 faced a five-year
jail term, having finally confessed to his involvement with the Rabta
facility with June 1990.43
Imhausen-Chemie did not work alone at Rabta. Siemens, a ma-
jor German chemical manufacturer, was also implicated when jour-
nalists, on a tour organized by the Libyan government to counter
United States accusations about Imhausen-Chemie's output, photo-
graphed crates bearing Siemens' logo."4 In addition, "Hanover based
Preussag... [was] suspected by the United States of providing key
equipment to Qadaffi. ' '45 Preussag insisted it was supplying, with
West German government approval, a water purification plant three
miles away from the Rabta site. Moreover, the company asserted that
a Japanese firm, Japan Steel Works Ltd., built a supporting facility for
the Rabta complex, claiming they were providing lathes and air guns
for an equipment factory to support a desalinization plant.46
Rabta was not the only West German foray into Middle East
chemical weapons plant construction. Karl Kolb & Co., through its
38. On March 14, 1990, the Libyans reported a serious fire at the Rabta facility involving
loss of life and significant destruction. The Libyans blamed Bonn, Tel Aviv, and Washington,
in succession. By June, however, United States intelligence sources were convinced that the
fire was a hoax, and that hundreds of tires were probably set ablaze so that satellite reconnais-
sance would register the event. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Says Evidence Points to Hoax in Fire
at Libyan Chemical Plant, N.Y. TIMEs, June 19, 1990, at A8.
39. Templeman et al., supra note 30, at 50.
40. Ledeen, supra note 25, at 38.
41. Templeman et al., supra note 30, at 51.
42. Dr. Hippenstiel testified that he avoided taxes of about $9.5 million on the profits
from the $136 million project at Rabta. W. German Admits Helping Libya Build Chemical
Plant, Cm. TRIB., June 14, 1990, at 21.
43. 'Fool Me Twice?' Imhausen Believed Building Second Poison Gas Factory in Libya,
Center for Security Pol'y, Pub. 90-P 80, (Aug. 1990) (press release). An unclassified cable
from the United States Consul in Stuttgart suggests that Imhausen-Chemie continued activities
to build a second plant in the Sebha Oasis south of Tripoli eight weeks after Dr. Hippenstiel
was sentenced to five years in prison. Further, the cable intimated that Imhausen-Chemie had
defrauded the West German government in order to underwrite the Pharma 200 project. Id.
44. Ledeen, supra note 25, at 38.
45. Templeman et al., supra note 30, at 50.
46. Id. at 51.
530 Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 15:521
subsidiary, Pilot Plant, together with Water Engineering Trading of
Hamburg, reportedly delivered a "turnkey" chemical weapons plant
to the Iraqis at Samarra.4 7 The West German press also implicated
Foxboro Deutschland, a subsidiary of Foxboro Company of Foxboro,
Massachusetts, as a participant in the Samarra plant.48 These compa-
nies were following the lead of Swiss based Kregs A.G., which pro-
vided technology to construct a plant to manufacture phosphorous
trichloride, an essential ingredient for nerve gas, at Abu Zaabal,
Egypt after 1985. Operating under the lenient eye of the Swiss gov-
ernment, Kregs also obtained permission to help Iran produce phos-
phorous pentasulfide, another nerve gas ingredient.49
2. Logistics of Moving the West German Government into Action
For eight years, the West German government collected infor-
mation about the Rabta facility's development and about the West
German firm's involvement in the project. Even the most casual
reader of the chronology of intelligence reports outlined in the Febru-
ary 1990 Report to the Bundestag may question West Germany's con-
tention that appropriate agencies did not know of the West German
firm's involvement. 50 The West German government insisted that it
lacked probable cause until the summer of 1988, and that the series of
intelligence reports dating back to 1980 concerning the Rabta facility
contained nothing more concrete than "varied trends" and "ru-
mors."5 1 Defending the timeliness of the investigation of Imhausen-
47. Jackson, supra note 24, at 16. The plant was dedicated to producing two nerve gases.
The Samarra complex was destroyed "in the early stages of the multinational offensive against
Iraq." John Eisenhammer, Crisis in the Gulf. The Merchants of Death 'Will Be Brought to
Book,' THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 31, 1991, at 6.
48. Jackson, supra note 24, at 16.
49. Michael R. Gordon & Stephen Engelberg, Egypt Accused of Big Advance on Poison
Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1989, at Al.
50. Note the following statement of May 1988:
The BND reports that it is highly likely that a plant for the manufacture of nerve gas
is being or has been built in connection with an almost completed industrial plant
near Rabta. Companies from the Federal Republic have not so far made an appear-
ance in the business, it is said.
Report to the Bundestag, supra note 22, at 59.
Compare the following, made in February 1988: "The supply of equipment has mainly been
organized via Switzerland, with German intermediaries and German companies being thought
to be involved. Passed on to the BND." Id. at 58-59.
51. Policy Statement of Dr. Wolfgang Schauble: Hearings of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 110, 111 (1989) [hereinafter Schauble Statement]. Dr. Schau-
ble was Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Chief of the Federal Chancellery. His state-
ment was made to the Bundestag on February 17, 1989.
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Chemie, Dr. Wolfgang Schauble told the Bundestag:
Although Imhausen possessed the expertise to supply all kinds of
chemical plants, including ones needed for the manufacture of war-
fare agents, there were no signs whatsoever of Imhausen being in-
volved in such a project . . . In May of 1988 the Federal
Government received from the United States thefirst indication of
participation by Imhausen in the construction of a chemical weap-
ons plant in Libya.52
In November 1988, impatient United States authorities reported
the allegations against Imhausen-Chemie to the highest levels of the
West German government. Dr. Schauble reported "[O]n 15 Novem-
ber, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher received during
their talk with Secretary of State Shultz in Washington information
from CIA Director Webster on the participation by German compa-
nies, including Imhausen and IBI. ' '5 3
Six weeks later, the United States press took over the campaign
to move the West German government into action. New York Times
columnists Stephen Engleberg and Michael Gordon broke the de-
tailed story on January 1, 1989. William Safire, a prominent journal-
ist, sounded the rallying cry in a New York Times editorial the
following day, calling the Rabta facility "Auschwitz-in-the-sand. '54
"The moral reaction from West Germans with consciences, including
journalists, is to demand the whole truth quickly. Who broke the
laws and what government officials turned a blind eye? Why did
Bonn's higher-ups procrastinate for six months?" 55
The Bonn government suggested not only that it had been caught
in the crossfire of former United States President Ronald Reagan's
personal vendetta against Libyan leader Qaddafi, but also that the
United States was deliberately trying to embarrass Foreign Minister
Hans Dietrich Genscher because of his stand favoring a global ban on
chemical weapons.5 6 The West German press wasted no time taking
up Safire's challenge. In the days preceding the Paris Conference,
journalists not only revealed the details of Imhausen-Chemie's partici-
pation in the Rabta project, but also that of other West German com-
52. Id. at 111-12 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 113. IBI was a firm managed by Dr. Ihsan Barbouti, who served as a middle-
man for the construction of the Rabta plant. See Jesse Birnbaum, Chemical Weapons: The
Mysterious "Doctor B., " TIME, Feb. 27, 1989, at 40.
54. William Safire, The German Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1990, at 23.
55. Id.
56. That German Innocence, supra note 35, at 45.
1993]
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panies and their brokers. The West German Parliament ordered a full
report to be delivered in February 1989. This began an energetic ef-
fort to enact laws strong enough to prevent the export of chemical
warfare technology, and laws extensive enough to allow West German
authorities to police exports effectively.57
Whether the West German government was protecting sensitive
intelligence sources, 58 acting under due process constraints, 59 running
interference for West German corporations, 6° or simply dragging its
feet, only an extraordinary and concerted outpouring of disapproval
spurred the West German government to action. To those who be-
lieve the only hope of curbing chemical weapon proliferation was to
cut off the source of the technology, the Imhausen-Chemie episode
was daunting. West German enterprises dominated the list of foreign
companies aiding the transfer of chemical weapons technology, 61 fol-
lowed by Italy62 and Japan.63 In response, the United States Congress
attempted to regulate the activities of countries involved with the
Third World chemical weapons technology market.64 Since Congress
57. See also Report to the Bundestag, supra note 22, at 88-104 (describing the legislative
and executive changes proposed by the Bonn government to remedy the situation).
58. Report to the Bundestag, supra note 22, at 51.
59. Schauble Statement, supra note 51, at 112.
60. See Rabtagate, supra note 23, at 5.
61. In 1990, United States officials complained that West Germany waited until the
United States prodded them before they would investigate West German companies suspected
of shipping restricted exports to Iraq, with few convictions resulting. For example, the United
States learned that H&H Metalform, Ltd. of Drensteinfurt was sending machinery to build
high-speed centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium. West German officials investigated but
decided that H&H had broken no laws because the specific type of machinery was not on the
export license list. Observers suggest that West Germany "may feel pressure to increase lucra-
tive exports to the Middle East to pay the enormous costs of reunification." Louise Lief &
Michael Wise, Inside Bonn's Middle East Arms Bazaar, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RPT., May 28,
1990, at 41.
62. An Italian company, Technipetrole, was involved in nerve gas plant construction.
See 136 CONG. REC. S17,179 (1990).
63. See David Sanger, Toshiba Supplied Libyan Factory, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1989, at
A11. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries allegedly sent 50 Japanese technicians and engineers to the
Rabta facility to install metal-machining equipment for making bomb canisters. The World,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1989, at A2.
64. The positive effect on West German policy continued when the West German govern-
ment vowed to prosecute West German firms providing technology to Iraq. Eighteen West
German firms are suspected and five are under investigation, including Karl Kolb, which has
been under investigation since 1987 without judgment. Unified Germany now must contend
with East German firms that provide help. Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm was involved in the
Condor missile project which provided Iraq, Egypt, Argentina, and Romania with technology
to develop a 600-mile range missile. Such a missile is necessary to deliver a tactical chemical
pay-load. Technicians of the giant Messerschmitt formed a Swiss-based company, Consen, to
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wanted more "teeth" in the United States legislation than the Bush
Administration was prepared to accept, this attempt was quickly
frustrated. 65
C. Stones and Glass Houses: United States Suppliers
As Paul Freedenberg, then United States Under-Secretary of
Commerce for Export Administration, said "I live in fear of the day
when the German Ambassador may come in here and say that Bonn
has found an American company selling chemical weapons materials
to the Middle East."' 66 One incident brought this prospect uncom-
fortably near.67
Called a precursor chemical, 68 thiodiglycol is one of the critical
continue the Condor work after 1985. Yet another West German company, Gildermeister
Projecta, was involved in the development of a military research center to produce missiles and
aircraft in the Middle East. Lutz Stavenhagan, coordinator of Germany's intelligence services,
promised, "Justice will be seen to be done." Eisenhammer, supra note 47, at 6.
65. Meanwhile, West German firms under fire for providing technology to Iraq have
complained of a double standard. Edzard Reuter, head of Daimler-Benz, stated that it was
politically acceptable to help Iraq in the "first Gulf war" with Iran. "Nowhere in Germany is
there an economic term about which there is so much hypocrisy, cowardice and opportunism
as arms exports," Reuter said. Ian Murray, New Bonn Curbs on 'Exporters of Death,' THE
TIMES (London), Jan. 29, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TTIMES File.
66. Michael Gordon, Poison Gas Fears Lead US. to Plan New Export Curbs, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1989, at 1.
67. See Brian Duffy et al., From Baltimore to Baghdad, U.S. NEws & WORLD RPT., June
4, 1990, at 51.
68. In November, 1989, the United States Commerce Department made effective the offi-
cial list of precursor chemicals. It also prohibited destinations in accordance with agreements
of the Paris Conference. Export licenses would be required for all shipments of the following
chemicals:
Phosphorus trichloride
Trimethyl phosphite
Thionyl chloride
Excluded from this requirement were shipments going to NATO countries, New Zealand,
Australia, Ireland, Japan, or Switzerland. Shipments of the following were banned to Libya,
Iran, Iraq, and Syria:
Potassium hydrogen fluoride
Ammonium hydrogen fluoride
Sodium fluoride
Sodium bifluoride
Phosphorus pentasulfide
Sodium cyanide
Triethanolamine
Disopropylamine
N,N-diethylethanolamine
Sodium sulfide
Ellen Goldbaum, More Curbs on Weapons Precursors, CHEMICAL WK., Oct. 18, 1989, at 22.
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ingredients for producing mustard gas.69 One ton of thiodiglycol
yields one ton of mustard gas.70 Alcolac International,7t a chemical
firm based in Baltimore, Maryland, sold small quantities of thiodig-
lycol for use in making ballpoint pens. 72 In 1987 and 1988, however,
Alcolac provided hundreds of tons of thiodiglycol 73 to Nick Defino.
Defino's partner in a New York sheetmetal export business, Harold
Greenberg, asked Defino to locate and order thiodiglycol. Greenberg
was providing the service to Charles Tanaka, an export agent in Ja-
pan. Tanaka had been approached by Frans Van Anraat, "a mysteri-
ous European businessman who ran a Singapore company that
bought and sold chemicals. '7 4 Alcolac export manager, Leslie
Hinkleman, helped Defino and Greenberg falsify the shipping
documents.75
Doubting that the chemical was destined to be a "textile addi-
tive" for a fabric manufacturer in Singapore, an alert accountant in
Alcolac's main office noticed the sudden increase in thiodiglycol ship-
ments.76 Alcolac officials stopped shipments intended for Iraq, but
indirectly allowed other shipments to Iran because they were labelled
for shipment to Singapore, a legally permissible destination. 77 Realiz-
69. Mixing thiodiglycol with hydrochloric acid produces mustard gas. In 1983, Phillips
Petroleum Company of Oklahoma shipped five hundred tons of thiodiglycol "through a Dutch
firm, KBS Holland BV, to a 'pesticide' plant in the Iraqi town of Samarra. Only after a second
order was delivered in 1984 did Phillips begin to have doubts." Elie Marcuse, An Equality of
Terror, L'ExPRESS, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., Mar. 1989, at 18.
70. Michael Gordon, US. Companies Tied to Chemical Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1989,
at A3.
71. At the time of the thiodiglycol incident, Alcolac was a subsidiary of the British hold-
ing company, RTZ. Nerve Gas Precursor Controversy, CHEMICAL WK., Feb. 8, 1989, at 5.
72. A dual use chemical is regulated through the United States Commerce Department,
while a finished product like mustard gas would be considered a munition and regulated by the
United States Defense Department.
73. Customs agents stopped one shipment of 120 tons bound for Iran. Nevertheless, a
shipment of 520 tons slipped through to Iraq. Duffy et al., supra note 67, at 51.
74. Id.
75. Moreover, it was revealed that the "U.S. Customs Service arrested an American and
a Dutch citizen, both unnamed, on charges of illegally re-exporting thiodiglycol - manufac-
tured in Baltimore - from Antwerp, Belgium to Jordan .... Jordan is a common tranship-
ment point for shipments to Iraq." Nerve Gas Precursor Controversy, CHEMICAL WK., Feb. 8,
1989, at 5. Nu Kraft Mercantile Corporation of New York, an affiliate of United Steel and
Strip Corp., ordered more than 500 tons of thiodiglycol. The shipments were sent to Antwerp,
Belgium, and Rotterdam, the Netherlands for ultimate customers in Western Europe, but at
least three shipments actually went to Jordan. Gordon, supra note 70, at A3.
76. See Thom Shanker, West Underwrites Third World's Chemical Arms, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 3, 1989, at Al.
77. Id. Three shipments of thiodiglycol went to a West German company, Chemco
G.m.b.H., and were apparently re-exported to Iran. Gordon, supra note 70, at A3.
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ing these diversions, United States Customs officials filled the last
shipment with water instead of thiodiglycol. The drums were placed
on a barge in Baltimore, Maryland, headed for Norfolk, Virginia.
From there, the shipment was tracked by satellite as it traveled by
freighters to Nova Scotia, Singapore, and Pakistan. The drums sat on
a Karachi dock for a time before being loaded for their final destina-
tion, a chemical weapons plant in Iran.78
Defino, Greenberg, and Hinkleman pleaded guilty and cooper-
ated with federal authorities by luring Tanaka to the United States on
a ruse to sell fingerprint technology to United States police.79 Tanaka
also pleaded guilty. Frans Van Anraat was arrested by Italian author-
ities.8o Alcolac pleaded guilty to knowingly violating export laws8
and faced a fine of $1 million.8 2 Not long afterward the French mul-
tinational Rhone-Poulenc acquired the company.8 3
Rhone-Poulenc also acquired portions of Stauffer Chemicals, an-
other United States chemical company with a history of Middle East
involvement.84 In 1985, Stauffer provided the Swiss firm, Kregs A.G.,
with a design for a chemical plant identical to its own in Penn-
sylvania. The proposed plant would produce phosphorous trichlo-
ride, a precursor chemical for Sain. The chemical was intended for
El Nasr Pharmaceutical Company of Egypt. When Kregs began de-
velopment of a second plant, Swiss authorities counseled Kregs to
break off talks, and the United States State Department voiced con-
78. Shanker, supra note 76, at Al.
79. Id.
80. Van Anraat is a Dutch citizen affiliated with Companies, Inc., a Swiss firm. He lived
in Italy. Gordon, supra note 70, at A3.
81. Id.
82. Jack Rubin, a vice president for Alcolac, said the company had cancelled all of its
overseas sales of thiodiglycol. "Anyone can trick a legitimate firm and divert these chemicals
from their allowed commercial use to chemical weapons. It is like terrorism. It is nigh-on
impossible to prevent." Shanker, supra note 76, at 1 (quoting Jack Rubin); Tom Shandler,
West Underwrites Third World's Chemical Arms, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1989, at 1.
83. Strategic Developments-I 989-1990, CHEMICAL WK., Jan. 30, 1991, at 39.
84. Id. Iraq's first chemical weapons plant was built with United States help in 1978-79.
Pfaudler Corporation of Rochester, New York, provided the plans. "Pfaulder [sic] labelled its
drawings 'flow charts for a pesticide plant,' but even a novice would have recognized that at
least two of the chemicals it was supposed to produce, Amaton [sic] and Paratheon [sic], could
be used to make nerve gas." Crisis in the Gulf Terror Arsenal the West Ignored, THE IN-
DEPENDENT, Sept. 12, 1990, at 9. Though United States Customs refused to grant a license for
the requisite machinery from Pfaudler, the plans were delivered, and using parts purchased
from various sources in Europe, the Iraqis jury-rigged a chemical weapons plant at a cost of
$60,000,000. Id. See also BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 30, at 65 (providing a detailed
analysis of substantial public information about chemical weapons).
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cern to the Egyptian ambassador.8 5
Even with aggressive criminal investigations by the United States
Customs Service, officials say the odds of uncovering such conspira-
cies are low. 8 6 Alert informants play a key role. For example, in
United States v. Reed,8 7 suspicions were raised when Iranians tried to
order chemical warfare protective suits, in violation of export licens-
ing requirements for items on the United States Munitions List.88
Notably, the purchaser required "that the suits not be made by per-
sons of the Jewish faith."8 9 In other cases, purchasers customs offi-
cials noticed that the requested air freight shipments costing five times
as much as sea transport. 90
Moreover, investigations are thwarted by the fluidity in the pro-
scribed list, the confusion over which destinations are illegal, 91 and
85. Michael R. Gordon & Stephen Engelberg, Poison Gas Fears Lead US. to Plan New
Export Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1989, at Al. Another source of proliferation is govern-
ment-to-government assistance. The Australia Group, composed of 22 free world nations,
aims to control proliferation. However, its task is difficult as many nations are willing to
provide technology and precursors for a price.
India presents a case in point. After Transpek Private Ltd., a state-owned trading agency,
shipped 60 tons of thionyl chloride to Iran, a precursor for mustard gas, the United States
pressured India to cancel the second order of 257 tons. Transpek dramatically increased its
output of thionyl chloride from 150 tons in 1979 to 2203 tons in 1987. A West German
company, Rheineisen, placed the order with Shatef Trading in Dubai. Shatef Trading, in turn,
placed the order with Transpek Private. The cargo was loaded and ready to sail on June 30,
1989. United States Secretary of State James Baker raised the issue with West German For-
eign Minister Genscher on June 21, 1989, and provided details in a June 24, 1989 letter. West
German authorities promptly raided Rheineisen. On the basis of evidence found, the West
Germans appealed successfully to the United Arab Emirates to block the shipment. Character-
izing export restrictions on dual-use chemicals as "colonialism," Indian officials publicly re-
sisted pressure to conform to the goals of the Australia Group. See Stephen Engelberg &
Michael R. Gordon, India Seen As Key On ChemicalArms, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1989, at Al.
Likewise, China briefly entered the precursor market, but when the Bush Administration
protested China halted all shipments. Bill Gertz, Chinese Move Seen as Aiding Libya in Mak-
ing Poison Gas, WASH. TIMES, July 12, 1990, at A6. Moreover, evidence suggests that at least
one former Warsaw Pact member provided finished products, not precursors, to Libya.
"Czechoslovakia's ousted Communist Government had shipped 1,000 tons of lethal Semtex
explosives to Libya." Gary Milhollin & Jennifer Weeks, Poison Gas Laws: Still Leaking, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1990, at D19.
86. Templeman et al., supra note 30, at 51.
87. 790 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1986).
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 371, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778(b)(2), 2278(c) (1990).
89. Reed, 790 F.2d at 209.
90. See Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 209 (testimony of Dr. Will D. Car-
penter, Chairman of the Chemical Manufacturers Association Work Group on Chemical
Weapons).
91. The number of chemicals on the control list has grown rapidly over the last two
years. Ten chemicals were added in 1990, and two more in 1991. See 54 Fed. Reg. 52,017
(1990).
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the willingness of unscrupulous brokers to provide false shipping doc-
umentation. These factors allow shipments of precursor chemicals to
slip through United States customs. 92 A senior United States official
stated:
We know this is not the only case. We just don't know how many
more cases exist .... More often than not, we are outgunned and
outfinanced. We are dealing with finite resources. Unfortunately,
the bad guys are told that they will get whatever it takes to get the
job done.
93
While export controls recently have been tightened for precursor
chemicals, opportunities still remain for the enterprising conspirator.
Controls for the export of equipment, technology, or expertise for
chemical weapons related development exist under United States law,
but they are newly enacted, hotly contested, and untested. Though
West Germany, following the Imhausen-Chemie debacle, aggressively
addressed this flaw in their export laws by passing tough export legis-
lation, the United States has lagged behind. While United States law
enforcement and intelligence agencies may aggressively pursue those
United States citizens who attempt to supply weapons-grade precur-
sor chemicals, little can be done to those United States citizens who
arrange deals overseas for foreign materials for third world gas plants.
D. Chemical Weapons Brokers
Peter Walaschek, a Czechoslovakian pharmacist, was one of the
co-conspirators arrested when the United States Customs Service
92. Admiral Thomas E. Brooks, director of Naval Intelligence, told Congress that Egypt,
Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Taiwan, China, and Ethiopia should be included on the
proscribed destination list for critical precursor chemicals. Gordon & Engelberg, supra note
85, at Al.
93. Shanker, supra note 76, at 1. Some enterprising merchants attempted to sell finished
chemical agents. William Von Raab, Commissioner of the United States Customs Service,
described the following case in testimony to Congress:
On January 12, 1989, United States Customs agents arrested Juwhan Yun, President
of Komax International, Short Hills, New Jersey .... [A] [United States] citizen of
Korean descent .... Yun began to negotiate with a Customs undercover agent to
purchase and illegally export [S]arin .... Yun was [also] attempting to purchase 500
mark 94 bombs, each would have contained 108 pounds of [S]arin [which is] con-
trolled under category XIV(a) of the [United States] munitions list .... The com-
plexity and sensitivity of this investigation required the cooperation of a number of
U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies. Assistance was provided by the Depart-
ment of Defense, United States Army, Navy, the Naval Investigative Service, Her
Majesty's Customs and Excise and the Customs Service, located in London, Paris,
Seoul, Honolulu and Los Angeles.
Governmental Affairs Hearings, supra note 7, at 130.
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closed in on Alcolac International.94 Walaschek explained his system
to authorities before he forfeited his bond and fled the country.
Chemco, a subsidiary of Walaschek's German company, Colimex,
was set up expressly to take international shipments which it would
later send through to restricted Middle Eastern destinations, such as
Iran. 95  Together with Van Anraat and Tanaka, Walaschek's
transhipping companies represented one of the many brokerage sys-
tems believed to be working in Europe.
Ihsan Barbouti, a former architecture professor at Baghdad Uni-
versity and a multimillionaire with interests in Switzerland, Greece,
Thailand, and the Middle East, filled the broker's role for Libya's
Rabta chemical plant.96 While under contract with Libya, Barbouti
established Ihsan Barbouti International ("IBI"),97 a company
designed to purchase everything needed to construct the Pharma 150
project at Rabta. These purchases included Japanese desalinization
and electrical equipment, plastic molding and precision machining
plants, and a foundry procured from a Danish firm. Barbouti boasted
to a friend that one Rabta contract was worth nearly $2 billion. 98
Though German authorities raided IBI's Frankfurt office in January
1989, Barbouti remained undisturbed and journalists easily located
him in London for a candid interview the next month. 99 In spring
1990, Barbouti suddenly died in London, while federal authorities
were investigating an operation in Boca Raton, Florida, designed to
export cyanide to Iran. The plan had been masterminded by
Barbouti. 100
Monzer Al-Kassar is another of these brokers. Intelligence re-
94. Shanker, supra note 76, at 1; West Underwrites Third World's Chemical Arms, supra
note 82, at 1.
95. See Stephen Engelberg & Michael R. Gordon, Iran Stockpiles Chemical Arms With
West's Help, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 1989, at Al. Evidence suggests Chemco was working under
the supervision of an Iranian diplomat in Bonn. Gordon, supra note 70, at A3.
96. Birnbaum, supra note 53, at 40.
97. IBI's subsidiaries included "IBI Engineering in Frankfurt and several letter box com-
panies in Switzerland." Templeman et al., supra note 30, at 51. Imhausen-Chemie's off-shore
subsidiaries were located in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Id. The Swiss connection pro-
vided the route of payment. Id.
98. Id.
99. Birnbaum, supra note 53, at 40.
100. Alan Friedman et al., The Sinister Alchemy of the Iraqi "Doctor, " FIN. TIMES, July 3,
1991, at 4. The company was called Product Ingredient Technology ("PIT"). Its plant was
staffed by Spanish and Arabic-speaking workers, while the supervisors arrived in chauffeured
Jaguars with armed body guards. The plant purportedly produced a food flavoring known as
bitter almond oil. Id. The shipper alerted the CIA when the plant attempted to ship 1500
pounds of its product to Houston where it was to be loaded on a ship bound for Jordan, and
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ports consider this multimillionaire Syrian to be the most successful
private arms dealer in the world.10o "[Ulsing Syrian and Brazilian
passports ... he [has been] spotted by United States intelligence in
Budapest, Damascus and Kuwait."10 2 Al-Kassar reportedly provided
vast amounts of arms outside the government-to-government net-
work, including to terrorist groups and governments such as Iraq.
Chemical weapons represent merely one more product line which mil-
itary arms brokers offer to their customers. Past experience suggests
that this private market is "largely beyond the control of mechanisms
established by the United States and other Western countries to pre-
vent the spread of mass weapons of destruction to the Third
World."
0 3
"I'm flabbergasted at how good and quick [the Germans have]
become [at uncovering brokerage arrangements]," said a diplomat fa-
miliar with the problems of brokering and transhipping.104 Despite
stricter export laws, increases in personnel, and greater cooperation
between investigating agencies, observers admit that false declarations
of destination, coupled with a multitude of circuitous routes to the
Middle East, render uncovering the conspiracies very difficult. There-
fore, enthusiasm for a more concerted effort, perhaps through con-
trols instituted by the European Economic Community, is growing.10 5
Understanding the market forces engendering proliferation of
chemical weapons is necessary to appreciate the practical problems
governments face in attempting to curtail that proliferation. How this
economic structure operates is only half the story, however. To ap-
preciate the intensity and ingenuity with which the participants con-
tinue to advance their goals, an understanding of the product is also
essential.
II. THE DEADLY ATTRACTION OF POISON GAS
A white cloud hung in the cold Flemish mist, momentarily turn-
ing yellow-green as it began to drift. Allies and Germans alike
watched with awe as the cloud inched toward Ypres that April morn-
ultimately Iraq. This was apparently to be a trial run for a larger operation. Id. Some of
Barbouti's associates believed that he faked his death. Id.
101. James Adams, Arms and the Salesmen, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1991, at CI.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Francine S. Kiefer, Bonn To Tighten Export Controls, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 29, 1991, at 4.
105. Id.
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ing in 1915.106 Carrying chlorine released simultaneously from
thousands of pressurized cylinders, that cloud ushered in the era of
chemical warfare. Over the next three years, chemists refined the
agents, eventually replacing chlorine with Phosgene. Both sides ad-
vanced the delivery system from cylinders opened by hand to artillery
shells. The Allies introduced mustard gas on the battlefield in 1917,
thus escalating the chemical weapons race from transient inhalation
agents to persistent skin exposure agents.
A. Prologue to Paradox
Even while the civilized world forswore chemical weapons,
chemists devised even more deadly chemical compounds. The re-
quirements for a chemical weapons program, however, remain funda-
mentally unchanged today since World War I. Whether the chemical
agent is temporarily debilitating or instantaneously lethal, a chemical
weapon still requires favorable weather and terrain, a reliable delivery
system, and an unprepared target for maximum effectiveness.
"Chemical ... agents are simultaneously the most sinister yet
beckoning agents of human destruction."1o7 Often called the "poor
man's atom bomb," chemical agents weigh heavily in the balance of
power, providing the possessor government clout with its neighbors.
In the Middle East, where only Israel possesses nuclear capability,
chemical weapons hold special attraction as potential equalizers.
Among nations that believe themselves ignored by the superpowers, a
large chemical arsenal becomes a show of strength, as much for do-
mestic ego inflation as for international status.
1. European Disillusion
Chemical warfare did not shock western European nations so
much as it exasperated them and prompted the signing of the Geneva
Protocol of 1925.108 The gas program of World War I was largely a
military failure. 109
Poison gas's greatest value remains a psychological one. Ironi-
cally, the psychological advantage of poison gas also constitutes its
inherent flaw. Historically, the same morale crisis created by the use
106. See L. F. HABER, THE POISONOUS CLOUD 34 (1986).
107. JOSEPH D. DOUGLASS, JR. & NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE 1
(1987).
108. For the text of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, see supra note 9.
109. HABER, supra note 106, at 34.
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of poison gas precipitated the quick response to develop defenses.110
Each newly developed defense engendered the need for more novel
chemical agents. This reciprocating escalation of agent and defense
eventually resulted in a stalemate. Even though gas was inexpensive
and easy to use in battle, it was a resounding tactical letdown, a nov-
elty tried by World War I commanders and rejected. The escalation
of chemical agents and defensive measures "was outside the regular
officer's frame of reference.""'I  A sound set of gas related war tactics
never developed during World War 1112 because "the trouble was,
generally speaking, chemists and soldiers did not get [along]. ' ' 1 3
Nevertheless, poison gas captured many imaginations and took on a
life in myth that it never possessed on the battlefield.
2. Multiple Regression Equation as Metaphor
Factoring each variable into the equation of chemical warfare re-
quires that each be assigned a weight predicated on the interaction of
that variable with all the others. Two answers emerge from this
"multiple regression" analysis. First, the equation yields an estimate
of the probability of chemical weapons use. A realistic assessment of
this probability suggests the level of urgency with which nations
should prosecute programs to curb proliferation. Second, the equa-
tion reveals whether any variable or combination of variables will
show up as a significant determinant of that probability. Isolating the
significant determinants allows efforts for curbing proliferation to
pinpoint prophylaxis for greatest efficacy.
B. Variables: Agents, Properties, and Effects
Except for the addition of nerve agents, the known chemical
weapons arsenal remains unchanged since the Europeans agreed that
gas was ineffective on the battlefield. Most sources list four classifica-
tions of poison gases."14 These standard categories include choking
agents, blister agents, blood agents, and nerve agents. Technically,
three more classes conclude the list, including the smokes, incapaci-
tants, and riot control agents. Understanding these gases' origins,
110. Id. at 275. Haber reports that "voluntary disablement" by troops with mustard gas
may also have exasperated commanders. Id. at 276.
111. Id. at 266.
112. Id. at 270.
113. Id. at 273.
114. Colleen A. Nash, Chem- War in the Third World, AIR FORCE MAG., Jan. 1990, at 80.
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chemical descriptions, physiological effects, lethal doses, 11 5 and persis-
tence is essential in determining why governments remain enthusiastic
about possessing them in their arsenals.
1. Choking Agents
To produce Phosgene, manufacturers pass equal volumes of chlo-
rine and carbon monoxide over charcoal." 6 Phosgene represents one
of the original World War I poison gases; it produced eighty percent
of that war's gas casualties."
l 7
Phosgene is a colorless gas, called agent CG in the United States
Army code," I8 and it smells like newly mown hay. It kills by attack-
ing the delicate tissues of the respiratory system, inducing spasmodic
coughing followed by retching and fatal pneumonia. 119 The lethal
dose of Phosgene is 3200 milligrams (mg) per cubic meter (m) in one
minute (min). 12
0
Of the choices available to German chemical warfare specialists
in 1915, Phosgene emerged "by elimination, as the most suitable" be-
cause its molecular weight exceeds chlorine's. Phosgene was thus less
likely to drift upwards and away from the battlefield.' 2 ' Further, be-
cause Phosgene's boiling point and vapor pressure are lower than that
of either chloropicrin,122 diphosgene, 123 or hydrogen cyanide, 124 Phos-
gene diffuses into the air better than the alternatives. 125
Other choking agents include chlorine, trichloromethyl
115. J.B. NEILANDS ET AL., HARVEST OF DEATH: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN VIETNAM
AND CAMBODIA 9 (1972). Lethal doses are calculated by the number of mg-min/m 3; that is,
how many milligrams (mg) per minute (min) over how many cubic meters (m) will kill half of
all breathing animals (LDo). Id.
116. HABER, supra note 106, at 84.
117. J. Perry Robinson, Chemical Weapons, in CBW: CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WAR-
FARE 33 (Steven Rose ed., 1968).
118. The formula for Phosgene is COCI2. See id. at 32.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 33.
121. HABER, supra note 106, at 41-42.
122. Chloropicrin is a vomiting agent. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
123. Diphosgene is actually trichloromethyl chloroformate. HABER, supra note 106, table
4.1.
124. Hydrogen cyanide is virtually impossible to deliver in uniformly lethal concentra-
tions, thus the agent was never a serious contender in the German arsenal. Id. at 42. Never-
theless, because cyanide is universally recognized as a deadly poison, the mere mention of
hydrogen cyanide evokes deep psychological revulsion. Therefore, hydrogen cyanide contin-
ues to appear on lists of credible chemical weapons.
125. Id. When cold weather prevented Phosgene from vaporizing, the Germans added
chlorine as anti-freeze.
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chloroformate, and disulphur decafluoride. 126 "[Choking agents] are
unlikely to be used in modern chemical war, for their initial irritancy
or smell immediately warns of their presence, and gas masks can be
donned before a lethal exposure."' 127 In fact, gas mask technology
during World War I was more advanced than the chemical weapons
technology because industry moved to protect workers as chemical
processes were introduced into plants. 128 The rapid adaptation of res-
pirators for combat equipment was an expected development. Once
gas mask training was universal, Phosgene and the other choking
agents lost their strategic value.
The harmful potential of choking agents, however, remains
deeply embedded in the collective psyche. Some commentators
pointed to the aftermath of the industrial accident at Bhopol, India in
1984 as an example of this potential where the target is an unprepared
civilian population. In a matter of hours, at least 3000 people died
when methyl isocyanate, a compound used to make pesticide, escaped
into the atmosphere.1 2
9
2. Blister Agents
Alcohol, bleaching powder, and sodium sulfide represent the es-
sential ingredients for mustard, the most well known vesicant, or blis-
ter agent. As Dr. Matthew Meselson, a Harvard University
biochemist, told Congress in 1989, "the technical fact is a government
that wants to make mustard gas can do so, even without outside
help." 130 Though technically an incapacitating, rather than a lethal
agent, mustard is an oily liquid with a faint garlic smell which causes
intense irritation to all tissue it contacts. In high concentrations, the
various formulationsl 3l of mustard kill by destroying lung tissue.
Sesqui-mustard burns or blinds at an exposure of less than 50 mg-
min/m 3 and kills if inhaled (as an aerosol) at dosages of 200 mg-min/
m3 132
126. Robinson, supra note 117, at 21.
127. Id.
128. See HABER, supra note 106, at 16.
129. See PAUL SHRIVASTAVA, BHOPOL: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS 42-48 (1987).
130. S. REP. No. 166, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1989) (statement of Dr. Matthew
Meselson).
131. Bis (2-Chloroethyl) Sulfide is distilled mustard and still the most important formula-
tion. Robinson, supra note 117, at 22.
132. M.L. Burnstall, The Industrial Context of Chemical Warfare, in STOCKHOLM INTER-
NATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PROJECTED
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 35 (1986).
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Sulphur and nitrogen mustard are made by three different
processes, 33 each of which developed during World War I. Germany
used both the monochloride route and the thiodiglycol route.134 The
British used the dichloride route, 135 combining ethylene with chlorin-
ated sulphur and the thiodiglycol route.136 The thiodiglycol method,
known as the Meyer method, is "probably the most widespread large-
scale route to mustard gas, finding its most recent application in mus-
tard [gas] used by Iraq against Iran."' 37
To produce nitrogen mustard gas, bis or tris(ethanol)amine re-
places thiodiglycol. The preferred chlorinating agent is thionyl chlo-
ride. 138 During World War II, the United States arsenals at
Edgewood, Huntsville, and Rocky Mountain produced 92,000 tons of
mustard. 139
The precursors of mustard are relatively common industrial
chemicals that require few additional steps to yield mustard. 40 Ethy-
lene' 41 represents the basic industrial chemical, with annual world
output exceeding 50 million tons.142 Hydrogen chloride also is widely
manufactured. 143 While the basic chemical building blocks of mus-
tard are universally available and impossible to control, the chlorinat-
ing or sulphochlorinating agents are less widely available. Thus,
thionyl chloride and chlorides of sulphur are easier to track through
the international market. On the other hand, since they are easier to
make, the possibility that renegade nations may secretly produce
them remains.144
A country wishing to covertly produce its own mustard would
create suspicion by suddenly importing large quantities of ethylene or
chlorides of sulphur, assuming no domestic use exists in a plastics or
133. Other ways to produce mustard gas are possible, but probably cost prohibitive. J.P.
Perry Robinson, The Chemical Industry and Chemical- Warfare Disarmament: Categorizing
Chemicals for the Purposes of the Projected Chemical Weapons Convention, in STOCKHOLM
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PRO-
JECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 55 (1986) [hereinafter The Chemical Industry].
134. Burnstall, supra note 132, at 39.
135. C2H4 + SC12 or $2C12 - (CICH2 CH 2)2S. Id. at 39.
136. (HOCHCH) 2S + HCI , (C1CHCH 2)S. Id.
137. The Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 73.
138. 2N(CH 2CHOH)3 + 3SOC12 ' 2N(CH 2CHzC1) 3 + 3H 20 + 3SO2. Id.
139. Id. at 91.
140. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
141. The formula for ethylene is C2H 4.
142. Burnstall, supra note 132, at 39.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 40.
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rubber industry.145 Thionyl chloride imports could perhaps be justi-
fied for pesticide production. 146
Mustard's advantage over Phosgene is that complete cover, as
well as a gas mask, is required for effective defense. Another advan-
tage is mustard's relative persistence in the field;' 47 the residue can
persist for days in sheltered areas even after rain. 148 In 1917, bleach-
ing powder was the universal antidote for mustard because it broke
down the residue. Mustard decontamination became a serious prob-
lem during 1917, beginning a long era of experimentation in order to
determine which sort of gear might be both protective and practical
for battlefield conditions. 149
Lewisite spawned one of the earliest antidotes to mustard.
50
Lewisite, another agent in the blister or vesicant category, is an arse-
nic agent. Like mustard, lewisite has its irreparable effect within min-
utes. Nevertheless, unlike almost odorless mustard, Lewisite's sharp
odor provides a warning to don protective clothing.' 5'
3. Blood Agents
Even though World War I field commanders experienced re-
peated frustrations in deploying hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chlo-
ride, these chemicals remain in the chemical weapons program.
When inhaled, they enter the blood stream and replace oxygen.
Hydrogen cyanide is a colorless gas with the odor of bitter al-
monds. In peacetime, it is used in the production of chemical in-
termediates in synthetic fiber, plastics, nitrites, and cyanide salts
manufacturing. It is also used to fumigate ships, trains, buildings,
orchards, tobacco, and food products. 152 Other sources of hydrogen
cyanide include petroleum refining, electroplating, and metallurgic
and photographic developing operations. 1
53
Cyanogen is also colorless but emits a more pungent odor of al-
monds than does hydrogen cyanide.154 Besides military weapons use,
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. HABER, supra note 106, at 117.
148. Id. at 201.
149. Id. at 202.
150. Robinson, supra note 117, at 22. Lewisite now has diminished importance. The
Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 66.
151. Id.
152. Cyanide, POISON MANAGEMENT, available in MICROMEDEX (66th ed. 1990).
153. Id.
154. Id.
19931
Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L.J
cyanogen and cyanogen halides are used as fumigants, as fuel gases
for cutting and welding, and as rocket or missile propellants. 55
In early November 1990, a cyanide spill contaminated a stretch
of the Western Dvina (also known as the Daugava) River in Latvia.
By all reports the spill originated in a weapons plant producing cy-
anogen.156 Though not as lethal as Phosgene, the blood agent cya-
nides act faster and are more difficult to combat.1 57 Iran reportedly
employed blood agents in its gas warfare against the Iraqis. At least
one reputable study ascribes Kurdish civilian casualties at Halabjah to
Iranian, not Iraqi, blood agents. 58
4. Nerve Gases
Developed by the Germans in the 1930s, anticholinesterase
agents, or nerve gases, are grouped in the United States code as three
G-agents, Tabun, Sarin, and Soman, and the V-agents. Anticholines-
terase agents block "the enzyme which the body uses to destroy one
of its chemical nerve signal transmitters after it has done its job."'' 59
Two deadly effects follow: "[C]ontrol is lost over the affected part of
the nervous system," and as the transmitter, a powerful poison itself,
builds up, the body is "forced to poison itself.' 6°
a. Tabun
Though deadly, Tabun is the least toxic of the three G-agents.
Tabun was first produced on a large scale in 1942. Tabun's advan-
tages include persistence in the field and easy manufacture. Tabun
represented the preferred nerve gas in the Iraqis' chemical weapons
development program. 161 Not only will Tabun provide a vapor haz-
ard for several days after dissemination, but if destroyed by hydroly-
155. Id.
156. James Rosen, Cyanide Spill Poisons River in Latvia, UPI, Nov. 14, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. At least five tons of acetone cyanohydrin escaped from the
Polimer defense factory in Novopoltsk, killing more than 300,000 fish and polluting the drink-
ing water. Damage estimates ranged from $34 million to $510 million. Id.
157. Robinson, supra note 117, at 22. By World War II, blood agents had replaced Phos-
gene in most arsenals. Id.
158. News Chronology, 11 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1991, at 5
(discussing a study conducted by the United States Army War College Strategic Studies Insti-
tute). For a detailed description of the confusion over the facts of the Halabjah incident, see
BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 30, at 126-29.
159. Robinson, supra note 117, at 23.
160. Id.
161. Harvey J. McGeorge, Chemical Addiction, DEF. & FOREIGN AFF., Apr. 1989, at 16.
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sis, Tabun produces hydrogen cyanide. When Tabun is treated with
decontaminating solutions, it provides another lethal poison, cyano-
gen chloride. 1
62
Tabun can be manufactured in several ways; three are unclassi-
fied.' 63 The published recipe for 100 tons of Tabun is 25 tons ammo-
nia, 60 tons methanol, 30 tons sodium cyanide, 134 tons phosphoryl
chloride, and 37 tons ethanol, absolute.164 One variation is a combi-
nation of ammonia, methanol, ethanol, and phosphorus oxychlo-
ride. 65 The lethal dose of Tabun is 150 mg-min/m 3 for inhalation,
but for skin absorption the lethal dose is 1500 mg per person or
roughly thirty "drops."' 16
6
b. Sarin
Sain, though not as persistent as Tabun, is twice as lethal, re-
quiring only 70 mg-min/m 3 for LD50 by inhalation.67 Once Sarin
splashes to the ground, it quickly evaporates, except in very cold
weather. 168 Sain is very difficult to manufacture because of its corro-
sive properties. During World War II, the Germans produced only a
half ton. However, United States chemists solved the corrosion
problems in the production process and continued making Sarin. 169
Sarin and its cousins, Soman and VX, are also difficult to make be-
cause they contain a methyl group linked to a phosphorus atom, a
bond not available commercially.
70
The production of Sain depends on whether diester or dichlor
are the intermediates. The diester method requires diisopropyl
methylphosphonate.' 7' The dichlor method, originated by Gerhard
162. Robinson, supra note 117, at 23-24.
163. The method used by Germany during World War II was a "two-stage process start-
ing from phosphoryl chloride and dimethylamine, the latter being produced on-site from meth-
anol and ammonia:
2Me2NH + POC13 -- Me2N.P(O)CI2 + Me2NH 2CI
Me2NH 2C1 + POC13 - Me2N.P(O)CI2 + 2HCI
Me2N.P(O)CI2 + 2NaCN + EtOH -- Me 2N.P(O)(CN)OEt."
The Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 74.
164. Id.
165. Burnstall, supra note 132, at 44.
166. Robinson, supra note 117, at 33.
167. Id.
168. NEILANDS ET AL., supra note 115, at 9.
169. Robinson, supra note 117, at 24; The Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 76.
170. Burnstall, supra note 132, at 44-45.
171. The Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 75. The final steps of the diester method
are:
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Schrader, requires methylphosphonyl dichloride.172 Using the dichlor
method, the recipe for 100 tons of Sarin is 510 tons phosphorus
trichloride, 145 tons chlorine, 160 tons methanol, 58 tons isopropa-
nol, and 20 tons hydrogen fluoride.1 73 All Sain routes require the
production of phosphorus trichloride through chlorination of elemen-
tal (white) phosphorus. Access to elemental phosphorus is crucial for
Sain production.
74
All nerve gases fall into the category of organophosphorus com-
pounds, each requiring elemental phosphorus, a compound available
worldwide. Of the two methods for extracting phosphorus from
phosphate rocks, most producers prefer the "wet" method. "Treat-
ment with sulfuric acid converts the rock to water soluble calcium
phosphates or to phosphoric acid."' 75 A low ratio of acid to rock
yields superphosphate, the mainstay of fertilizer. 76 A high ratio of
acid to rock yields phosphoric acid. 77 Both methods are inexpensive
and widely used. Though slightly more expensive than the "wet"
method, superheating phosphatic rock, coke, and silica produces ele-
mental phosphorus of greater purity. 78 In monitoring the develop-
ment of Sarin, Soman, and VX in the Third World, authorities agree
that the precursors providing access to elemental phosphorus, phos-
phorus trichloride and phosphorus oxychloride, require the closest
vigilance. 179
The manufacturing process for nerve gas is similar to the produc-
tion of organophosphorus insecticides such as malathion, parathion,
and schradan. These insecticides are popular because their short du-
ration keeps them out of the food chain. The third world increasingly
consumes organophosphorus insecticides. As the developed nations
export the technology and chemistry necessary to produce these insec-
ticides, they are also exporting the expertise that enables the manufac-
(PrO),MeP(O) + COC12 -- PrO.MeP(O)CI
'PrO.MeP(O)CI + HF -- 'PrO.MeP(O)F.
Id.
172. Id. Schrader's original process was MeP(O)CI 2 + NaF + 'PrOH --
'PrO.MeP(O)F. Id.
173. Id. at 76.
174. Id. at 77.
175. Burnstall, supra note 132, at 40.
176. Id. at 41.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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ture of nerve gas.18 0
c. Soman
Soman is twice as toxic as Sarin. The same chemical routes
which produce Sarin eventually will yield Soman. The diester
method, however, requires pinacolyl alcohol. Pinacolyl alcohol was
the export that first alerted the West German intelligence community
in 1985 to Imhausen-Chemie, the West German chemical company
implicated in the construction of Libya's Rabta poison gas plant.' 8'
Because pinacolyl alcohol is difficult to obtain and procurement may
alert observers, a new producer would probably avoid the diester
method for Soman production.
8 2
d. V-Agents
The United States code for the most lethal nerve gas is VX; the
Swedish code is F. A British chemical corporation, ICI, patented the
process for phosphonothiolates in 1955. This blocked a German cor-
poration, Bayer, and one of the originators of nerve gas, Gerhard
Schrader, from patenting a later application. 8 3 Swedish reports place
the lethal dose from two to ten milligrams, an invisible amount for
skin absorption. The V-agents are five times more lethal than Soman
in inhalation toxicity, and 2000 times more lethal than mustard gas in
skin absorption. 8
4
Shrouded in secrecy until 1971, when the United States declassi-
fied the formula, VX has at least eight chemical routes. The
"Newport Method" involves transesterification of diethyl
methyldichlorophosphine, and provides the basis for binary VX
munitions. The other methods depend on an intermediate step in-
volving aminoethyl chloride. 8 5 Curiously, Warsaw Pact scientists
were the first to leak the formula for VX. In 1966, two Romanians
described VX as ethyl S-dimethylaminoethyl methylphosphonotio-
late. 8 6 In 1967, a Russian described VX as S-dialkylaminoethyl alkyl
180. Id. at 43.
181. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
182. The Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 75.
183. Robinson, supra note 117, at 24.
184. Id.
185. The Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 78-79. In the United States,
R'O.RP.OCHCH 2NR" 2 is the route "which came to be used in the only plant-scale process
thus far described in the open literature, namely the one run by the Army during 1961-67 to
produce the present stockpile of VX." Id. at 78.
186. See generally D. JULEA & I. POPA, REVISTA SANITARA MILITARA (1966).
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methylphosphonothiolate. Some observers believe that VX or some
similar agent was responsible for the killing of more than 6000 sheep
in March 1968 at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah.18 7
5. Other Chemical Agents
In addition to choking, blood, blister, and nerve agents, the
chemical arsenal includes a collection of other weapons of varying
toxicity. For example, certain forms of white phosphorous producing
smoke cause toxic reactions in varying degrees.18 8
Among the incapacitants, lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD")
temporarily held the attention of researchers as they contemplated a
chemical weapon that might render a combatant unable to fight with-
out inflicting permanent physical injury.189 However, dosage repre-
sents the problem with such chemicals; a chemical weapon should be
effective at less than 100 mg-min/m 3 . If a drug is effective at that low
dose, a higher dose will probably be lethal. Because a commander
often substitutes quantity for accuracy when delivering chemicals in
the field, the probability of delivering a lethal dose is very high. Thus,
the special expenditures may be unwarranted, especially when lethal
gases are inexpensive and readily available.
A few other incapacitating, non-lethal agents deserve some note.
One is a glycolate incapacitant called Agent BZ or 3-quinuclidinyl
benzilate, and the other is a group known as the riot control agents,
including CN, CS, and DM.
a. Glycolate Incapacitant
Agent BZ slows mental function and causes dizziness, disorienta-
tion, and hallucinations. Some surmise that Agent BZ was developed
in the search for atropine, the nerve gas antidote. 90 Agent BZ is ap-
parently manufactured by a process involving the "transesterification
of the sodium derivative of methyl benzilate with 3-quinuclidinol."'' 9
However, substitutions in the recipe for Agent BZ appear possible.
Therefore, if 3-quinuclidinol is listed as a controlled precursor, so
should its substitute, N-methyl-4-piperidinol. Further, if methyl
benzilate is listed, so should its possible substitutes, including other
187. NEILANDS ET AL., supra note 115, at 10.
188. McGeorge, supra note 161, at 16.
189. In fact, "[i]ncapacitants of the Fentanyl or Meperidine families may have caused the
crash of the C-130 aircraft which killed Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq." Id.
190. Robinson, supra note 117, at 25.
191. The Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 80.
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glycolate esters. 192 Sarin, Soman, and VX also have possible substi-
tutes that make it more difficult to control the precursors for those
chemical weapons.
93
b. Riot Control Agents
Whether used for riot control or for troop harassment, agents
CN, CS, and DM are irritants "lethal only in very high concentra-
tions."1 94  CS, ortho-chlorobenzalmalononitrile, commonly called
"tear gas," is the most well known. Technically termed a "lachryma-
tor," CS causes a "burning sensation in the eyes and copious flow of
tears, coughing, difficult breathing [and even] nausea and vomit-
ing."' l Though not persistent, its half life is ten minutes; 196 and a
little goes a long way. An amount as small as one part per 10,000,000
may drive even the most determined person away from a permeated
area. 197 CS, however, is lethal at 25,000 mg-min/m 3.198 Like the
choking agents-Phosgene and chlorine, a respirator and eye mask
neutralizes CS. Nevertheless, when used on unprepared civilian
populations, especially in extremely close quarters, CS causes
casualties. 199
Agent CN, chloroacetophenone, better known as Mace, is an-
other incapacitant with potentially fatal consequences in civilian
populations. 2°° Lethal at 850 mg-min/m 3 , some Vietnamese civilian
fatalities resulted from burning CN grenades which emitted carbon
monoxide in closed tunnels and shelters.
Mixing diphenylamine with arsenic trichloride yields agent
diphenylaminochlorarsine, or DM. Also known as Adamsite, DM
mainly causes vomiting.20 Though the lethal measure is 1500 mg 10-
min/m 3, the effects of "profuse watery nasal discharge, severe pain in
nose and chest, sneezing, coughing, nausea, vomiting, [and] depres-
sion" disable a target for several hours. 20 2
192. Id.
193. Id. at 81.
194. Robinson, supra note 117, at 20.
195. Id.
196. NEILANDS ET AL., supra note 115, at 23.
197. Robinson, supra note 117, at 20.
198. NEILANDS ET AL., supra note 115, at 23.
199. Id. at 23-24.
200. "[A]lmost all substances ... can kill if the dose taken into the body . . . is high
enough." Robinson, supra note 117, at 60.
201. NEILANDS ET AL., supra note 115, at 21.
202. Id. at 22.
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6. Summary: Precursor List
As the foregoing illustrates, chemical weapons are particularly
attractive to military powers in developing nations since they provide
a lot of killing power. The formulas for the most reliable agents, mus-
tard and Tabun, are known, and their manufacture requires a low
level of technological sophistication. With a few exceptions, nations
can easily procure the necessary ingredients under the guise of peace-
time industrial use. The following table illustrates the critical precur-
sor chemicals and their distance in production steps from a designated
chemical weapon:
Poison Gas Proliferation
Precursor Produ
H
sulphur monochloride 1
sulphur dichloride 1
thiodiglycol 1
2-chloroethanol 2
ethylene oxide 2
ethylene 1-2
vinyl chloride 1
dimethylphosphormidic dichlorid
methylphosphonyl difluoride
isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate
ethyl methylphosphonothioate salts
methylphosphonyl dichloride
dimethyl methylphosphonate
dimethyl pyromethylphosphonate
diisopropyl methylphosphonate
diethyl methylphosphonothionate
diisopropylaminoethyl ethyl
methylphosphonite
diethyl methylphosphonite
ethyl hydrogen methylphosphonite
methyldichlorophosphine
dimethyl hydrogen phosphite
diisopropyl hydrogen phosphite
triisopropyl phosphite
phosphorus trichloride
phosphoryl chloride
dimethylamine
2-diisopropylaminoethanol
2-dissopropylaminoethyl chloride
methyl benzilate
3-quinuclidinol
Key: H = mustard, GA = Tabun, GB = Sarin,
VX = V agents, BZ = 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate.
20 3
ction steps away from:
GA GB VX BZ
1 - - 2
- 1 - -
- 1 - -
- - 1 -
- 1-2 - 2
- 2-3 - -
2-3 - -
2 - -
- - 2 -
- - 1
2
- - 1
2-3 2-3
3-4 -
3 -
3 -
3 2-5 3-4
2
2
2
- - 1
The lure of mustard, Sarin, and Soman is obvious because those
chemicals requiring more than two steps to the desired poisonous
output are luxuries to developing nations without a broad
technological base. Likewise, the world community can more easily
monitor those less common chemicals which yield a weapon-grade
agent after one or two steps. The difficulty, so vividly illustrated in
203. The Chemical Industry, supra note 133, at 92 (reproduced with permission).
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the table, centers on the common precursors readily available-either
through commercial import or domestic production-which are only
one or two low technology steps from weapons grade.
Mustard ranks highest in the economy of production hierarchy,
with Tabun in second place and Sarin close behind. However, the
problems of tactical deployment in the field-especially weather
conditions, delivery systems, and preparedness of the target-all
contribute to the final equation in determining which agent, if any, a
commander would ultimately use.
C. Non-Chemical Variables
Mere chemical genius for creating lethal compounds is not
enough to wage chemical warfare. The decision of a field commander
to use a novel weapon may be based on many quantifiable premises,
but often those premises meld into a "gut feeling." The gut feeling in
World War I was wariness; after World War I, it was exasperation
which then became contagious anxiety.
1. Variables: Weather and Terrain
Although the specter of a chemical agent blowing back onto the
releasing forces represents the most immediate problem, the real wind
problem arises if the agent blows away from the target. Phosgene
replaced chlorine for just that reason--chlorine is too light and likely
to blow away. However, Phosgene reacts to temperature and fails to
vaporize in cold weather. In addition, rain significantly reduces the
persistence rates of chemical agents. The chemical properties of each
agent interact with ambient weather conditions surrounding the
target.
The target's topography also influences the efficacy of a chemical
agent. The less poisonous agents with the highest rate of persistence
are least affected by obstructions such as dense vegetation in the field
or large buildings in urban areas. For example, mustard trapped in
pockets of cover can continue to harass troops many days after its
deployment. But less persistent agents, such as Sarin, might be con-
tained by natural barriers and quickly dissipate.
2. Variable: Delivery Capacity
The graduation from pressurized cylinders to artillery shells rep-
resented a major advance in 1916. However, the properties of the
ordnance must factor into the chemical equation. The nature of the
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payload changed the artillery regimen as well. For example, the ex-
plosive heat of ordnance may interfere with the chemical reaction
designed to disperse the chemical agent in droplet or vapor form.
During World War II, both the Germans and the Allies discovered
that artillery shells must be designed for safe charging and weighted
differently than high explosives.20 4 Moreover, the artillery drill itself
must be altered in order to deliver units of chemical agent in a pattern
most likely to create a low cloud of uniform density over the target.
Early in the development of artillery shells for chemical warfare, the
problem of the embedded shell appeared. A shell which became bur-
ied in debris could not effectively disperse its contents. Therefore, a
drill designed to deliver the shell on the surface was quickly devised.
Seventy years later, armies recognize that the tell-tale signal of chemi-
cal attack is the low percussion of an incoming shell opposed to the
loud explosion of a high explosive.
The complexities involved in chemical agent delivery by artillery
shells, whether by mortar or howitzer, require special training. In the
only large scale deployment of chemical agents, World War I field
commanders literally invented drills and tactics as they went along.
Today, extensive and rigorous training conducted by the major pow-
ers reduces the difficulty of deciding to deploy chemical weapons.
Less sophisticated forces, however, must adjust by returning to
the direct application of chemical agents, skipping the problems of
ordnance interaction. Aerial spray substituted for dug-in cylinders at
Ypres. Victims of the Iraqi attack on the Kurds reported low-flying
aircraft prior to the mass death and injury. While the Iraqis used
artillery to deliver chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq war, fighters
and helicopters delivered agents as well. 20 5
The most publicized concern is that renegade nations will use
more sophisticated delivery systems. The major concerns are the
SCUD-B and Condor II tactical missiles. In 1989 "Iran and Iraq
[were] believed to be working on chemical warheads for their ballistic
missiles. '20 6 During the war for Kuwait, Iraq used the SCUD missile
without a chemical warhead to inflict damage. Iraq also possesses the
204. White phosphorus shells are easiest to modify for a chemical weapon pay-load. The
Iraqis used white phosphorus shells during the Iran-Iraq war. McGeorge, supra note 161, at
16.
205. James Adams, The Chemical Nightmare, SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991.
206. Global Spread of Chemical & Biological Weapons: Hearings before the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
63 (1989) (testimony of W. Seth Carus).
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Al-Husayn missile with a 650 kilometer range, as well as the Al-Ab-
bas missile with a 900 kilometer range. 20 7 The capacity to arm these
missiles with chemical agents would place major population centers in
Israel and Iran under the threat of long range chemical attack.
In 1968, a high probability existed that a SCUD missile "loaded
with nerve gas [could] produce 30 per cent casualties among a fully
deployed battle group of 1400 men, and within seconds and under
almost any conditions. ' 208 By 1989, experts predicted that, "given an
urban target one kilometer in diameter, and the right environmental
and population conditions, an attack by two SCUD-B missiles armed
with nerve agents [such as Sarin, Soman, or VX], casualties of... [20]
percent would result in a city 300 miles away. '" 20 9
Nevertheless, skeptics argue that the negative aspects of artillery
shell delivery are exacerbated by missile deployment. For example,
placing an agent in the most effective location, perhaps in relation to
simultaneous launches, becomes more difficult as the target is farther
away. Factoring in weather and terrain conditions from greater dis-
tances also presents problems. Therefore, the effectiveness of chemi-
cally-armed SCUD missiles as attack weapons remains debatable. 210
The principal question now becomes to what degree urban cen-
ters in Israel are vulnerable to a terrorist attack by a hostile neighbor?
During the war for Kuwait, Iraq demonstrated the clear capability for
such an attack. Yet not one of the SCUD missiles used either against
Israeli civilians or Allied troops in the Saudi desert carried a chemical
agent. This fact emphasizes the difference between calculating the
possibility of chemical attack and calculating the probability of such
attack.
3. Variable: Target's Preparedness
The technological competition between the German and Allied
207. Id.
208. Robinson, supra note 117, at 34.
209. McGeorge, supra note 161, at 16.
210. "[A]n unidentified Iraqi engineer, speaking in Jordan, [said] that 'technical problems'
... prevent[ed] Iraq from fitting its SCUD missiles with [chemical weapons] warheads." 11
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1991, at 14. The same engineer said,
"The SCUD attacks on Israel [on January 18, 1991] have shown that there is a 'large
deviation' between the target and the object that was hit. However, this must not
happen in the event of a poison gas attack, because such an attack must not hit
Jordan. It is difficult to attach a heavy gas container to a warhead without causing
ballistic deviation."
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forces in World War I illustrates how technology swiftly neutralizes a
newly developed chemical agent. The rapid development of the gas
mask, from the original cotton pad soaked in urine to modem breath-
ing sets, gas helmets, and respirators, kept troops one step ahead of
weapons development. When the gas mask effectively blocked inhala-
tion agents such as Phosgene, chlorine, and hydrogen cyanide, chemi-
cal agents targeted skin absorption, and protective clothing quickly
developed.
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 testifies to the stalemate created by
these two parallel lines of technology. When facing an opposing army
fitted with inhalation and skin absorption protection, a commander
must choose between raising the level of lethality, knowing that defen-
sive protection will develop just as quickly, or calling a halt to the
escalation. Europeans have chosen to do both. Although European
nations forswore the first use of chemical agents in warfare, develop-
ment nevertheless continues.211 The Germans' reluctance to employ
their stockpiles of sophisticated nerve gases, especially in the desper-
ate period beginning with the Normandy Invasion, is as much an
enigma as Saddam Hussein's decision not to use Iraq's stockpiles of
nerve gases, even after pointed threats.212
Most observers agree that the answer comes back to the level of
protection available to the enemy. One of the most advanced forms of
protection is the XM21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm
manufactured by the Brunswick Corporation. 213 Together with the
individual Chemical Agent Detector made by Environmental Tech-
nologies, the Allied troops in the Desert Storm operation could count
on some measure of advanced warning reducing the need to con-
211. See generally FREDERIC J. BROWN, CHEMICAL WARFARE: A STUDY IN RESTRAINT
(1968).
212. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein told an emergency meeting of the Arab League, "We
should announce clearly that if Israel attacks us, we are going to hit back fiercely, and if it uses
weapons of total destruction against [the Arab] nation, we will use against it the weapons of
total destruction which we have." 8 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., June 1990, at
18. In November 1990, the United States Army issued a 145-page intelligence manual entitled
Desert Shield Order of Battle Handbook. Concerning Iraqi chemical weapons capability, the
manual reported:
Chemical weapons are utilized when planners assess fire support or force size as in-
sufficient to attain the objective. Once authorization for chemical weapons use is
given corps commanders are given chemical rounds to be delivered by artillery.
Chemical warheads include three types: a lethal mustard agent, an incapacitating
agent, and tear gas.
11 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1991, at 5.
213. See Marines Select Brunswick for Chemical Detector, DEFENSE NEWS, Jan. 28, 1991,
at 19.
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stantly wear protective gear. 214 Even if worn constantly, protective
gear hampers combat operations very little. 215 "In the hot desert sun,
well trained troops in protective gear have successfully conducted as-
sault exercises for up to two hours. ' 2
16
Given the uncertainties created by the other variables in the
equation to predict chemical weapons use, protective gear is probably
the most significant. Even if the threat of chemical attack forces an
enemy army to operate in cumbersome protective gear, thus reducing
their fighting capacity, the reliable killing power of a chemical attack
may not outweigh the choice of conventional high explosives.
Overkill may solve some of the problems created by other vari-
ables in the probability of use equation. Where chemical properties
require certain dosages in uniform density, commanders could simply
double or triple the rounds launched. Commanders could solve some
weather and terrain problems by excessive deployment. An effective
barrier to inhalation and skin absorption, however, is relatively imper-
vious to such overkill.
The critical bottom line to chemical warfare seems to be the ab-
solute requirement of an unprepared target taken by surprise. As a
result, chemical weapons are most likely to be used against civilian
populations. 217
D. Testing the Equation: Known Chemical Weapons Use
Chemical weapons have become exponentially more lethal since
World War I, although the fundamental variables of the probability of
use equation emerged during that period. Since the Geneva Protocol,
use of chemical agents has been sporadic and unevenly documented.
Yet, even with incomplete reporting and many unanswered questions,
these incidents bear out the significance and interaction of the vari-
ables in the chemical weapons use probability equation.
The Japanese reportedly used chemical agents in China in 1939
against civilian targets. "Data on the Japanese use are sparse ....
Chemical weapons were used in coordination with gunfire and close
combat to create surprise and confusion within the Chinese ranks.
'218
214. Contracts, STATE NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 9, 1990.
215. Mathew Meselson, The Role of Chemical Defense in Chemical Warfare, Chemical
Deterrence and Chemical Disarmament, 11 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar.
1991, at 19.
216. Id.
217. BROWN, supra note 211, at 37.
218. Edward Corcoran, Assessing Chemical Weapons' Military Utility in NEW TECHNOLO-
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The Japanese also used chemical agents to "dislodge personnel from
caves and villages and seal off battle areas. '219
Between 1963 and 1967, the Egyptians employed chemical
agents repeatedly in North Yemen. The information about the
Yemeni operation, however, is sketchy at best. "Initial reports in-
volved mustard gas and some similar agent on several villages. ' ' 22o
Egypt denied the allegations that casualties were high when the royal-
ist headquarters at Kitaf were attacked with nerve gas. 221
Prior to 1971, when the United States suspended its herbicide
program in Vietnam, reports of United States deployment of chemical
weapons against civilian populations appeared frequently enough in
the foreign press to prompt embarrassed denials from United States
officials. Samples of Agent Orange from supplies at Tan Son Nhut
airbase in 1969 were found to be highly teratogenic-capable of pro-
ducing fetal abnormalities. 222 The herbicide caused a severe skin irri-
tation called chloracne. As early as 1959, reports of neurological
damage from the active ingredients of Agent Orange appeared in
medical literature. 223 In October of 1970, allegations of United States
use of toxic substances against the Vietnamese were presented to the
Stockholm Conference.224 Not until 1991 did the United States un-
equivocally recognize the toxicity of Agent Orange. Congress finally
passed legislation to remove restrictions on Veterans Administration
benefits for United States service personnel exposed to the chemical
while serving in Vietnam.225
Since 1980, there have been reports that Ethiopia launched
chemical attacks against the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front. Iron-
ically, the Ethiopians themselves were targets of one of the few chemi-
cal weapons attacks after World War I. In 1937, invading Italian
GIES FOR SECURITY & ARMS CONTROL 287, 296-97 (Eric H. Arnett ed., 1989). See generally
BURCK & FLOWERREE, supra note 30.
219. Id. at 297 (citing R. HARRIS & J. PAXMAN, A HIGHER FORM OF KILLING 3 (1982)).
220. Id. at 298.
221. Id.
222. NEILANDS ET AL., supra note 115, at 173.
223. Id. at 104-05. Foreign newspapers reported on September 15, 1965, that 78 civilians
were killed when a toxic grenade exploded in a shelter at Ba Long An in Quang Ngai province.
On February 1, 1968, 141 civilians, including 74 children, were reported killed by toxic gas at
Ky Anh in Quang Nam province. Id. at 37.
224. Id. at 38.
225. Service personnel exposed to Agent Orange filed a class action suit against the manu-
facturers of the chemical; the suit was settled by a consent decree. See In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, aff'd 818 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1984). For a background
discussion, see PETER SHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986).
1993] 559
Loy. L.A. Int7 & Comp. L.J.
forces used mustard against Ethiopian defenders.226 The Italian oper-
ation has been described as follows:
[C]hemical weapons were used in support of advancing ground
forces, but they were delivered almost exclusively by aircraft, ini-
tially by dropping drums of mustard gas, and later, by using air-
craft spray tanks. Much of this effort went into terrain
contamination and was particularly effective against shoeless
tribesmen .... These chemical attacks had a deep psychological
effect on the Abyssinians, many of whom simply deserted.
2 27
Reports emerged in the early 1980s that the Soviet army was us-
ing chemical agents against insurgents in Afghanistan. Reports also
implicated Soviet use of chemical weapons in Georgia. A Report to
the President from the United States Department of State in 1982
described aerial bomb and rocket delivery of a lethal agent and an
incapacitating agent against Afghan insurgents.
228
All of the reported incidents share the common variable of an
unprepared civilian target. Even where the Iraqis used chemical
agents in the Iran-Iraq war, reports suggest that the Iranians were
using "human wave" tactics with untrained teenagers. Most observ-
ers agree the net effect of Iraqi chemical weapons use was only to
prevent themselves from being overrun by the Iranians. Chemical
agents apparently provided the Iraqi military no offensive advantage.
E. Tactical Applications
In addition to use against unprepared troops or civilian popula-
tions, three other applications of chemical weapons exist which might
make sense given the low probability estimate generated by the inter-
active equation of variables. First, chemical weapons function as de-
terrents. The simple possession of chemical agents accompanied by a
credible delivery system is enough to provide deterrence. Some ob-
servers suggest that the ability to retaliate in kind substantially
reduces the probability of chemical attack.229 The standoff between
equally equipped Axis and Allied troops during World War II is a
prime example. Iran's initial inability to retaliate against Iraq demon-
strates the opposite. The war for Kuwait illustrated that a credible
226. McGeorge, supra note 161, at 16.
227. Corcoran, supra note 218, at 297.
228. United States Department of State, Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghani-
stan, Report to the President, March 22, 1982 (updated in November 1982) cited in Corcoran,
supra note 218, at 299.
229. McGeorge, supra note 161, at 16.
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threat of retaliation in kind may not be necessary because a threat of
retaliation in effect carries the same impact. In a letter addressed to
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, President Bush laid down the
gauntlet:
Should war come, it will be far greater tragedy for you and your
country. Let me state, too, that the United States will not tolerate
the use of chemical or biological weapons .... The American
people would demand the strongest possible response. You and
your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable
actions of this sort.
230
Second, commanders cannot expect to accomplish a military ob-
jective greater than harassment with chemical weapons use. At best,
a commander can hope that the threat of chemical weapons will force
an opposing army to take protective measures limiting its own mobil-
ity. Commentators suggest that had Iraq deployed chemical weapons
against Allied troops in the Saudi desert, commanders would have
withdrawn troops to protected positions, forcing them to resort to ae-
rial bombing to accomplish their objective of retaliation. 231
The third application is one of last resort. Apparently, Iraq's
chemical weapons use during the Iran-Iraq war emanated from a
sense of desperation. However, in other wartime situations where use
of a weapon of last resort might be expected, such as the last desperate
hours of the Third Reich, chemical weapons, though available, were
never used. The last resort application is probably highly dependent
on the level of retaliation the enemy can muster. As a result, the
military attitude toward chemical warfare in World Wars I and II has
been characterized as follows:
Influenced by the counter-propaganda writings of articulate mili-
tary proponents of chemical warfare, most civilians assumed the
military accepted and was eager to employ chemical weapons.
This assumption was false. Aside from those military leaders insti-
tutionally committed to toxic agents, the military establishment as
a whole was opposed to their use. As an area weapon developed by
scientists to strike insidiously and from afar, gas did not accord
with the honor of the profession. In addition, the immense logisti-
cal and training burden unique to gas warfare required greater bat-
tlefield effect than could be attained with other weapons in order to
230. 11 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1991, at 11 (quoting the INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IHT File).
231. See Livingstone & Douglass, supra note 5, at 57.
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justify resorting to such a high cost weapon. 23 2
Are these attitudes universally held by military commanders of
the nations known to possess chemical weapons? The United States,
the Soviet Union, France, Iraq, and Iran have publicly acknowledged
their possession of chemical weapons. Though the attitudes of the
Iraqi military were obscured by the public insistence of Saddam Hus-
sein that chemical weapons represent a legitimate military option, the
conduct of Iraqi commanders during the war for Kuwait suggests that
they do not share that view. Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel,
Libya, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam possess chemical capability,
though without public acknowledgement. Cuba, Hungary, Laos,
North Korea, Poland, and Romania probably possess chemical weap-
ons as probably do the states formerly comprising Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the suspicion of chemical weapons capa-
bility falls on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Paki-
stan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and
Thailand.23 3 The answer to the question of military attitude in those
nations can only be surmised.
Clearly, the main incentive for governments to develop a chemi-
cal weapons arsenal is to gain a psychological advantage over their
enemies. Yet that psychological advantage quickly dissipates when
rival governments develop either equal capability or effective defen-
sive measures. The tactical advantages of chemical weapons use in
military conflicts then become illusory. "Despite the many reports of
Iraqi deployment of chemical munitions in the Kuwait theater of op-
erations, [by] mid-March [1991], it appears that none have been
found. '234 In fact, after the cease fire, " 'United States military of-
ficers have virtually concluded that the most controversial weapon in
Iraq's arsenal-chemical weapons-never entered the combat thea-
ter.' "235 Moreover, this assessment of the chemical option was of-
fered at the American Association for the Advancement of Science in
September, 1990:
The idea that chemical weapons are the poor man's deterrent is
wrong; they are not. If the poor man wants to deter someone with
nuclear weapons, that someone is, by comparison at least, a rich
man. Rich men can also afford gas masks. Chemical weapons...
232. BROWN, supra note 211, at 293-94.
233. McGeorge, supra note 161, at 16.
234. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1991, at 16.
235. Id.
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are the killer of the poor man. This is coming to be understood
even in the Middle East.
236
The menace of chemical weapons, nevertheless, still possesses the
power to mobilize world opinion, a fact which may render a chemical
capability more of a liability to a renegade government than an asset.
This liability potential arose in the unanimous coalition formed with
unprecedented rapidity in the United Nations when Iraq refused
to withdraw from Kuwait in November 1990. Meanwhile, the specter
of Libya's confounding the probability prediction of chemical weap-
ons use has caused concern. This provided a backdrop for the scena-
rios that world leaders used to gain popular support for military force
against Iraq. Saddam Hussein helped the staging by declaring in a
Baghdad Radio address in April 1990:
We have the binary chemical [al-kimawi al-muzdawij]. Let them
take note of this. We have the binary chemical. According to our
information only the United States and the Soviet Union have it
.... It exists in Iraq. 237
Apart from the sequence of events leading to the United Nations
effort to employ military force to liberate Kuwait, the psychological
advantage afforded by chemical weapons applies only in the short
term. Even before the war ended, some observers raised questions
about the absence of the one form of destructive power which the
world press painted as inevitable.
F. Theoretical Application: Terrorism
The importance of preparedness of the target suggests one appli-
cation of chemical weapons not easily dismissed, terrorism. Six rea-
sons exist to explain why terrorists may find chemical weapons
attractive:
(1) Chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive. One source es-
timates $600 worth of chemical weapons possesses the killing power
of $2000 worth of conventional weapons.
238
(2) Chemical weapons are easily produced in a short time. Sci-
entific texts provide the recipes. Terrorists merely need an expert to
236. Matthew Meselson, Implications of the Kuwaiti Crisis for Chemical Weapons Prolifer-
ation and Arms Control, in CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
PROCEEDINGS FROM A AAAS CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING 16 (Eric H. Arnett ed., 1990).
237. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., June 1990, at 13.
238. JOSEPH D. DOUGLASS, JR. & NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE
16 (1987).
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practice the "alchemist's art. '239
(3) Any chemical weapon creates a credible threat. A few milli-
grams of VX can kill one human being. Where population is dense, a
small amount-a few hundred pounds--can cause thousands of
casualties.
24o
(4) Any target is vulnerable. Because terrorists depend on sur-
prise and choose unsuspecting targets, chemical weapons possess
great appeal. 2
41
(5) Chemical weapons create less hazard to terrorists themselves
than does a nuclear device. Moreover, because effects may be
delayed, chemical weapons allow a better chance for terrorists to es-
cape after delivering the payload.242
(6) Chemical weapons prove more reliable than a nuclear device
because the need to test before deployment is not as great and can
generally be solved by overkill. 243
Although biological agents probably hold a superior attraction to
terrorists than chemical weapons, a credible example of chemical
weapons terrorism occurred in the mercury poisoning of exported Is-
raeli citrus fruit in 1978. "[C]hemical agents [are] . . . superior to
either biological[s] ... or toxins because of their stability, ease of man-
ufacture and dispersal, and controllability (inasmuch as they are not
contagious)."
'24
Even if the metaphorical regression equation yields a low
probability of chemical weapons use, when a nation's own troops may
face such a threat, calls for strict proliferation control assume ur-
gency. The difficulty lies in balancing among the many competing
interests which must bear the residual effects of the attempt to control
chemical weapons proliferation to renegade governments.
III. SANCTIONS SPOTLIGHT TENSION IN UNITED STATES
EXPORT POLICY
Sanctions "bring home the official position of the country with
respect to the production and use of chemical weapons," then Direc-
tor of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, William Web-
239. Id. at 17.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 17-18.
242. Id. at 18.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 13.
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ster, told Congress in 1989.245 "[Sanctions provide] an opportunity
for sustained moral suasion, putting the spotlight on these
activities. ,
246
The United States may apply sanctions to the proliferation of
chemical weapons under the Export Administration Act ("EAA").247
The EAA is far reaching. Its provisions cover not only United States
manufacturers and exporters, but offshore subsidiaries of United
States companies as well. Foreign purchasers and manufacturers us-
ing United States components or technology, as well as foreign firms
affiliated with United States firms, are included. 248 United States ex-
port policy, however, functions in an arena where interests favoring
more rigid unilateral control often oppose interests favoring more
flexible multilateral control.
A. Competing Goals of the EAA
In 1989, the Eastern Bloc-closed for a generation to most west-
ern commerce-trembled. When no Soviet tanks appeared to prevent
it, the Eastern Bloc dissolved almost without violence. Within weeks,
Germany was reunited and the Warsaw Pact 249 nations had thrown
open their doors, cordially inviting western businesses to help them
join the mainstream of the free world's capitalist economy.250 In the
United States, businesses eager to participate turned to Congress. Re-
ferring to sweeping export legislation, Donald W. Reigle, chairman of
the Senate Banking Committee, said, "The [bill] will enable us to lend
help to the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe that need West-
ern technologies to modernize their economies."'251 United States in-
245. S. REP. No. 166, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1989).
246. Id. at 5-6.
247. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-24 (1990).
248. Edward J. Krauland et al., Recent Developments in U.S. Export Licensing and Civil
Enforcement Procedures, 7 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 204, 204 (1989).
249. The military alliance called the Warsaw Pact was officially dissolved as of July 1,
1991. Michal Donath, East Europe Dissolves Warsaw Pact, Discusses Yugoslavia, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, July 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
250. Presently, the United States Secretary of Defense must review and determine whether
the export of goods, technology, or industrial techniques will significantly increase potential
military cabability of a controlled country before such export may be authorized. 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2403-1(b) (1974). Controlled counties include "the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and
such countries as may be designated by the Secretary of Defense." Id. § 2403-1(d) (emphasis
added).
251. House, Senate Approve Conference Report on Bill to Extend System of Export Con-
trols, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1636 (Oct. 31, 1990).
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dustry and its advocates realized that the old Cold War restrictions on
trade to Eastern Europe had to be discarded quickly.
The principal purpose of the EAA lies in encouraging commerce.
Congress has found that, "[e]xports contribute significantly to the
world economic well-being of the United States and the stability of
the world economy...."252 Placing a "high priority" on exports is in
the "national interest. ' 25 3 The second purpose of the EAA, however,
is the control of those exports which may affect national security.
"Exports of goods or technology without regard to whether they
make a significant contribution to the military potential of ... coun-
tries may adversely affect national security .... -254
The interplay of these two purposes---encouragement and restric-
tionL-creates tension. These inherently competing interests emerge
from the application of EAA at many levels. Even at the highest
level, the dichotomy of purpose appears. For instance, the regulation
of exports is constitutionally the domain of Congress. Historically,
where greater accountability might engender flexibility, Congress has
delegated that authority to the President, fundamentally yielding leg-
islative flexibility in favor of the President's discretion. Ironically, in
the matter of chemical weapons proliferation control, it would be
Congress arguing for greater rigidity as the President maneuvered for
greater flexibility.
Moreover, the President divides the actual oversight of exports
on the same theme. The United States Commerce Department ad-
ministers the EAA 255 in the best interests of industry, placing a high
premium on flexibility. However, because the President also may use
exports to advance foreign policy, 2 56 both the United States Depart-
ment of State and the United States Department of Defense play im-
portant roles in the application of the EAA. Since a main tool of the
foreign policy function often involves withholding or withdrawing ex-
port privileges, the roles of the Departments of State and Defense
257
place a high premium on rigidity.
252. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401(2).
253. Id. § 2401(3).
254. Id. § 2401(5).
255. See id. § 2403.
256. See id. § 2402(1).
257. The United States Department of State exercises its power over exports under 22
U.S.C. § 2778 (1989) with advice from the United States Department of Defense. See 51 Fed.
Reg. 17,509 (1986). The United States Customs Service, under the United States Treasury
Department, provides enforcement for various agencies. See 22 C.F.R. § 127.4 (1992).
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Congress' attitude toward Germany illustrates the tension engen-
dered by the duality of purpose. On the one hand, flexibility of export
control may help Germany through the budgetary trauma of reunifi-
cation. On the other hand, Germany represents the target of the lat-
est congressional demand for mandatory sanctions against suppliers
of chemical weapons technology and their subsidiaries. This results
because Germany leads the list for the number of private firms in-
volved in weapons traffic with the Middle East.
B. Flexibility and Multilateral Action: Commerce and Industry
The EAA controls exports for three purposes: national security,
foreign policy, and short supply.258 Goods and technologies which
may make significant contributions to the military capability of any
country potentially detrimental to the national security of the United
States form the broad domain of items regulated under national secur-
ity. Under foreign policy, EAA includes the control of goods and
technology which may significantly further the foreign policy of the
United States or its declared international obligations.259 The sweep
of EAA expands further with the third purpose to protect the domes-
tic economy from losing scarce materials.
26
0
1. Licensing Scheme
Through the Export Administration Regulations, 261 the United
States Commerce Department grants licenses to exporters of com-
modities and technologies included under the EAA. These objectives
assume that all goods and technologies may be freely traded. Upon
that foundation of total flexibility comes the caveat that some items
require special permission. Still within the tradition of flexibility,
however, is the assumption that the permission will be granted in the
form of a license. The Commodity Control List 262 enumerates those
items which require licenses, either general or validated. In theory,
the scheme furthers the goal of encouraging United States exports
while imposing a limited set of restrictions. In reality, the restrictions
are extensive, broadly defined, and frequently changing.263 Moreover,
258. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 15 C.F.R. § 768 (1992).
262. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (1992).
263. In 1990, 10 new chemicals were added to the Commodity Control List for a total of
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the licensing scheme is a complex hierarchy determining what com-
modity may go to which country at what time.
The existence of a separate list, regulations, and sanctions under
the Arms Control Export Act ("ACEA") 264 administered by the
United States Department of State further complicates the situation.
An exporter must consult the current Commodity Control List to de-
termine if the desired export falls under the category of a "general
license" for which specific authorization is unnecessary. If the export
does not fit the general license category, the "exporter must apply for
and obtain a specific 'validated license.' "265
Classifying the export as a controlled commodity is not the end,
however. An exporter must confirm the ultimate destination of the
export. 2 6 6 Some chemicals, for example, may be restricted to every
country except a chosen few; these include nine chemicals on the Aus-
tralia Group's core list. On the other hand, some chemicals may be
restricted only to specific countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, or
Libya. 267 In the case of precursor chemicals, for instance, an export
license for thiodiglycol would be required if the destination were Iraq
but not if the destination were New Zealand.
Additional restrictions control the re-export of goods. If authori-
ties at the intervening destination regulate exports in cooperation with
the United States, then no license may be required for re-export unless
the item is a supercomputer. 268 The exporter must also check the
United States Munitions List to be certain that the good or technol-
ogy does not fit within a catch-all category.
2. Penalties
The Commodity Control List contains more than 200 pages. 269
International negotiations and intelligence reports affect the list, with
restricted nations and commodities constantly changing. Some com-
mentators suggest that the Commodity Control List represents a trap
for unwary exporters. 270 In probable recognition of the opportunities
51. See 54 Fed. Reg. 52,017 (1989). In 1991, two new chemicals were added. See 56 Fed.
Reg. 2676 (1991). In 1992, four new chemicals were added. See 57 Fed. Reg. 60,122 (1992).
264. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1990).
265. See Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 207.
266. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b)(1) (1990).
267. See 54 Fed. Reg. 52017 (1991).
268. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(4)(A).
269. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. 1 1990).
270. See Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 207.
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for innocent violation, civil penalties27' are markedly more lenient
than the criminal penalties for "knowing" or "wilful violations. ' 272
Criminal penalties have the greatest impact on United States compa-
nies, providing for fines as much as five times the export's value and
five years in prison. Under the civil section, the maximum fine per
violation is $100,000.273
The most severe penalty, however, is the denial of all export priv-
ileges to a violator for up to ten years. 274 The 1988 reauthorization of
the EAA allows the denial of export privileges to persons "related" to
the convicted violator.275 Because separate amendments dealt with
conspiracy, exporters became concerned about the ways a person
might be related to a violator, thus becoming subject to the dreaded
sanction of being denied all licenses. The accompanying rules issued
the following year addressed the question, though unsatisfactorily.
The rules outlined the circumstances that the Director of Export Li-
censing may consider before barring the export privileges of a "re-
lated" person. The rules then offered the assurance that notice would
be given and a hearing provided to challenge the existence of the
relationship. 276
However, new language may bring "unintended third parties
within the EAA's coverage and forbid them to export on some attenu-
ated affiliation. ' 277 Finding the appeal procedure inadequate for a de-
nial of privileges on the basis of relation to a violator, one observor
remarked that, "the government appears to be giving itself greater
latitude in EAA enforcement. ' 278 Despite this concern, the Senate
may have eliminated sanctions applying to a violator's entire corpo-
rate family in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 ("Weapons Control Act") 279 which
271. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c) (1990).
272. See id. § 2410(a), (b) (1990).
273. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1992).
274. 15 C.F.R. § 770.15 (d).
275. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b).
276. 15 C.F.R. § 770.15(h) (1992).
277. Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 223.
278. Id.
279. Chemical & Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-138, 105 Stat. 1245-59 (1991). The Weapons Control Act was first introduced as
S.195 during the 101st Congress, 1st Session, but was reintroduced as S.320 in 1991 and
emerged on September 25, 1991, in the House of Representatives as H.R. 3409, sponsored by
Representative Dante B. Fascell, Democrat from Florida. H.R. 3409 was reported to the
House on October 3, 1991 and again on November 19, 1991. See H.R. REP. No. 235, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 835.
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was incorporated into the Omnibus Export Amendments of 1990.
The Office of Export Enforcement may exercise much discretion
before it refers a violation to the Justice Department. If an exporter
voluntarily admits a violation, authorities consider extenuating cir-
cumstances and actual impact on "regulatory objectives" as well as
whether the violation represents "an aberration" in an otherwise com-
pliant history.280 In such cases, authorities may issue a warning let-
ter. Even when a violation has reached the charging letter stage,
authorities encourage violators to settle.281
3. Contract Sanctity
The policy of contract sanctity allows agreements negotiated
under one set of government regulations to be implemented despite a
later change in regulations. Contract sanctity clauses provide another
measure of leeway. As regulations change regarding which products
will be denied licenses and which destinations have become pro-
scribed, the United States Commerce Department maintains the right
to allow for the licensing of shipments contracted before the change.
For example, thionyl chloride, one of the principal precursors for
mustard gas, was placed on the proscribed list of chemicals in 1989 so
as to bring the list in line with the one published by the Australia
Group earlier that year.28 2 But the regulation still allowed approval
of applications for thionyl chloride shipments to Iraq if the contract
was formed before July 6, 1987.283 Thionyl chloride shipments to
newly restricted destinations other than Iran, Iraq, Libya, or Syria 284
would be approved if the agreements were entered into before Decem-
ber 12, 1989.285
C Rigidity and Unilateral Action: State and Defense
Under the auspices of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in
the Department of State, the Office of Munitions Control oversees ex-
280. Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 225 (citing Bureau of Export Administration,
Voluntary Disclosure, 54 Fed. Reg. 9233, 9235 (1989)).
281. Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 226.
282. 15 C.F.R. § 776.19(d) (1992).
283. Id.
284. The prohibition does not apply to NATO members, Australia, Austria, Ireland, Ja-
pan, New Zealand, and Switzerland. Id. § 766.19(h).
285. The rules also contain savings clauses. For example, the final rule announced Janu-
ary 24, 1991, approved any shipment loaded or on the dock for loading pursuant to actual
orders for export before February 7, 1991, provided it was exported by February 22, 1991. See
56 Fed. Reg. 2676 (1991).
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port licenses for arms shipments. Though somewhat shorter than the
Commodity Control List, the United States Munitions List presents a
complex maze of categories for license applicants. Wide categories of
component parts are described.28 6
In addition, while the sanctions for violating the EAA are lenient
and flexible, the penalties for violating the AECA 28 7 are severe and
rigid. The criminal penalty may be as high as $1 million in fines plus
a maximum of ten years in prison. The maximum civil penalty is
$500,000.218 The State Department possesses wide power to revoke,
deny or suspend export privileges:
(1) [W]henever the Department believes that the AECA... or a
United States government export authorization has been violated;
(2) [W]henever a party to a manufacturing license or technical
assistance agreement has been debarred;
(3) [W]henever an order of debarment or suspension has been
made applicable to an applicant, licensee or party to an approved
or proposed agreement;
(4) [W]henever a person who has been debarred or suspended has
a significant interest in the transaction;
(5) [W]henever the applicant or, in certain cases, any party to the
export or agreement has been indicted or convicted of specified
criminal offenses or is ineligible to contract with or receive an ex-
port or import license from an agency of the United States govern-
ment; or
(6) [W]henever an applicant fails to provide information expressly
required by the ... license forms.
28 9
Previous legislation allowed some discretionary authority to
grant new licenses to exporters convicted of violating the AECA.
However, since 1989, a minimum period of three years must pass
before any new license can be issued.290 The total number of persons
barred for violating the AECA stood at twenty-six in 1988. The regu-
lations and procedures surrounding this ultimate penalty have be-
come more comprehensive as to who may be debarred for direct or
indirect violation and more rigid as to the avenues of appeal. 291
286. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1992).
287. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1990).
288. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e) (1990).
289. Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 209 (citing 22 C.F.R. §§ 126.7, 127.6 (1980)).
290. 22 C.F.R. § 127.6(c) (1992).
291. See Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 214-15.
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D. New Rules Bring Tension to Surface
When the Department of State unveiled a plan in September
1990 "to require United States companies to obtain export licenses for
all items, from computers to paper clips, that they believe will be used
to develop missiles and chemical or biological weapons, ' 292 the ten-
sion between the opposing goals of the President's export enforcement
policy arose anew. The new plan expanded the category of items war-
ranting denial as "unacceptable risks" for use in missile, chemical, or
biological warfare projects.
The new plan also shifted the burden to the exporter to show
whether the end use of the export was known to be a weapons pro-
gram. The call for greater rigidity reflects the frustration created in
export control when suppliers of materials and technology insist, usu-
ally in good faith, that they did not know their exports were ulti-
mately destined for weapons programs. Making the lists of
proscribed items more specific and placing the burden of scienter on
the party best able to prove it are examples of two ways in which the
government sought to relieve the frustration.
The unilateral quality of the new "enhanced" controls disturbed
representatives of the affected industries and officials in the Com-
merce Department. Some experts estimated that the unilateral clos-
ing of these gaps in export controls would cost United States industry
$250 billion a year in exports. Industry contended that such controls
must be multilateral so that United States exporters do not bear a
disproportionate share of the burden imposed by anti-proliferation
measures. 2
93
E. Dual Use Item Caught In the Middle
The Commerce Department and industry representatives advo-
cate flexibility and multilateral action in export control. Meanwhile,
the Departments of State and Defense champion rigidity and unilat-
eral action. In the middle is the dual use export item, a commodity
such as Phosgene, extensively used for peacetime products such as
urethanes. 294 Yet, Phosgene's long history as a chemical weapon, 295
292. Industry Attacks US. Plan to Impose Unilateral Curbs on Proliferation Exports, 7
Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) No. 44, at 1697 (Nov. 7, 1990).
293. Id.
294. See Ellen Goldbaum, For Illicit Chemical Arms, No Easy Remedies Seen, CHEMICAL
WK., Jan. 18, 1989, at 12.
295. Phosgene was the second chemical used in World War I and continued to be the
preferred choking agent for the duration of that war. See Haber, supra note 106, at 41-42.
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illustrates its usefulness in a chemical weapons program. Addition-
ally, many legitimate users stockpile the chemical and resell it. Fur-
ther, international arms brokers ingeniously disguise the ultimate
destination and purchaser. Given this set of circumstances, to apply
effective unilateral controls on Phosgene requires close scrutiny of
every shipment not only from the United States but also from subsidi-
ary suppliers outside the United States. Such scrutiny inevitably adds
cost and reduces competitiveness.
1. Assigning the Right List
As weapons technology advances, the overlapping jurisdiction of
the Departments of Commerce and State creates difficulties with iden-
tifying what products advance proliferation.296 The dilemma posed
by the dual use item arises from the use of two lists, the Commodity
Control List and the United States Munitions List, and consequently,
two sets of sanctions. If dual use items remain on the Commodity
Control List under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department, in-
dustry can expect some flexibility. However, if the item moves over to
the Munitions List, industry must brace itself for rigid application of
penalties.
The "enhanced" program announced by the State Department
suggests that dual jurisdiction may be the solution. The precedent for
dual jurisdiction appears with inertial navigation systems that are
standard equipment in civil aircraft. The systems appear on the
United States Munitions List if the destination is a controlled country
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.297 Otherwise, the same
equipment comes under the jurisdiction of the EAA.
298
2. Interagency Disagreement
On at least one occasion the Departments of State and Defense
experienced difficulty agreeing on an item bound for Iraq. "[T]his
stuff was classified a munition," testified Dr. Stephan Bryen, former
Under Secretary of Defense, to Congress, "because it was in a mili-
tary-type container. ' 299 The 1987 application involved an export li-
cense to send atropine injectors to Iraq. An atropine injector delivers
296. See supra part II.B.6.
297. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(0 (1990).
298. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2416(c) (1990).
299. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 203.
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a self-administered dose of nerve gas antidote under combat
conditions.
The State Department at the time thought it was all right, basically
saying, "Well, it seemed to them it was a defensive, almost human-
itarian kind of export." . .. The Army thought it was all right
until they did a little hard thinking about it. The policy people in
what we called international security affairs, the people who had
responsibility for that region, thought it was all right. My own
technical people [at the Defense Department] thought it was all
right, too. I didn't think it was all right. I thought it was a dumb
thing to do and dangerous thing to do, mostly because the only
people that had nerve gas.., were the Iraqis and the only conceiv-
able reason that they would want these products was to allow them
to operate with impunity close up against the Iranians or the
Kurds or whoever they were using it against as some means of
protecting themselves from its effects. 3°°
In testimony carefully orchestrated by Senator Jesse Helms to
allow the telling of the atropine injector story, Dr. Bryen insisted his
was not a scientific call but a layman's application of common sense.
"So, I objected to it. I got myself into quite a little quarrel with the
State Department and people in my own department .... [I]t shows
you that the rules and regulations that we have are pretty weak and
unclear."30
1
The Commerce Department evidently was not involved in the
atropine injector license denial. Given the categories of the Munitions
List, however, the Department of State must have stretched some cat-
egory to include the injectors. The Commerce Department could
have claimed jurisdiction under the Commodity Control List had it
wanted to enter the argument. This sort of dispute might have been
prevented had an earlier proposal passed that provided for "a dispute
resolution procedure between the Departments of Commerce and
State over whether commodities should be controlled as defense arti-
cles under the munitions list of the [AECA] or dual use commercial
goods on the Commodity Control List under EAA.
' '30 2
3. Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative
The decision to stop shipment of the Iraq-bound atropine injec-
tors was correct. However, the decision-making process illustrates
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,182 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
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why industry worried openly over the "Enhanced Proliferation Con-
trol Initiative" announced in early 1991, especially with regard to the
technology classified as contributing to chemical weapons production.
Although the chemical industry convinced the Commerce Depart-
ment during the comment period to omit process control instruments
or computer systems specially designed for highly automated systems
from the new list, high nickel content alloy equipment survived to the
final rule stage. Industry complained that "high nickel content alloy
equipment ... is 'ubiquitous' " and that the United States is not the
only supplier.303 While many of the provisions in the Department of
State's new initiative fill gaps in United States export control, the
sweeping additions of equipment and technology with wide commer-
cial use defy logic. 30 4
303. Industry Comments Partially Considered in New List of Banned Chemical Equipment,
8 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) No. 7, at 235 (Feb. 13, 1991).
304. Id. at 23 5-36. The revised list of export-controlled equipment and technology in the
"Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative" includes the following:
1. Chemical process equipment constructed of Hastelloy, Monel, or another alloy with a
nickel content in excess of [forty] percent by weight, as follows: reactor vessels, storage
tanks and containers, heat exchangers, distillation columns, or condensers.
2. Thermometers or other sensors encased in alloy with a nickel content in excess of [forty]
percent.
3. Chemical process equipment as in item 1 which is lined with nickel, polyvinylidene fluo-
ride, high density polyethylene, or glass.
4. Pumps or valves
(a) incorporating a body made from alloy with a nickel content in excess of [forty] percent
by weight, or
(b) lined with nickel, or
(c) otherwise designed to be utilized with fluorine or hydrogen fluoride, or with orga-
nophosphorus compounds.
5. Filling equipment enclosed in a glove box of similar environmental barrier, or incorporat-
ing a nickel-lined or Hastelloy nozzle.
6. Incinerators specially designed to incinerate
(a) any chemical weapons agent or listed precursor; or
(b) organophosphorus compounds.
7. Toxic gas monitoring systems designed to detect phosphorus, sulphur, or fluorine com-
pounds, or designed to detect any [chemical weapons] agent, which are:
(a) designed for continuous operation, and
(b) capable of detecting such chemicals at a concentration less than 0.1 milligrams per
cubic meter of air.
8. Monitoring systems for detection of chemical compounds having anticholinesterase
activity.
9. Engineering services as follows:
(a) overall plant design;
(b) design, specification, or procurement of equipment;
(c) supervision of construction, installation, or operation of complete plant or components
thereof;
(d) training of personnel; or
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F Congress' Position
Since the EAA comes up for renewal every two years, 305 Con-
gress may amend the export policy administered by the President
through the Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense. Invaria-
bly these efforts reflect congressional impatience with the stalemate
created by competing goals of flexibility and rigidity.
1. The Toshiba-Kongsberg Affair
Resentment of Japanese insensitivity to United States export pol-
icy 30 6 was at the heart of an unprecedented amendment in 1988 that
may represent a constitutionally prohibited ex post facto law. 307 The
amendment not only extended the force of United States export sanc-
tions retroactively, but in broader scope as well.
When Japanese Toshiba and Norwegian Kongsberg sold com-
puter-controlled machine tools to the Soviet Union, they violated
their own laws but not United States laws because the entire transac-
tion took place outside the United States. 30 8 The fact that the United
States possessed no jurisdiction angered the Congress. The computer
technology contained in the equipment was reverse-engineered by the
Soviets. Intelligence sources said the resulting application allowed
Soviet submarine propellers to run silently, improving Soviet opportu-
nities to avoid United States detection. 30 9 Congress imposed a three
year ban on government procurement contracts with both firms and
their parent companies. 310
(e) consultation on specific problems, for any facility which the provider of such services
knows is designed or intended to produce any of the [chemical weapons] agent or of any
precursor chemical ....
10. Software for process control which is specifically configured to control or implement the
production of any [chemical weapons] agent or of any precursor chemical ....
Id.
305. When the EAA lapses because of a delayed vote or a veto, Executive Orders are
employed. The Executive Order which followed the veto of the 1990 reauthorization is Exec.
Order No. 12,730, 3 C.F.R. 305 (1991).
306. See David Buchan, The Toshiba Affair: Little Scope for Japan to Make Amends, FIN.
TIMES, July 2, 1987, at 6.
307. See Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 235-36. The constitutional issue was dismissed
along with the entire cause of action in the Court of International Trade. See Arjay Assoc.
Inc. v. Reagan, 707 F. Supp. 1346 (1989).
308. See Krauland et. al, supra note 248 at 233, 234 n.240.
309. See Buchan, supra note 306, at 6.
310. Some exceptions were made to the Toshiba sanctions:
These sanctions do not apply to the procurement of defense articles or services:
(1) under existing contracts or subcontracts,
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This action illustrates the congressional policy agenda for export
control where Congress disapproved the implementation through nor-
mal channels. First, Congress intended to influence the behavior of
United States corporations as well as the behavior of foreign corpora-
tions. Second, Congress sought to hold the parent company liable for
its subsidiary's action, in complete disregard of traditional concepts of
limited corporate liability available to multinational enterprises.
311
Third, Congress declined to entrust a critical case to the conventional
discretion of the executive branch. Instead, Congress demanded
mandatory sanctions, accepting no equivocation about the need for
foreign policy flexibility from the executive branch. Fourth, when
sufficiently aroused, Congress would apply these rigid controls unilat-
erally without concern for foreign policy objectives which ordinarily
call for multilateral action.
Once Congress demonstrated its policy agenda for especially
egregious cases, the four stringent requirements that appeared in the
Weapons Control Act should have surprised no one. Forewarned,
Bush Administration representatives appeared at hearings to urge
Congress to devise sanctions against chemical weapons proliferation,
knowing that they would be strict. The fact that three of these rigid
requirements survived the House and Senate Conference on the Om-
nibus Export Amendments Act of 1990 ("Omnibus Act") 312 suggests
Congress' unwillingness to heed the Bush Administration's simultane-
ous call for multilateral flexibility. This bill died by pocket veto.
2. The 1990 Legislation
The Reagan Administration "viewed [sanctions legislation] as
[an] unnecessary infringement on executive branch prerogative.
313
The Bush Administration, surprisingly, invited Congress to join in a
"coordinated" effort to control chemical weapons proliferation. "In
working with the Congress on the proposed legislation," then Assis-
tant Secretary of State H. Allen Holmes said, "we accept in principle
(2) if the President determines that the procurement involves 'essential defense arti-
cles or services' and there exists no alternative supplier, or
(3) the President determines that the articles or services are essential to the national
security under defense co-production agreements.
Krauland et al., supra note 248, at 234.
311. See Philip I. Blumberg & Kurt A. Strasser, Corporate Groups and Enterprise Liability.
Contracts and Torts, in RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CORPORATE PARENT FOR THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE SUBSIDIARY (PLI Series No. 706, 1990).
312. See H.R. 4653, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).
313. H.R. REP. No. 334, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1989).
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that some form of sanctions . . . would give the administration an
additional instrument against countries that use [chemical weap-
ons]. ' ' 314 The Bush Administration immediately stated that it sought
no Toshiba-style sanctions. Instead, they desired sanctions allowing
executive discretion with no automatic triggering or retroactive
application.
The House of Representatives was willing to give President Bush
what he wanted, stating, "Sanctions are intended to be mandatory
and swift. 3 1 5 "The legislation does recognize, of course, that it is
reasonable to allow the President discretion in imposing sanctions.
316
A unilateral initiative to curb chemical weapons proliferation seemed
desirable.
While agreeing the initiative must be unilateral, the Senate, on
the other hand, refused to comply with the President's wishes. Its
version of chemical weapons sanctions began with a revocation of pat-
ent rights. The bill outlined the mandatory imposition of a two-year
revocation of export privileges as well as liability for the violator's
corporate family. During hearings, the chemical industry successfully
pressed its case against upsetting the delicate infrastructure of propri-
etary rights which patent suspensions, used as punishment tools,
would cause. The patent clause faded before the conference began
work on a compromise between the Senate and House versions.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, nonetheless, insisted
on two remaining differences. The first difference required the Presi-
dent to impose a two year sanction once he had found a violation.
The Senate Foreign Relations committee "wanted to ensure that no
bureaucracy would be able to succeed in pressing the President to
make an erroneous or capricious determination. '3 17 The second dif-
ference required the corporate parent and all other subsidiaries to suf-
fer the same sanction as the violating subsidiary.
The bill accorded the President new powers inside and outside
the country. Internally, the President could require a validated li-
cense for "any good or technology that he deems would assist a coun-
try in development, production, stockpiling, or delivery of chemical
or biological weapons. ' 31 8 Externally, sanctions would apply to the
314. Id.
315. Id. at 5.
316. Id.
317. S. REP. No. 166, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989).
318. Id. at 7.
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government that used chemical weapons; this section was a revival of
the sanctions measure originally drafted against the Iraqis for the
Kurdish incident.
319
Because the United States cannot exclusively rely on assurances
of foreign governments, the bill allowed regulation beyond the juris-
dictions of the Commerce and State Departments. That power was to
be unequivocally unilateral even though the bill paid lip-service to the
primacy placed by the Bush Administration on multilateral efforts.
"[U]nilateral sanctions cannot substitute for multilateral penalties,"
stated the Report accompanying S. 195, "[a]ccordingly, [the Senate] is
approving sanctions as the first strong step that should lead, with ad-
ministration support, to multilateral barriers.
'320
3. How Much Discretion Is Enough?
Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointed to
numerous opportunities for presidential discretion in the Chemical
Weapons Act. First, for companies engaging in technology and pre-
cursor trade, the bill allowed the President to determine if the viola-
tion was "knowing." Second, if the government in whose jurisdiction
the offending company resides imposes its own penalties, the Presi-
dent need not invoke sanctions. Third, if a country uses chemical
weapons, the legislation allowed the President to choose sanctions
"fitting the situation." Finally, for "both companies and countries,
the President could waive sanctions after 1 year in the national secur-
ity interest or if remedial action has been taken.
'321
Senator Garn revealed the underlying motive of the strict re-
319. 136 CONG. REC. S 17,179 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Pell). In floor
debate, Senator Claiborne Pell outlined the sanctions requirement against a nation which used
chemical weapons:
A country sanctioned ... would automatically face immediate imposition of at least
[six] of these . . . sanctions and subsequent imposition of a seventh sanction if the
illegal behavior continues:
Termination of U.S. assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
Termination of U.S. Government or commercial arms sales;
Termination of arms sales financing;
U.S. opposition to loans by international financial institutions;
Denial of U.S. Government credit including credit through the U.S. Eximbank;
Prohibition of loans or credit from U.S. banks;
Prohibition of the export of controlled dual-use goods and technology;
Other export restriction;
Downgrading or suspension of diplomatic relations;
Termination of landing rights in the United States.
Id. at 17,180. See also supra notes 6-105 and accompanying text.
320. S. REP. No. 166, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989).
321. 136 CONG. REC. S17,183 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Garn).
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quirements in his floor speech. "The only reason that I can see for a
broader waiver is so that the State Department can find some diplo-
matic excuse for the United States to let a company selling chemical
weapons to Iraq, or a country like Iraq that gasses its own people, get
off scot free."
'322
The Bush Administration favored the House version. The Presi-
dent wanted legislation "based on international cooperation rather
than unilateral fiat."' 323 In arguing that the Senate version left the
President without "sufficient flexibility to impose or waive sanctions
based on a consideration of the nation's security interests," the bill's
constitutionality was questioned. 324 Provisions requiring "determina-
tions and . . . follow-on actions by the President in response to re-
quests from relevant committee chairmen" 325 arguably violated the
separation of powers doctrine.
326
Senator Jesse Helms characterized the House version as "full of
loopholes which will enable companies who wish to continue to trade
in chemical and biological weapons technology to avoid all effective
sanctions. ' 327 Declaring that "everyone knows that the State Depart-
ment will invoke a waiver any chance it gets," Senator Helms ex-
plained that the waiver provisions in the House version were
unacceptable to the conferees:
To those who insist that the corporate sanctions section of the bill
must have waiver authority available for the President to exercise
immediately, all I can say [is] that we had our waiver-for the past
[two] years. The State Department has waived or opposed every
single effort from this Congress to hold Iraq accountable for its
actions. 328
Placing responsibility on the corporate family was another rea-
son Senator Helms gave the Senate for reporting a stronger version
than what the Administration wished:
Any clever corporate executive could set up five subsidiaries that
sell principally to the United States and another, separate subsidi-
ary the sole purpose of which is to sell chemical weapons to Iraq
.... Under the Senate version, not only the parent corporation...
322. Id.
323. Id. at 17,184 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Helms).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. For a modem articulation of this doctrine, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
327. 136 CONG. REC. S17,184 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Helms).
328. Id. at 17,185.
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[but the] five subsidiaries ... become prohibited corporations be-
cause of the poison gas sales of the sixth. 329
Though the legislation's language described the liable members of the
violator's corporate family as having "knowingly assisted," Senator
Helms explained that the United States legal standard of "imputing
knowledge to other entities in the corporate structure [would] be fol-
lowed in imposing sanctions."330
Another source of congressional frustration was revealed in the
floor debate for the Omnibus Act. The Commerce Department had
repeatedly overruled the Department of Defense's objections to ex-
port licenses. In fact, between 1985 and 1989, fourteen recommenda-
tions for denial of export licenses to Iraq were overruled by
Commerce. As an additional tightening measure, the Department of
Defense was given an automatic review of export licenses to Iran,
Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Any dispute would be resolved by the Na-
tional Security Council.331
4. Life after Veto
a. Executive Order
President Bush pocket-vetoed the Omnibus Act, citing the lack
of flexibility as the reason.
Because the veto also left the Export Administration Act of 1979
without reauthorization, the President issued an Executive Order.332
The Executive Order established the chemical and biological weapons
provisions that the Bush Administration favored. The Executive Or-
der was greeted with derision in the Senate. "[A] reading of the No-
vember 16 Executive Order indicated that necessary flexibility meant,
simply, the ability to do nothing. '333
The Executive Order allowed sanctions to be terminated if a vio-
lating company ceased providing precursors or technology. "An of-
fending company could ship all of the dangerous equipment to a
chemical weapons plant and avoid penalty if the shipments are fin-
ished before discovery. ' '3 34 In addition, the Executive Order allowed
the Secretary of State to waive sanctions for national security or for-
329. Id.
330. Id. at 17,186.
331. Id.
332. Exec. Order No. 12,730, 3 C.F.R. 305 (1990).
333. 137 CONG. REC. S1892 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1991) (statement of Sen. Helms).
334. Id.
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eign policy reasons. "[T]he most disgusting regime on Earth could
gas thousands of people--could even commit genocide-and the act
would be excused if the Secretary [of State] was convinced that impo-
sition of sanctions might have a bad effect on relations with that coun-
try," declared Senator Helms. 335 Moreover, Senator Helms faulted
the exclusively prospective nature of sanctions dating from November
16, 1990.336 Sanctions against countries using chemical weapons
against their own nationals, as when the Iraqis gassed the Kurds, do
not appear in the Executive Order.
b. The 1991 Legislation
The Executive Order and the State Department's newly an-
nounced "Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative" notwithstand-
ing, the bill was reintroduced in the Senate and passed in February,
1991. The House of Representatives did not share the Senate's enthu-
siasm to override the President's earlier veto. The Senate version lan-
guished in committee throughout the spring and summer. On
December 10, 1991, the House wiped the slate clean by declaring in a
resolution that the bill "contravenes the first clause of [the] seventh
section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States337
and is an infringement of the privileges of this House and that such
bill be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communi-
cating this resolution. '338
When the legislation was finally reported to the House on No-
vember 19, 1991, the congressional clock had been effectively turned
back to early 1990. The House bill allowed the President discretion to
waive sanctions if national security was affected.3 39 The first part of
the House Report on the bill revealed the reason for the dramatic
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 provides: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as
on other Bills." In short, the Senate was incorrect in reintroducing S.320 before the House had
an opportunity to do so.
338. H.R. REs. 267, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
339. H.R. REP. No. 235, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1991). Curiously, the House
version ignores the objection raised by the Bush Administration to the early version. The
House version requires that there must be "concurrence of the Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking
Minority Members of both committees" in any decision the President may make to waive the
imposition of sanctions on a country violator in the interests of national security. Keyed to the
reprogramming procedures of the Foreign Assistance Act, the waiver allows Congress to "put
a hold on the President[']s waiver decision." Id.
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reversion to the inability of the House Ways and Means Committee
and Senate conferees to resolve whether to reinstate import sanctions
as part of the sanctions list.3 40 Included among the "foreign persons"
liable for sanctions are "any successor entity' '3 4 1 or "an affiliate of
that foreign person if that affiliate knowingly assisted . . . [and] is
controlled in fact by that foreign person."3 42
G. Paradoxes Multiply Meanwhile
More than $700 million in United States goods and technology
were shipped to Iraq between 1986 and 1990 under 494 Commerce
Department licenses. Returned without action were 171 applications
for a value of $157 million while 31 applications for a value of $11
million were rejected. At the time the embargo was imposed against
Iraq because of the invasion of Kuwait, 61 applications for a value of
$107 million were pending. 343 Because Iraq was no longer listed as a
terrorist supporting nation after 1982, the Commerce Department
could deny licenses only if diversion to the Soviet Union, Eastern Eu-
rope, or China was suspected, or if the exports were likely to be used
in Iraq's nuclear industry. 344
In the House Report for the revised Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, Congress-
man Pete Stark complained that while the bill was a good one, it did
not go far enough. 345 He praised the provisions of the bill which ex-
tended sanctions against foreign companies selling chemical or biolog-
ical weapons but found fault that such sanctions did not include
nuclear weapons.3 46 Stark listed foreign firms involved in nuclear
proliferation as candidates for similar sanctions. 347
The paradox of the United States export control system is that it
340. H.R. REP. No. 235, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I at 4 (1991).
341. H.R. 3409, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
342. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 235, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 12 (1991).
343. Commerce Approved Export Licenses for Iraq, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at
1609 (Oct. 24, 1990).
344. Id.
345. H.R. REP. No. 235, 102d Cong., Sess., pt. 2, at 15 (1991).
346. Id.
347. Id. Listed as involved with gas centrifuge design for Iraq were: Man Technolgien of
Germany, Export-Union of Germany, H&H Metalform of Germany, Matrix-Churchill of
Great Britain, Saarstahl of Germany, Schmiedemeccanica of Switzerland, Usinor-Sacilor of
Great Britain, Gachot of France, Leybold of Germany, VAT of Liechtenstein, Inwako of Ger-
many, Swift-Levick of Great Britain, Schaeublin of Switzerland, and Kavo of Germany. Id.
Stark identified Siemens, a German conglomerate, as being interested in supplying a nuclear
reactor to Iran. Id.
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did not stop dangerous exports from reaching a renegade nation
which threatened United States interests, even though the export con-
trol policy created a great deal of anxiety in the executive and legisla-
tive branches and significant expense for the affected industries.
Additional pressures created by multilateral policies will be examined
in Part IV, to be followed by a series of legislative alternatives in
search of a better way to regulate chemical exports while, at the same
time, advancing an anti-proliferation policy.
IV. GLOBAL PICTURE: FOUR MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
"As a world community, we must act, not only to deter the use
of inhumane weapons like mustard and nerve gas, but to eliminate the
weapons entirely," President Bush told the United Nations General
Assembly in October 1990.348 "This isn't merely a bilateral concern.
The Gulf crisis proves how important it is to act together, and to act
now, to conclude an absolute worldwide ban on these weapons. ' 349
The global ban envisioned by President Bush is only one of four
viable international responses to the widespread availability of chemi-
cal weapons. In direct opposition lies the idea of deterrence through
mutual assured destruction. Deterrence offers massive retaliation in
kind as a disincentive for any first use of chemical weapons. Propo-
nents of deterrence support the continued research and development
of chemical agents in the military arsenal as well as deployment of the
binary chemical weapons program.
Between the two extremes of global ban and deterrance, how-
ever, exist two more possibilities.350 Closer to deterrence is the propo-
sal to create multilateral sanctions. This middle ground of global
opprobrium entails providing the Geneva Protocol of 1925 some gen-
uine enforcement power. An attempt to rally support for this concept
at the Paris Conference fell disappointingly short of the mark.
The second middle position resembles the concept of the global
ban. Its proponents favor the strict control of precursors and technol-
ogy while possessor nations attempt to negotiate a more comprehen-
sive ban. The Australia Group formed the core of this movement and
enjoyed greater progress at its Canberra meeting in September 1989
348. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Dec. 1990, at 4, 10.
349. Id.
350. Brad Roberts, The United States and Chemical Arms Control, in NEW TECHNOLO-
GIES FOR SECURITY & ARMS CONTROL: THREATS & PROMISE 303, 306-08 (Eric H. Arnett
ed., 1989).
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than did the Paris Conference earlier in the year. The anti-prolifera-
tion forces organized through the Australia Group could have ad-
vanced their objectives even if the wider movement favoring a global
ban had faltered. Multilateral anti-proliferation strategies could work
just as well, while members scale down their own chemical arsenals
by means of bilateral agreements.
A. Deterrence
Scoffing at protective gear as the response to a chemical weapons
threat on the battlefield, and warning of the impracticalities of em-
ploying a nuclear response, proponents of chemical deterrence main-
tain that only the capability to retaliate in kind constitutes an
adequate defense to a chemical threat. Only by improving its own
arsenal of chemical agents can the United States maintain the clout
necessary to keep not only superpowers from breaching the taboo
against chemical agents but renegade nations as well. 351 Proponents
asserted that:
On account of the President's own illusions that a [chemical weap-
ons] ban will solve the problem of chemical weapons, both Mr.
Bush and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin
Powell, are being forced to do a "whistling in the dark" routine on
this aspect of the Iraqi threat .... Instead of trying simply to put
a brave face on the risk of chemical attack by Iraq, and blithely
assuring the public about the adequacy of the United States' ability
to deal with such an attack if it comes, the Bush Administration
should seize this crisis as an opportunity to walk away from its
misguided policy on chemical arms.
352
Critics found two flaws in the President's global ban initiative.353
The first was the illusion of the ban's "global quality" and the second
was the impossibility of verification.
1. Comprehensive Ban Impossible
Because the necessary materials, technology, and converted facil-
ities are so widely available, a global ban not only on use, but also on
production and stockpiling of chemical agents, is impossible to effec-
351. For a general overview, see J. AROESTY ET AL., DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF A
CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY (1989).
352. Bush's Chemical Chickens Come Home to Roost, CENTER FOR SECURITY POL'Y PUB.
No. 90-P 79 (Aug. 9, 1990).
353. Banning Chemical Weapons: Negotiating Unilateral U.S. Disarmament, CENTER FOR
SECURITY POL'Y PUB. No. 89-61 (Oct. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Banning Chemical Weapons].
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tuate. If the Chemical Weapons Convention cannot become effective
until every nation signs it, then the ban is doomed from the beginning.
If, however, the Chemical Weapons Convention becomes effective
when a certain number of countries sign, those nations will be held
hostage to the possessors declining to become signatories.
[F]ew devotees of the [chemical weapons] treaty believe such an
arrangement is feasible. Indeed, some chemical weapons ban advo-
cates go so far as to say that it is unreasonable to hold United
States acceptance of the ban hostage to a decision by Libya, Iraq or
others to participate. They believe the goal of getting most nations
to participate in a [chemical weapons] treaty is too important to
allow the fact that some decline to stand in the way. Such thinking
is the very antithesis of the concept of a "global" ban.354
2. Verification Impossible
When deterrence proponents focus on verification, they touch
the ban's Achilles Heel. Verification, more than any other facet of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, slowed the negotiation process. The
highlights of the struggle over verification put forward by groups such
as the Center for Security Policy illustrate the dimensions of the
problem.
a. Monitoring of Chemical Agents
Unlike uranium, which is rare and expensive, the precursors for
chemical weapons are common and inexpensive. Monitoring the
materials needed for manufacturing chemical weapons makes the sort
of verification which is successful in curbing nuclear proliferation use-
less for chemical weaponry. Moreover, under a binary program,
chemicals themselves may be harmless until they are combined, ide-
ally after the weapon is launched. 35 5 Thus, not only lethal but harm-
less chemicals must be adequately tracked, complicating the process
and inevitably reducing its efficacy.
b. Further Obstacles to Verification
Several other obstacles to verification exist. First, where large
quantities of chemical munitions may not be tactically necessary, con-
tainers of chemical agents could be easily concealed in most inspec-
354. Id.
355. Id. See also Caleb Baker, Lean Times for Army Will Mean Few New Programs, DE-
FENSE NEWS, Feb. 11, 1991, at 10.
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tions. Second, because the process of manufacturing nonmilitary
chemical products resembles that for producing chemical weapons,
plants can be disguised as pesticide or pharmaceutical producers, frus-
trating inspection. Third, because artillery shells or SCUD missiles
can easily be adapted to deliver a chemical payload, controlling the
method of delivery for chemical weapons is not feasible. Finally, even
though the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention was supposed to end
the threat of biological warfare, there is "considerable evidence that
other signatories are systematically violating the [Biological Weap-
ons] Convention.
356
c. Aggressive Verification Burdens the Chemical Industry
Any system of verification will burden the chemical industry.
However, proponents downplay this because the chemical industry
favored the Chemical Weapons Convention. Many of the snags in
negotiating, nevertheless, may be traced to the burden on industry.
The United States chemical industry offered some concessions to
negotiators. If their proprietary rights enjoy protection, the industry
will cooperate with verification; indeed, they have offered to develop
the prototypical inspection regime.35 7
The chemical industry has been forced to accept small victories
in exchange for large sacrifices in other arenas. For example, the in-
dustry agreed to sanction the entire corporate family in exchange for
the removal of patent forfeitures from the Export Administration
Amendments. In the Commerce Department's new rules to govern
proliferation, the industry was forced to accept sweeping controls of
nickel alloy equipment in exchange for concessions related to produc-
tion control equipment.
3. Proof in the Gulf War?
United Nations Resolution 678, adopted on November 29, 1990,
perfectly exemplifies the force of deterrence. The resolution author-
ized "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait...
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council
Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security
in the area. ' 358 The Japanese foreign minister warned Iraq specifi-
356. Banning Chemical Weapons, supra note 353, at 3.
357. CMA's Olson Unravels Intricacies of Verifying a Chemical Arms Treaty, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 24, 1980, at 167-72.
358. News Chronology, supra note 348, at 12 (emphasis added).
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cally against using chemical weapons. 359 Prince Khalid Bin-Sultan,
the Saudi commander of the joint forces, warned Saddam Hussein in
August, 1990:
[W]e are fully aware of his limited capabilities, and we also know-
and he knows it full well-that should he use [chemicals] it would
cause the total destruction of Iraq. At the same time, with regard
to the Saudi Armed Forces, we are prepared for this type of
warfare. 36
Given these warnings of devastating retribution coupled with the
United States' stern warnings, it may be concluded that the absence of
chemical weapons in the war for Kuwait resulted from deterrence.
Proponents of defense theories based on deterrence assert that
deterrence represents the only practical policy, although they respect
the notion of tandem policies. "America's energies in the chemical
weapons areas ought to be focused on the maintenance of modest
chemical retaliatory capabilities and the destruction of the preponder-
ance of obsolescing United States .. .stockpiles. ' 361 "At the same
time, the United States should seek to provide means of enforcing the
present arms control regime banning first-use of chemical weapons. ' 362
As the war with Iraq approached, however, the Bush Adminis-
tration stood firmly in the middle, neither embracing nor rejecting the
concept of retaliation in kind. On August 14, 1990, United States
Defense Secretary Richard Cheney stated that he could conceive of no
situation in which the United States would use chemical weapons. 363
Only two days later, United States Ambassador Stephen Ledogar told
the Conference on Disarmament that "if [United States troops] are
attacked with chemical weapons, we must have a variety of response
options, including the option to respond in kind so long as we still
have some chemical weapons. ' ' 364 After the war for Kuwait ended,
however, President Bush abandoned the idea of "retaliation in kind."
He announced in May 1991, that the United States would destroy its
chemical weapons stockpile within ten years, retaining none of the
defensive reserves authorized by the bilateral treaty with the Soviet
359. Japanese Minister Warns Iraq on Chemical Weapons, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Feb. 14, 1991, at FE/0996/A4/1.
360. News Chronology, supra note 348, at 8.
361. Banning Chemical Weapons, supra note 353, at 5.
362. Id.
363. News Chronology, supra note 348, at 6-7.
364. Id. at 7.
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Union and the draft of the Chemical Weapons Convention.365
B. Global Ban: Chemical Weapons Convention
The multilateral initiative intended to replace United States de-
pendence on deterrence, and to take precedence over unilateral efforts
to control the proliferation of chemical weapons, focuses on eradicat-
ing chemical arsenals. Under the terms of the initiative, declared pos-
sessors of chemical weapons must dismantle their production
programs and destroy their stockpiles. The Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (the "Convention") tabled by the United States in 1984 at the
United Nations proposed a forty-nation disarmament conference in
Geneva.
1. The Draft Convention
The "Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons
to the Conference on Disarmament" is the full title for the informal
term: the "Rolling Text" ("Report" or "Rolling Text"). During the
drafting period, twenty Articles, eight Annexes, and a Protocol of In-
spection Procedures composed the 130 pages of the first appendix to
the Report. The second appendix contained provisions under devel-
opment or already discarded. "Every word that goes into the report,
be it appendix I or appendix II, requires consensus of the forty partic-
ipating states.
'
"366
a. Article I: The Promise
Signatories promise not to "develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indi-
rectly chemical weapons to anyone. ' 367 The first article clearly for-
bids the use of chemical weapons and mandates the destruction of
both weapons and facilities which produce them. 368
365. Michael R. Gordon, US. Weighs a Plan for Arms Control in the Middle East, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1991, at Al. President Bush announced: "We are formally forswearing the
use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective when
the convention enters into force. The United States unconditionally commits itself to the de-
struction of all our stocks of chemical weapons within ten years of entry into force." Id.
366. Johan Molander, Negotiating Chemical Disarmament, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CON-
VENTION BULL., Feb. 1990, at 3. By the time this Article went to press, the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention had been opened for signature in Paris, with more than the required signatures
to officially enact it by January 15, 1993.
367. Id.
368. Id.
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b. Article I: Definition
If a nation intends to use a chemical as a weapon, that chemical
comes within the definition of the Convention. By pinning the defini-
tion to the intent, negotiators built flexibility in the Convention to
keep pace with technological advances. Chemical weapons covered
by the Convention fall into three categories:
i. toxic chemicals and their precursors,
ii. specially designed munitions, and
iii. equipment specifically designed for use in deployment.
Though the United States and the former Soviet Union represent the
only two self-declared possessors of chemical weapons and though the
two nations agreed to extensive dismantling of their own chemical
programs, 369 the Convention is aimed at the programs of every
country.
c. Article III: Declarations
The Convention requires each signatory to publicly declare its
obligations under the agreement. For example, each signatory nation
must declare whether there are any chemical weapons under its juris-
diction. Further, each signatory must declare whether any chemical
weapons are on its territory. The Convention also requires a signa-
tory to declare if "it has transferred or received any chemical weapons
and... [if] it has transferred or received from anyone the control over
such weapons" from a specific date yet to be decided. 370
The Convention requires similar declarations about chemical
weapons production facilities, including the "precise location, nature
and general scope of activities of any facility and establishment on its
territory or under its jurisdiction," including laboratories and test
sites. 371 To combat the problems created by the vast scope of these
declarations, negotiators generated questionnaires that can be an-
swered either "yes" or "no. '372
369. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Agreement on Destruction on
Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Conven-
tion on Banning Chemical Weapons, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 932 (1990).
370. Thomas Stock & Ronald Sutherland, Objectives and Requirements of a National
Body, Based on Implicit Suggestions in the Current Rolling Text of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, in NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FUTURE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CON-
VENTION 15 (Thomas Stock & Ronald Sutherland eds., 1990).
371. Id. at 16.
372. Id.
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d. Articles IV and V Destruction and Verification
In conjunction with detailed annexes, Articles IV and V outline a
ten year plan to destroy and verify the destruction of chemical weap-
ons. The time table set out in Articles IV and V declares:
Complete destruction is to be achieved within ten years. Should a
State Party, in exceptional cases, for technological, financial, eco-
logical or other reason not be in a position to do so, the Convention
allows for the possibility of extending this time frame by up to five
more years. Furthermore, in exceptional cases of compelling need,
Article V permits State Parties to convert, rather than destroy,
chemical weapons production facilities, but only under strict con-
ditions designed to prevent their possible reconversion.
373
e. Article VI: Exceptions
Signatories may continue to develop, produce, or transfer chemi-
cals as long as the end product is not a weapon. This provision divides
control requirements by degree of chemical toxicity. The first cate-
gory includes the organophosphorus nerve agents: VX, Tabun, Sain,
and Soman, as well as mustard and BZ. These chemical agents are
rated by toxicity rather than the method of production, and some of
them overlap with the biological agent category. 374 The second cate-
gory of control is the super-toxic chemicals that are lethal by them-
selves. This category consists of Phosgene, hydrogen cyanide,
cyanogen chloride, phosphorus oxychloride, and phosphorus trichlo-
ride. Thiodiglycol is also in the second category because it yields
mustard after adding hydrochloric acid. The third category contains
the key precursors that possess nonmilitary as well as military uses.
Chemicals containing P-methyl, P-ethyl, or P-propyl bonds along
with pinacolyl alcohol are in this category. In 1989, a fourth category
emerged to include industrial chemicals with weapon potential. This
includes methyl isocyanate which accidentally killed thousands of
people in Bhopal, India in 1984. By dividing the agents in this fash-
ion, different degrees of risk translate to different levels of monitor-
ing.37 5 No explicit restrictions were placed on dual-use equipment. 376
The final draft of the Convention requires that provisions be imple-
373. Adolph Ritter von Wagner, The Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, 17 CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Sept. 1992, at 1, 3.
374. Ricin exemplifies an agent in this third category. See AROESTY ET AL., supra note
351, at 8.
375. AROESTY ET AL., supra note 351, at 7-8.
376. von Wagner, supra note 373, at 3.
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mented in a manner that does not hamper the economic and techno-
logical development of the signatories.
377
f Articles VII and VIII. Organizational Structure
Each signatory state will develop a National Authority empow-
ered to implement the Convention. An International Organization
with a Technical Secretariat will oversee the Convention worldwide.
The latest estimate of the cost is $800 million over the first fifteen
years of the Convention's life.378
g. Articles IX Challenge Inspections
Article IX was probably the most controversial and hotly de-
bated provision of the Convention. It sets out the parameters for a
challenge inspection to reinforce on-site inspection and material ac-
counting. The challenge inspection agreement has been called:
[A] novelty in the verification of a universally applicable arms con-
trol and disarmament treaty . . . [which] constitutes a politically
sensitive concept [and] which balances carefully the verification in-
terests of a State Party and of the international community and the
interest of the inspected State Party to protect sensitive informa-
tion not related to the Chemical Weapons Convention.379
h. Articles X and XII
Article X details how signatories may protect themselves from
chemical weapons. It represents one of the "built-in safeguards of the
Convention to protect States Parties against the eventuality of the hy-
pothetically continuing risk of being threatened or attacked by chemi-
cal weapons. ' 380 Article X provides for three major systems to aid
signatory states. First, it provides voluntary funds for assistance by
the Conferences of States Parties. Second, it assures assistance
through the organization if chemical weapons are actually used
against a State Party, or so threatened. Third, it also provides for
immediate emergency assistance from other States Parties. 38'
Serving as the "principal safeguard of the Convention to protect
the States Parties against violations," Article XII gave the authority
377. Id.
378. News Chronology, supra note 348, at 10.
379. von Wagner, supra note 373, at 3.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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to order remedies, including sanctions, for "any situation which con-
travenes the provisions of the Convention. ' 382
2. Fundamental Requirements on Signatories
A signatory to the Convention must meet several requirements as
soon as the Convention enters into force. First, within thirty days of
the Chemical Weapons Convention's effective date, signatories must
declare all stockpiles and recent transfers. Then, each signatory will
have ten years to destroy everything. Second, once a signatory de-
clares its production facilities, it must stop all activity except that nec-
essary to close the facility. Third, the Convention allows small
quantities of super-toxic weapons and key precursors for deterrence
against chemical attack as well as for research and medical use. Presi-
dent Bush summed up how the Chemical Weapons Convention would
affect the United States:
Today, I want to announce steps that the United States is ready to
take-steps to rid the world of these truly terrible weapons-to-
ward a treaty that will ban--eliminate-all chemical weapons from
the Earth [ten] years from the day it is signed. This initiative con-
tains three major elements.
First, in the first [eight] years of a chemical weapons treaty, the
United States is ready to destroy nearly all-[90%]--of our chemi-
cal weapons stockpile, provided the Soviet Union joins the ban.
And I think they will.
Second, we are ready to destroy all of our chemical weapons-
100% every one-within [ten] years, once all nations capable of
building chemical weapons sign that total ban treaty.
And third, the United States is ready to begin now. We will elimi-
nate more than 80% of our stockpile, even as we work to complete
a treaty, if the Soviet Union joins us in cutting chemical weapons
to an equal level, and we agree on the conditions, including inspec-
tions, under which stockpiles are destroyed.
383
The estimated cost to the United States for its participation in the
Convention is just under $400 million during the first fifteen years of
the treaty's life.
384
382. Id.
383. Conference Against Chemical Weapons, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1989, at 45.
384. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Dec. 1990, at 10. The
following were the anticipated signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention which was
reported to the United Nations on September 3, 1992: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Brazil, Bulga-
ria, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslavakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia,
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3. Bilateral Prodding
The former Soviet Union and the United States agreed to reduce
the aggregate quantity of their respective stockpiles by one-half before
the end of 1999. Further, they agreed to bring the aggregate total to
under 5000 tons by the end of 2002.385 "The Soviet-United States
bilateral agreement was designed to provide new impetus to the con-
clusion of a comprehensive verifiable global chemical weapons ban at
the earliest possible date. '38
6
Although the Soviets have met each proviso that President Bush
set out in his statement on the United States' willingness, another con-
dition may be harder to meet.
More controversial is President Bush's statement that the United
States would not agree to eliminate all of its chemical weapons
stocks until "all nations capable of building chemical weapons
signed that total ban treaty." [N]ations that have signed the treaty
would not give up all their stores of poison gas as long as a single
country that could make chemical weapons, such as Libya, refuses
to go along with a treaty.
387
In answer to the criticism that a single nation would have com-
plete veto power over the Convention, the Bush Administration ar-
gued that the provision might encourage "recalcitrant third world
nations to go along with a global ban. ' 38 8 Given the President's an-
nouncement in May 1991, promising the unilateral destruction of the
entire United States chemical arsenal, the debate seems moot.
Buoyed by the success of the bilateral treaty with the Soviets,
President Bush reiterated his goal in the Executive Order that
reauthorized the Export Administration Act after his veto of the 1990
amendments bill:
It is the policy of the United States to lead and seek multilaterally
coordinated efforts with other countries to control the proliferation
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, It-
aly, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slo-
venia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. CHEMI-
CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Sept. 1992, at 26-27.
385. See 1990 Soviet-American Treaty, art. IV, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 932, 933 (1990).
386. Conference on Disarmament Continues Work on Chemical Weapons Accord, UN
MONTHLY CHRON., Sept. 1990, at 34.
387. Michael R. Gordon, Neutralizing Poison Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1989, at Al.
388. Id.
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of chemical and biological weapons. The Secretary of State shall
accordingly ensure that the early achievement of a comprehensive
global convention to prohibit the production and stockpiling of
chemical weapons, with adequate provisions for verification, shall
be a top priority of the foreign policy of the United States.
389
4. Verification
Verification has two prongs. First, governments and their produ-
cers must report the existence of chemicals and production facilities.
Second, signatories demand inspection evidence that there exists no
further production of chemical weapons in any participating country.
Opponents of the Convention maintained that verification is an im-
possibility; they asserted that countries can change production facili-
ties from weapons grade chemicals to innocuous commercial
chemicals in a matter of hours.390 That notion was debunked when
the chemical industry deemed it better to become an active partici-
pant than a spectator. 39 1
a. Modes of Inspection
Holding signatories to their promises involves four levels of ver-
ification. First, if signatories agree never to use chemical weapons in
war, then the world must develop means to accurately determine
whether chemical agents are present on the battlefield. Second, if the
389. Exec. Order No. 12,730, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,587 (1990).
390. Speaking of the invitation for the press to inspect the facility at Rabta, Libya, then
CIA Director William Webster told Congress: "[W]ithin fewer than [twenty-four] hours,
some say [eight and one-half] hours, it would be relatively easy for the Libyans to make the site
appear to be a pharmaceutical facility. All traces of chemical weapons production could be
removed in that amount of time." Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat: The Urgent Need
for Remedies: Hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 33
(1989).
391. Kyle B. Olsen of the Chemical Manufacturers Association stated in an interview:
I don't think anyone can really say authoritatively that [a nerve gas facility can be
disguised in 12 hours] .... Simply to make the change from one product to another
is not enough .... [Y]ou also have to address traces of the illicit product .... [A]
plant designed to be able to make an incredibly quick shift would be very costly to
build .... [M]odern analytical methods [are] capable of detecting things down to
parts per billion or parts per trillion [so] there is always a chance of detecting some-
thing .... [S]eals, the gaskets on the pumps and various other fittings, the agitator in
the vessel, and various rubber components and grease seals, have a tendency to pick
up traces of the material. ... Yes, it is probably possible to make a changeover fairly
quickly. But can you do it in such a way that you eliminate all traces? That is a
trickier proposition than simply switching a few pipes and a couple of control sys-
tems around.
CMA's Olsen Unravels Intricacies of Verifying a Chemical Arms Treaty, CHEMICAL & ENGI-
NEERING NEws, Apr. 24, 1990, at 167-70.
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Convention allows some activities, such as research, to continue, then
the world must develop the ability to determine the difference be-
tween research facilities and production facilities. Third, if the Con-
vention forbids certain activities, the world must develop the means to
assure that those activities are not occurring anywhere in the partici-
pating country. Fourth, if compliance with the Convention derives
from the signatories' confidence in fellow participants, then the world
must devise ways to reassure everyone of universal compliance.
i. Verification of Non-Use
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 sets the standards for non-use. To
accurately verify compliance, a host of verification capabilities must
be developed:
[a.] The ability to collect samples from a combat region that may
be contaminated ... and transport for analysis.
[b.] The ability to detect and identify the presence of known
[chemical] agents in physical and biomedical samples collected
from the site of alleged use, against a natural background, possibly
in minute quantities.
[c.] The ability to detect and identify the presence of [chemical]
agents whose identities may not be known, in physical and bi-
omedical samples ....
[d.] In the event a [chemical] agent has been used which has a
naturally-occurring counterpart, the ability to determine that the
presence of such agent constitutes a violation of the Protocol.
[e.] The ability to distinguish epidemiologically that the occur-
rence of illness or trauma is the result of the use of [chemical]
agents, as opposed to endemic disease or other means of
warfare.3 9
2
ii. Verification of Permitted Activities
Using routine, ad hoc, and challenge inspections, the original
draft of the Convention, tabled at the disarmament conference by
George Bush, envisioned signatories cooperating to handle the inspec-
tion of commercial chemicals that could have chemical weapons po-
tential. The capabilities necessary included:
[a.] Routine chemical analysis, either in situ or off-site, including
detection and identification of trace components.
392. Barbara A.B. Seiders, Verification of Chemical Weapons Arms Control, in NEW
TECHNOLOGIES FOR SECURITY & ARMS CONTROL 313, 315 (Eric H. Amett ed., 1989).
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[b.] Toxicological analysis.
[c.] Chemical production process sampling and analysis, manned
and remote.
[d.] Area surveillance, manned and remote.
[e.] Inventory and stockpile counting.
[f.] Non-destructive and/or destructive analysis of munitions.
[g.] Local and area communications. 3
93
For the technology to accomplish this verification, Convention par-
ticipants must depend on the chemical industry. That dependence af-
forded the chemical industry a high degree of leverage in shaping the
verification component of the Convention.
iii. Verification of Compliance with Prohibited Activities
Cooperation can be expected to verify permitted activities but is
unlikely if a signatory country intends to hide noncompliance. There-
fore, the scope of verification in this realm must be different:
[a.] The ability to detect and identify, at any given time, the chem-
icals being manufactured in any facility otherwise capable of man-
ufacturing chemical agents [is required]. Such facilities include
recognized [chemical weapons] production facilities, as well as fa-
cilities located in ostensibly legitimate industrial chemical
complexes.
[b.] If a party makes a national determination that it has detected
and identified such clandestine production, it must be able to per-
suade the international inspectorate of the basis of its concern,
without jeopardizing the sources of information .... [I]t must be
able to demonstrate that such production is not consistent with the
activities permitted by the Convention. 394
iv. Miscellaneous Measures
Examples of measures designed to enhance the mutual confi-
dence of the signatories included "data exchanges, mutual visits to
facilities to be covered by an agreement, and arrangements to allow
parties to 'practice' verification procedures. ' 395 The task is not neces-
sarily hopeless. Even assuming that weapons precursor chemicals are
as ephemeral as carbon tetrachloride, both evident consumption and
price fluctuation will signal their diversion, in any quantity, from le-
gitimate industrial use. Once a study of legitimate consumption quan-
393. Id. at 316.
394. Id. at 318.
395. Id. at 319.
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tifies a baseline loss figure in any particular industrial application, any
departure from that normally recurring loss should trigger alarm.
Moreover, even covert diversions of industrially valuable chemicals to
military use should produce telltale increases in demand and price.
From either of these signals, the path points either to an ordinary sale
to a new customer, or an extraordinary sale to an old customer.
Only political considerations define the nature of the watchdog.
A supplier sufficiently motivated by harsh sanctions for careless distri-
bution or a bureaucratic office adequately staffed and supported will
suffice. Presently functioning regulatory systems offer mature models
for methods to track where weapons precursor chemicals are held,
transferred, or lost. Such systems make verification feasible; other
systems, such as unscheduled workplace safety inspections, make it
reliable.
b. Industry's View of Verification
The chemical industry devised a challenge inspection regime
based on taking four samples. One sample would analyze on-site
chemicals with a portable gas chromatograph and mass spectrome-
ters, thus eliminating chain of custody problems. The manufacturer
would analyze the second sample as a check. The third sample would
be taken off-site for detailed analysis. The fourth sample would be
locked into a tamperproof container on-site for retesting at a later
date. To prove the efficacy of the regime, the industry made a trial
inspection at the Akzo plant in Gallipolis Ferry, West Virginia.
396
c. Level of Intrusiveness: Recordkeeping Challenges
Because large proportions of chemicals are lost in the manufac-
turing process-as much as 5% for Phosgene-keeping track of
chemicals by bookkeeping alone could not accurately account for
large quantities. Carbon tetrachloride, for example, is widely used in
the manufacture of chlorofluorocarbons. In a process that consumed
580 million pounds of chemical in 1985, 2.7% could not be accounted
for by bookkeeping. "If this is accurate, it implies that 15.7 [million
pounds] of carbon tetrachloride could be lost in the production pro-
cess. If this chemical is typical of even a few of the treaty chemicals,
then a large amount ...could be diverted for [chemical weapons]
agent production without being detected by accounting
396. See Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 171.
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procedures." 397
Signatories, moreover, must believe that other signatories have
declared all their stockpiles and production facilities. Negotiators ac-
cepted a provision for the challenge inspection:
Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in
any other State Party in order to clarify any matter which causes
doubts about compliance with the provisions of the Convention, or
any concern about a matter pertaining to the implementation of
the Convention and which is considered ambiguous, and to have
this inspection conducted anywhere, at any time and without delay
by a team of inspectors designated by the Technical Secretariat.
The inspection shall be mandatory, with no right of refusal. 398
Some states, however, worry that such a challenge may become a bi-
lateral affair between the challenger and the challenged, leaving the
multilateral apparatus out entirely.3 99 At the same time, other verifi-
cation proposals include routine inspections, random inspections, in-
spections based on probable cause, and limitations on how many
challenge inspections one country may require of another given
country.
d. Burden on the Chemical Industry
It is undisputed that the chemical industry will bear the burden
of verification. A challenge inspection under the Convention intrudes
profoundly on the targeted facility. However, in the United States,
the industry is already heavily regulated. In Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.,4 the United States Supreme Court held that an ex parte war-
rant can be obtained for an inspection if entry to a government inspec-
tor is refused.40 1 The Court reasoned that because the industry was
regulated already, it was unnecessary to show cause beyond reason-
able regulatory requirements. In short, the chemical industry must
expect such inspections.4°2
Although the chemical industry cannot resist on the grounds
397. AROESTY ET AL., supra note 351, at 37.
398. Molander, supra note 366, at 5-6.
399. Id. at 6.
400. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
401. Id. at 26.
402. Cf Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (casting doubt on the per-
missiveness of the warrantless search in a regulated industry). See also Edward Tanzman,
Legal Aspects of Implementation under Domestic Laws, in IMPLEMENTING A GLOBAL CHEMI-
CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 15, 17 (Eric H. Arnett ed., 1989).
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that inspections amount to warrantless searches, the industry may
contend that the collection of data and wider access to that data will
erode their proprietary rights. Additional reporting requirements will
dovetail into a wide collection of reporting regulations already in
place. The opening of these reports to inspectors from the Technical
Secretariat under the Convention could exacerbate the revelation of
industry secrets. 40
3
The chemical industry is subject to numerous following regula-
tions. First, more than 65,000 chemicals comprised the first listing
under the Toxic Substances Control Act,4°4 with a thousand new
chemicals entering the market every year since. Key precursors are
included unless listed as pesticides or subject to a national security
waiver. Second, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act ("FIFRA") "[n]one of the [chemical weapons] agents
and probably none of the key precursors identified in the treaty is now
a registered pesticide. ' ' 4°5 However, laboratories, distributors, retail-
ers, commercial and private applicators, and importers register under
FIFRA. 4°6  Third, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("OSHA") 4°7 provides the prototype for the sort of challenge inspec-
tion envisioned in the Convention. Fourth, as part of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1965, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") 4°8 mandates a waste management system that charts
chemicals from their creation to their disposal. RCRA would cer-
tainly be implicated in the destruction of hazardous chemical weap-
ons stockpiles. Last, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act and Superfund Amendments
("CERCLA") would affect the disposal of hazardous chemical weap-
ons if there exists a danger of release into the environment. 4°9 CER-
CLA might require additional reporting to allow safety officials to
prepare responses should the substances be accidentally released.
5. Proliferation Not Addressed
Besides the difficulties of destruction and verification, another in-
herent flaw exists in the original Convention. This flaw is the absence
403. See AROESTY ET AL., supra note 351, at 23.
404. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988).
405. AROESTY ET AL., supra note 351, at 25.
406. 7 U.S.C. §§ 121-136 (1988).
407. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
408. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988).
409. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988).
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of restrictions regarding the private brokering of precursor chemicals
and technology to non-signatory nations.
4 10
Both the [Convention] Draft and the Rolling Text are virtually si-
lent about detailed methods for monitoring and controlling the in-
ternational transfer of chemicals, technology .. .and know-how
that could result in the further proliferation of [chemical weapons]
capability.
41'
The dual goals of banning chemical weapons and tightening con-
trol on the export of precursors and technology run on parallel tracks.
Though a different apparatus advances each goal, one track exerts a
profound influence upon the other, thus requiring tandem construc-
tion lest the engine of total eradication be derailed.
C. Global Opprobrium: 1989 Paris Conference
For five days in January 1989, representatives of 140 nations de-
bated the full range chemical weapons issues. The incoming Bush
Administration hoped for an endorsement of the global ban on pro-
duction. That endorsement was not forthcoming. Instead, the na-
tions reaffirmed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 condemning the first use
of chemical weapons in war.
1. Optimists
General William F. Bums, deputy head of the United States del-
egation, phrased the outcome optimistically, calling the nonbinding
declaration of the conference participants "a powerful global consen-
sus." ' 412 This assessment, however, proved to be a minority view.
Shortly after the Conference concluded, General Burns told Con-
gress that "[tihe purpose of the Paris Conference was not to single out
individual nations for past use of chemical weapons. '413 Any con-
demnation was intended to be prospective. In addition, the Confer-
ence was not meant to be "a negotiating forum in which to revise...
international norms [against chemical weapons use]."1414 Thus, deny-
ing that anything new was expected, General Bums tempered the dis-
appointment in the Conference's outcome. The central purpose,
410. AROESTY ET AL., supra note 351, at 4.
411. Id. at 7.
412. See Michael R. Gordon, Paris Conference Condemns the Use of Chemical Arms, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1989, at Al.
413. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 214.
414. Id.
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Burns asserted, was merely to "restore the authority of existing con-
straints, chiefly the Geneva Protocol.1 415
The United States certainly had hoped that the Conference
would accomplish more. However, General Burns limited those
hopes to those articulated in Secretary of State George Shultz's key-
note address:
[a.] International support for the U.N. Secretary General's investi-
gation of allegations of [chemical weapons] use.416
[b.] Support for appropriate action, in conformity with the United
Nations Charter, in the event of future illegal use of chemical
weapons .... 417
[c.] Support from the international community for humanitarian
aid for victims of [chemical weapons] use.418
General Burns found solace in the common themes of the ple-
nary statements of Conference participants:
[a.] Participating states reaffirmed their commitment to the Ge-
neva Protocol. Moreover, fourteen states [agreed to sign on].
[b.] Participants stressed the importance of the ongoing negotia-
tions in Geneva and the need to achieve a total ban on chemical
weapons ....
[c.] Nations repeatedly underlined the importance of the process
of the Secretary General's investigations into chemical weapons
use.
419
Finally General Burns painted the brightest possible face on the
Conference by summarizing its achievements:
[a.] The conference condemned the use of chemical weapons in vi-
olation of international law and existing norms.
[b.] Participants stressed the importance and continuing validity
of the Geneva Protocol.
[c.] Participants expressed grave concern over the spread of chem-
ical weapons, and called on all states to exercise restraint and act
responsibly.
[d.] The Conference reaffirmed full support for the Secretary Gen-
eral's [investigations].
415. Id.
416. This represented a change in United States policy since 1988.
417. In particular, sanctions were encouraged. Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 299,
at 214.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 215.
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[e.] Participants also supported humanitarian assistance given to
victims affected by chemical weapons.
[f.] The Conference called for negotiation of a global, comprehen-
sive, and effectively verifiable ban, of unlimited duration, on all
chemical weapons.
4 20
Despite this optimistic assessment, even the most unsophisticated ob-
server could conclude that little progress occurred at the Paris
Conference.
2. The Critics
While the condemnation of chemical weapons at the Paris Con-
ference was a "unique manifestation of international unity," the
United States failed to institute a "swift policy review" to bring its
negotiating position at Geneva in line.421
Rolf Ekeus, former Swedish ambassador to the Geneva Confer-
ence, probed the disappointing result of the Paris Conference
deeper.422 The Paris Conference represented a weak response to
chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war. Even though the Confer-
ence produced a consensus to reaffirm the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
"[t]his outcome was held in jeopardy until it proved possible.., to
deflect an initiative by some of the Arab states to make the Confer-
ence justify the threat and use of chemical weapons as a means to
offset a real or presumed nuclear weapons threat. '4
23
Moreover, doubts quickly arose that militarily advanced nations
had convinced Third World countries that chemical weapons are not
a viable equivalent to nuclear capability. Convincing nations without
nuclear capability to foreswear chemical weapons was difficult when
the two major powers-the United States and the former Soviet
Union-insisted on retaining their option to use their chemical arse-
nals for deterrence and retaliation.424 Calling the chemical weapons
sections of joint communiques "shadow-boxing," an observer up-
braided the "great powers" for their "hesitation and lack of resolve
with regard to the fundamental step of renouncing all use." 425
Indeed, some believe that the "most remarkable thing" about the
420. Id. at 215-16.
421. See Molander, supra note 366, at 8.
422. Rolf Ekeus, The Option of Using Chemical Weapons, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVEN-
TION BULL., June 1990, at 2-3.
423. Id. at 2.
424. Id. at 3.
425. Id.
1993] 603
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Paris Conference was "that it happened at all, given that the trigger
for it was widespread acceptance of Iraq's use of chemical weapons in
the [first] Gulf War. ' 426 Moreover, the admission by world govern-
ments that poison gas had indeed been used against Iran arose from
the thoroughness of the United Nations investigation of the Iranian
complaints.
427
The Paris Conference was criticized for "advertising the weapons
it was supposed to eliminate. ' '428 After four days of deliberation all
that the nations could muster was a communique voicing concern.
The communique was not even bold enough to name Iraq as the of-
fending party. Moreover, while supporting the "urgent" advance-
ment of negotiations for the Convention, the Paris meeting actually
deepened some of the rifts among the negotiating parties.
429
The timing of the Conference-within days of the United States'
shooting down two Libyan fighter jets over the Mediterranean-was
most unfortunate.430 Nor were the increasingly shrill accusations
over West Germany's involvement with Libya's Rabta facility helpful.
"Some Arabs... came to Paris in no mood to ban chemical warfare.
They say it is unfair to ask some countries to give up the right to
make chemical weapons while others [such as Israel] keep nuclear
ones. '"431 It must be noted that a linkage between chemical and nu-
clear weapons may yet undermine the Convention.
D. Voluntary Control: Australia Group
Twenty-two nations originally comprised the Australia
Group.432 Its purpose was to provide interim proliferation control
while the Convention was still under negotiation. As an informal as-
sociation, the Australia Group established no requirements for its
426. Ian Curtis, Europe Falters, Then Responds on Libyan CW, DEF. & FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan. 1989, at 41.
427. In 1988, British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe proposed beefing up the United
Nations' powers to investigate alleged chemical weapons attacks. He was supported by the
Soviet Union but opposed by the United States and France. Id.
428. Chemical Weapons; A Cloud of Talk, THE EcONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1989, at 28.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. The following countries formed the original Australia group: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Finland and Sweden later joined to expand the group's number to
twenty-two. At the end of 1992, Argentina and Hungary also were expected to join.
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participants' conduct.433
In terms of practical action, the Australia Group developed a list
of precursors and targeted Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya for export con-
trols. However, the Australia Group applied no collective sanctions
and its authority emerges from consensus.
The Australia Group met twice yearly to informally advance the
objectives of the Convention and to share intelligence on suspected
chemical weapons development.4 34 At the June, 1990 meeting in
Paris, the Australia Group agreed to extend its counter-proliferation
efforts to "technology and equipment as well as listed chemicals.
' '435
1. Domestic Impact of Australia Group
This decision prompted a flurry of activity in the United States
Departments of Commerce and State. The result was the "Enhanced
Proliferation Control" policy, to be implemented through administra-
tive agency rule making. On March 13, 1991, the agency published
interim rules that expand the lists of chemicals and destinations con-
trolled, as well as equipment, technology, and know-how. 436 In addi-
tion, the agency issued a proposed rule on March 13, 1991 governing
the question of scienter.
437
The rules "are not multilateral in nature," complained a repre-
sentative of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. "[T]he United
States is not the sole source of the controlled materials and technol-
ogy, and curbs should be agreed upon among nations. ' 438 Because
the controlled equipment is as "commonplace and benign as nickel
pipe, ventilation ducts and pumps used for making fertilizer, as well
as smokestack scrubbers used to remove air pollutants, ' 439 industry
analysts fear that the United States will carry a disproportionate bur-
den. Because the Australia Group possessed no sanctioning power,
nor any apparatus to enforce or police compliance of its members,
industry could not be assured of the multilateral application of the
restrictions. "What makes business most nervous is the unilateral ap-
433. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FINDING COMMON GROUND: U.S. EXPORT
CONTROLS IN A CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 71 (1991) [hereinafter SCHMITr
REPORT].
434. Clyde G. Farnsworth, US. Balks on Easing Export Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1991,
at D2.
435. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Sept. 1990, at 12.
436. See 56 Fed. Reg. 10760-01, 10756-01 (1991).
437. See 56 Fed. Reg. 10765-01 (1991).
438. Karen Riley, Bush Tightens Export Controls, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1991, at Cl.
439. Id.
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plication of our controls .... History shows that other people don't
necessarily follow our leadership, and so they get the sales we don't
make."44
2. Industry's Discomfort
Industry felt no more comfortable knowing that the Australia
Group delayed the revised lists of chemicals and countries because
members wanted to avoid naming Syria and Egypt as possible rene-
gade chemical weapons producers because they had joined the coali-
tion against Iraq. 441 The fact that the Departments of State and
Commerce were at odds over the new rules engendered no industry
confidence either.
442
Nor did the memory of India's attempt to break free from the
Australia Group's influence in 1989 assuage the uneasiness about ac-
cepting control guidelines from an informal group. India charged
"colonialism" when members of the Australia Group tried to per-
suade India to cut off its supply of thionyl chloride-an ingredient of
mustard-to the Iranians. India explicitly opposed the Paris Confer-
ence call for a total chemical weapons ban.443 Some warned that the
Indian attitude "casts more doubt on the viability of the Australia
[G]roup approach . . . . It's pretty clear that a lot of third world
countries with developing chemical industries have no inclination to
sign on."444
E. Multilateral Future
Though the Bush Administration employed efforts to move the
Convention forward in 1989 and 1990, little progress actually took
place. The atmosphere of approaching war with Iraq, a proven rene-
gade from the Geneva Protocol of 1925, heightened world interest in
the prospect of a global ban, but little change occurred at the negotiat-
ing table in Geneva. The surprising absence of chemical weapons
from the field of battle seemed to provide the world with an excuse to
again ignore this critical issue.
440. Farnsworth, supra note 434, at D2.
441. Stuart Auerbach, US. to Curb Export of Ingredients in Chemical Weapons, WASH.
POST, Feb. 27, 1991, at GI.
442. Farnsworth, supra note 434, at D2.
443. Stephen Engelberg & Michael R. Gordon, India Seen As Key on Chemical Arms,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1989, at Al. India was an active participant in negotiations, however,
and was an early signatory to the Convention.
444. Id.
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The abortive effort to enact a global ban on chemical weapons
use and production before the Gulf War did affect the United States,
however. The effort stirred up the frustrations of Congress and high-
lighted the cross-purposes of three executive agencies. The net effect
of President Bush's attempt to forge a global chemical weapons ban
has been to burden the United States chemical industry so as to ham-
per its expansion into new world markets. As industries of the world
scramble to exploit the radically changed political and economic cli-
mate created by the realignment of Eastern Europe, the United States
chemical industry may be left behind to sort out the latest labyrinth of
regulations now called "enhanced proliferation control."
The challenge for United States policy makers lies in conducting
an export control system that will stay synchronized with shifting bal-
ances not only within the United States but in the global arena as
well. An enforcement policy driven by disjointed and conflicting in-
terests can be no policy.
V. UNILATERAL/MULTILATERAL REMEDIES
Experts on United States export policy recently reported that,
"[u]nilateralism disadvantages the United States economy and can
rarely be justified in a competitive world economy by security con-
cerns." 44 5 These experts comprised the Panel on the Future Design
and Implementation of United States National Security Export Con-
trols. However, it is also referred to as the Schmitt Panel and its out-
put as the Schmitt Report.
Paradoxically, the Schmitt Panel reported to Congress. Congress
is perhaps the only body flexible enough to protect the competitive
interests of United States industry. This protection is achieved, how-
ever, only through the very unilateral action the Schmitt Panel so vig-
orously condemns.
The period in which chemical weapons commanded the world
spotlight saw contradictory executive policy-making further compli-
cated by congressional policy-making. During this time, a blue-rib-
bon panel of experts examined the quandaries raised by proliferation
and export control. Commissioned by Congress in 1988, the Schmitt
Panel struggled with export policy as it affected national security. Its
deliberations took a sharp turn in mid-course because of radical
445. SCHMITr REPORT, supra note 433, at 167.
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changes in the world geopolitical climate, especially in Eastern
Europe.
A. The Schmitt Report
The committee reviewed the issues of proliferation in terms of
nuclear capability, missile technology, and chemical weapons across
the widest possible spectrum. It recommended sweeping changes in
United States export policy. Many of the Schmitt Panel's general
conclusions, however, have immediate and specific application to the
problem of chemical weapons proliferation.
The Schmitt Panel outlined several interactive goals, examined
the impact of unilateralism on industry, and encouraged efficiencies
afforded by "red-side thinking" in the intelligence community.446 The
Schmitt Panel soundly criticized the current organizational scheme
for export control.44 7 Among the Schmitt Panel's criticisms were the
lack of sufficient judicial review and half-hearted participation by in-
dustry.448 Of all the shortcomings found, however, unilateralism re-
ceived the greatest share of disapproval. Paradoxically, the Schmitt
Panel thereafter concluded that a single agency could better manage
United States export policy. A National Security Directive would be
its only source of authority. This agency would harmonize control
lists and ensure industry participation. 449 The following sections will
describe the findings of the Schmitt Panel, examine the shortcomings
of those findings and offer an alternative plan.
1. Interactive Goals
Six of the nine "interactive goals" established for future adapta-
tion and modification of export policy bear directly on the problem of
chemical weapons proliferation:
[a.] Preventing or retarding the proliferation of items that could
directly and immediately enhance the conventional or strategic ca-
pabilities of countries that may now or in the future pose a threat
to the physical security or vital interests of the U.S. and other na-
tions that share common objectives.
[b.] Preventing or retarding the proliferation of items for use in
446. Id. at 168.
447. Id. at 172. Their criticisms included overlapping enforcement, confusing control
lists, and ineffective inter-agency dispute resolution. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 167.
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acts of terrorism or other political violence against the interests of
the U.S. and other nations that share common objectives.
[c.] Preventing or retarding the proliferation of items that may be
destabilizing to global or regional political structures and power
alignments.
[d.] Avoiding negative impacts on economic competitiveness and
the overall viability of the free market economies that participate
in global trade.
[e.] Maintaining harmony with U.S. allies and cooperating coun-
tries in the administration of export control measures.
[f.] Improving the structure and administration of export controls
to increase efficiency and lessen adverse effects in the private
sector.
450
Upon this broad base, the Schmitt Panel built its recommendations
for reform in United States export policy. The Schmitt Panel's bias
was clearly disclosed in its hard-line on unilateralism, a term which
can be translated as "interference by Congress. ' '451
2. Unilateralism's Impact on Industry
Stating that "[u]nilateralism disadvantages the United States
economy," the Schmitt Panel faulted the ease by which United States
export controls could be modified by unilateral action.452 The
Schmitt Panel asserted categorically that the unilateral quality of ex-
port control action engendered the worries of United States industry.
When restrictions and control practices are not implemented simulta-
neously by United States allies and, in particular, by members of the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
("CoCom"), United States industry rightfully perceives itself carrying
the burden of export policy.4 53
The Schmitt Panel listed those unilateral features of current
United States export policy which were most offensive to industry:
[a.] controls on reexports of U.S. items to third countries and the
requirement for written assurances regarding end use and reexport;
[b.] controls on U.S.-owned foreign entities;
[c.] controls on foreign products that use (or are made with) tech-
nologies of U.S. origin;
450. Id. at 166.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 167.
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[d.] controls on foreign products that have U.S.-origin compo-
nents in them;
[e.] control of some items as munitions that other CoCom nations
regulate less restrictively as dual use products;
[f.] selective imposition of unilateral product and technology
controls;
[g.] more burdensome and complex licensing regimes; and
[h.] more stringent enforcement mechanisms. 454
The panel recommended that the United States eliminate unilateral
features of export policy across the board, "except in those rare in-
stances in which such unilateral action" might accomplish a short
term objective. 45
5
3. "Red-Side" Thinking's Efficiencies
The changed relationship of the United States and its allies to the
former Soviets and their allies represented the focus of the Schmitt
Report. Under this rubric, the Schmitt Panel found that export pol-
icy could not prevent espionage and that "diversion practices" contin-
ued to undercut the goals of United States export policy.456 Though
the Schmitt Panel did not analyze the impact of espionage and diver-
sion practices regarding chemical weapons specifically, the same con-
clusion concerning more common materials and technology easily
follows. 457
In its analysis of the intelligence community, the Schmitt Panel
discussed how "red-side" thinking altered the United States focus on
Soviet activities. 45 8 "Red-side" thinking sets aside the idea that the
Soviets possessed the identical technological skill and goals as did the
United States and her allies.459 By reformulating the United States'
perception of Soviet goals, the United States could devise a more spe-
cific regime of export control, thus reducing over-control.
"Renegade-side" thinking about the chemical weapons goals of a
nation might prevent a similar sort of overkill. For example, if a rene-
gade nation's only enemy-nation is highly sophisticated, the likeli-
hood of chemical weapons use in battle might diminish. But if the
enemy is a group of unsophisticated people isolated from the rest of
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Nations such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran exemplify this concern. Id.
458. Id. at 168.
459. Id.
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the civilized world, the likelihood of chemical weapons use might in-
crease. Therefore, it might be more important to watch the flow of
materials and technology where they are more likely to be used
against an unprepared civilian population.
4. Schmitt Report Criticisms of the Status Quo
The Schmitt Panel found six major flaws in the current organiza-
tional framework for export control. The following sections detail
those flaws.
a. The Organizational Scheme
The Schmitt Panel found that more than "a dozen agencies, plus
the military services," exert various degrees of control over United
States export policy.460 The Schmitt Panel also found multiple stat-
utes governing those agencies. The result is a plethora of overlapping
and conflicting regulations. The agencies that are supposed to lead
United States export policy and implementation-the Departments of
Commerce, State and Defense-"are often unable to integrate the var-
ious national security, economic, and foreign policy issues."'46' The
dearth of balanced, coherent views on key issues, therefore, is no
surprise.
b. Overlapping Enforcement
Within the United States, the Customs Service and the Com-
merce Department's Office of Export Enforcement often find them-
selves "working the same case without each other's knowledge.
462
The Schmitt Panel found fault with the differing sanctions from stat-
ute to statute and with attempts to control behavior beyond the
United States' jurisdiction. 463 The Schmitt Panel recommended
bringing all export control authority within a single agency.
464
c. Confusing Control Lists
The panel criticized list management because definitions neces-
sary for control and decontrol are difficult to perfect. As a result,
export lists do not reflect multilateral decision making. The panel
460. Id. at 171.
461. Id. at 172.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 191.
1993]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J
went so far as to assert that "foreign nations and suppliers-not the
United States interagency process-are driving the [domestic] export
control apparatus" because the President has been forced to work
around the system.465 The Schmitt Panel recommended that the
United States consolidate all controlled commodities and technologies
into a single list with a single set of sanctions.466
d. Ineffective Inter-Agency Dispute Resolution
Without clear policy guidelines and straight forward agency re-
sponsibilities, disputes among the controlling agencies are inevita-
ble.467 What is not inevitable is the reasonable resolution of those
disputes. The Schmitt Panel echoed the criticisms heard in 1989 Sen-
ate hearings that agencies do not communicate adequately. As long
as multiple agencies exert control over list construction and enforce-
ment, inter-agency disputes will continue to burden the system to the
detriment of industry.
e. Insufficient Judicial Review
Admitting that "judicial review is no cure-all," the Schmitt Panel
suggested allowing the courts to "correct agency abuses. '468 The
Schmitt Panel relied on the doubtful efficacy of judicial review of ad-
ministration action because it advocated removing congressional in-
fluence. If the executive branch controls export policy exclusively,
some check on discretion will be necessary. Unfortunately, judicial
review of administrative rule-making does not have the track-record
to instill confidence in its ability to do the job.
f Half-Hearted Industry Participation
The Schmitt Panel found that "the traditional policy process
does not lend itself to effective and fair presentation of industry
views. ' '46 9 Admitting that half the problem was the fault of an apa-
thetic industry, however, it admonished United States industry to
take a greater interest.470
465. Id. at 172.
466. Id. at 192.
467. Id. at 173.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 174.
470. Id.
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5. Schmitt Panel Views Unilateralism as the Key Flaw
The cardinal sin of unilaterally imposed export controls is the
requirement for non-United States parties to secure permission for the
re-export of goods or technology. This attempt to control what for-
eign buyers do with United States products after the sale rankles
United States industry more than any single policy. "[A]necdotal evi-
dence [suggests] foreign manufacturers avoid United States sources in
order to escape the encumbrance of United States export controls.
471
If the perception that such congressional control automatically
imposes a heavier burden on United States industry could be over-
come, the necessity to exclude Congress from the export control arena
may also diminish. But thrusting the entire export control policy into
the hands of the executive branch may actually work against one of
the Schmitt Panel's most important objectives: to remove export pol-
icy from the arsenal that the United States uses to enforce foreign
policy objectives.
6. The Schmitt Report Plan for Change
The plan that the Schmitt Panel offered to correct the flaws in
the United States export policy scheme has four key elements. These
elements are discussed in the following sections.
a. A Single Agency
A single agency should maintain exclusive control over export
policy and its implementation. "[A] single agency [should have] final
authority to make decisions on routine licenses, to promulgate regula-
tions, and to resolve interpretive disputes with specific policy guide-
lines." 472 While the endorsement of a single agency represents a bold
move, courage failed the Schmitt Panel when it sought a location for
the agency. Asserting that working within the present system was
easier than making dramatic changes, it singled out the Commerce
Department's Bureau of Export Administration. The Schmitt Panel
overlooked the Bush Administration's inclination to shift power away
from the Commerce Department and into the Department of State.
473
A single agency answers the problems of overlapping jurisdiction and
471. Id. at 173.
472. Id. at 191.
473. This is evidenced by the "Enhanced Anti-Proliferation Rules" promulgated in 1991
over the vigorous objection of the chemical industry and its principal advocate in the Bush
Administration, the Department of Commerce. Id.
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contradictory enforcement, but the Schmitt Panel failed to follow
through on the recommendation to produce a solution that would
have overcome the greatest number of deficiencies in United States
export control.
b. National Security Directive as Authority Source
The Schmitt Panel's anti-congressional bias appears most graphi-
cally when it selects the source of the single agency's authority. The
single agency would derive its authority exclusively from a National
Security Directive and not through amendment to the EAA. The di-
rective would outline the process of implementing the executive's
policy.
Under the Schmitt Panel's plan, the President would devise the
objectives of national security export control and provide the direc-
tion for achieving those goals. The plan also suggests the establish-
ment of an Export Control Policy Coordinating Committee, along
with national security export control interagency groups, to provide
advice as guidelines develop under the National Security Directive.
The principal policy change that the Schmitt Panel envisions is the
substitution of "economic security" for foreign policy goals. Yet, his-
torically the President has been the source of the increasing emphasis
on export control as a tool for foreign policy objectives.
c. Harmonized Control Lists
Because the Schmitt Panel insisted on working within the cur-
rent structure, it could not recommend a dramatic revamping of the
export control lists. Rather, the panel called for a "set of integrated
United States control lists ... similarly structured and formatted. '474
Greater simplicity, the Schmitt Panel rightly argues, means greater
"transparency," thus making industry cooperation easier. The
Schmitt Panel, however, only recommended that "[a]n interagency
task group should regularly review the Munitions and Commodity
Control Lists to eliminate duplication and ensure coordination with
the CoCom Industrial List. ' 475 Likewise, it suggested some coordina-
tion of dual use lists with other multilateral control arrangements,
such as the Australia Group.
474. Id. at 192.
475. Id.
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d. Industry Participation
The strongest recommendation made by the Schmitt Panel envi-
sioned greater industry participation in the export control regime.
The Schmitt Panel presented an elaborate organizational scheme for a
committee of industry advisors that would "ensure continuity from
administration to administration. '476 Moreover, it recommended en-
hancing technical advisory committees to ensure the highest level of
expertise and responsiveness.
B. Short-sightedness of the Schmitt Report
Perhaps curiously for a committee created in response to a con-
gressional call for a comprehensive study of United States export ad-
ministration, the Schmitt Report recommended that, in the name of
efficiency, the executive branch should undertake formulation of both
export policy and the structure for its administration. The Schmitt
Report called for promulgation of a new policy and a new machinery
through the vehicle of a national security directive.
The Schmitt Report recommended, in addition, that the national
security directive concentrate the day-to-day administration of export
controls in a single agency, the Bureau of Export Administration,
within the Commerce Department. All three of these recommenda-
tions reflect a coherent, if not necessarily compelling, view of United
States government. Whatever the benefits from other forms of ex-
ports, these three recommendations offer no special advantage in
shrinking either the global market for, or United States exports of,
chemical weapons precursors and associated technology.
1. Efficiency as Sole Criterion
The Schmitt Report presumed that efficiency should be the sole
criterion for judging export policy and its administration. Such a
view fails to account for the fundamental presumption enshrined in
the Constitution that separation of powers among governmental
branches safeguards values more important than efficiency. The
Schmitt Report echoes previous calls to streamline regulatory govern-
ment by vesting greater control and discretion in the chief executive.
Influential among these has been the 1971 report of the President's
Advisory Council on Executive Organization.
477
476. Id. at 194-95.
477. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGU-
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The underlying blueprint for national government says nothing
about making policy; it speaks only of making and carrying out laws.
When the Constitution mentions lawmaking, it confers such power, in
most instances, to the Congress and the President acting jointly. Tra-
dition dictates that presidents approach Congress, thus honoring the
difference between proposing and making law.
The proper scope of lawmaking by national security directive
should reflect both constitutional presumption and inter-branch tradi-
tion. While the President is clearly expected to play a leading role in
the conduct of our nation's diplomatic and military affairs, the Con-
gress possesses the power to regulate international trade. At best, ad-
vocates for a greater presidential role in export policy-making should
argue for a greater presidential voice in the constitutionally designed
joint endeavor, not for the exclusion of the congressional voice.
A national security directive should not be a device to circum-
vent joint law-making in formulating policies as substantial as export
regulation. The national security directive is not an appropriate sub-
stitute for legislation on international trade. So the authorization by
statute of some presidential actions is not properly read as authoriza-
tion for action of the proportions apparently contemplated by the
Schmitt Report. The passage of the Chemical and Biological Weap-
ons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1990 proves that conflict
of competing constituent interests in the Congress does not foreclose
coherent action on issues as multi-faceted as chemical weapons
proliferation. The legislation's subsequent veto proves that the disci-
pline of hierarchical organization in the executive branch does not
necessarily enable coherent and uncompromised policy on such
issues.
2. Executive Abhorrence to Single Agency Control
When the Schmitt Report recommended consolidating day-to-
day administration of export controls in a single bureau of the Com-
merce Department, it flew in the face of the last twenty years of ad-
ministrative experience. The history of federal administrative systems
related to air travel and nuclear energy, for example, offers compel-
ling evidence that placing both promotional and regulatory responsi-
bilities in the same government office creates a conflict of bureaucratic
LATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES
(1971).
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interest that discourages aggressive enforcement of safety standards in
favor of industry accommodation.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, for example, abolished the old
Civil Aeronautics Administration,478 and transferred the task of en-
suring safety in domestic civil aviation to a new, independent Federal
Aviation Administration. Congress also responded to criticism that
the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") operated under a continu-
ing conflict of interest as both the promotor and regulator of nuclear
power. It divided the AEC's two primary duties between separate
agencies: the Energy Research and Development Administration 47
9
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 480
If, as the Congress clearly believes, the proliferation of chemical
weapons threatens United States security interests, then administra-
tion of curbs on proliferation by export should not be assigned to a
bureau under the department established to foster commerce. For an
effective program of export control Congress should establish offices
responsible for both policy design and implementation that are in-
dependent of existing bureaucracies.
The Schmitt Report recognized the need for a clearing-house of
competing interests at the policy level, but failed to recognize its ap-
propriate location in the legislative branch. The Schmitt Report
failed to see the equivalent need for a clearing-house of compting
interests at the administrative level, since it proposed consolidation of
administration into a bureau of the Commerce Department.
3. Means or Goals in Control?
Each of the three Schmitt Panel recommendations stems more
from dissatisfaction with the balance of power between political
branches than from the necessities of effective export control. This
observation is even more compelling if it is limited to just the impact
of the Schmitt Panel recommendations on chemical weapons precur-
sor and technology proliferation. The concentration of power in the
478. The Civil Aeronautics Administration, along with the Civil Aeronautics Board which
developed and promoted industry, was located within the Department of Commerce. Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
479. The Energy Research and Development Administration is responsible for the promo-
tion and support of civilian use of nuclear power. Act of October 11, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
438, 88 Stat. 1237 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (1988)).
480. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible for the safety regulation of reac-
tor construction and operation. Act of October 11, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1237
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (1988)).
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hands of an executive branch willing to re-analyze congressional as-
sessments of the competing costs versus other diplomatic objectives,
the domestic economy, and national security would affect a significant
shift in the balance of power between the White House and Capitol
Hill.
C. Unilateralism Is the Core Problem
The chemical industry's aversion to unilateral national controls
on international trade in chemical weapons precursors and technol-
ogy also contradicts the industry's apparent endorsement of the
worldwide elimination of such weapons. If the industry does not sell
in the military market, then it has little to lose from unilateral sanc-
tions intended to punish the renegade producer or broker.
1. Industry's Objections
Much of the industry's objection to unilateral controls centers on
controls applicable to resale. Producers object to the United States'
efforts to prevent foreign buyers from reselling precursors or technol-
ogy to third parties interested in weapons development. Producers
claim that foreign customers avoid United States sources in order to
avoid burdensome resale restrictions. If those foreign customers in-
tended to resell weapons to third parties at the outset, then the sale
was one which United States producers have already foresworn in the
absence of a middleman.
The industry's forbearance from direct sales for military use
seems hypocritical if, at the same time, it demands freedom to make
unrestricted sales to brokers intending the same final use. An objec-
tion to effective restrictions on resale because they restrict United
States producers in a market where foreign producers remain free is
only a variation on the industry's old position that it should be able to
sell directly abroad for military use because others do.
If the industry is not complaining about the discouragement of
buyers anticipating future resale for military use, then the industry
must be objecting to the discouragement of buyers anticipating resale
for legitimate reasons. United States restrictions intended to deter
military resale might well impact the other if the buyer's subsequent
task of satisfying United States authorities is foreseen by the potential
buyer as too costly. It might well be that brokers, or even consumers
who sometimes trade inventory, would abandon the United States
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market for one in which the same chemicals at the same price are
available without resale restriction.
2. Industry Objections Shortsighted
The United States chemical industry is complaining about
United States restrictions that prevent the United States producer
from competing with itself for the resale. Parallel end-user certifica-
tions have served conventional arms manufacturers very well. For
example, Colt, a firearms manufacturer, has relied heavily on resale
restrictions created by both contract and treaty to prevent buyers of
its military rifle manufacturing process from offering the product to
other countries in competition with Colt's product. Restrictions on
resale may drive some customers to other sources. But they also pro-
tect United States producers from having to discount their products
because a competitor offers legitimate buyers the same product at sale
prices.
C. The Schmitt Panel Criteria for Change
The central goal of the Schmitt Panel's recommendations lies in
using multilateral sanctions to constrain access to technologies and
materials by countries that might use chemical weapons. The Schmitt
Panel, it must be remembered, examined all aspects of United States
export policy, including nuclear, biological, and missile technology
with its principal emphasis on the changed relationship between the
United States and the former Soviet bloc. However, the Schmitt
Panel's general recommendations on the broader problem of prolifer-
ation apply to the narrower issue of chemical weapons proliferation.
Though the Schmitt Panel conceded that "export controls are
not universally effective in slowing proliferation," they are better than
unilateral controls.481 The Schmitt Panel stated:
Control regimes must be tailored to the particular circumstances of
specific proliferation threats and, to be effective, must be as fully
multilateral... involv[ing] the maximum number of suppliers ....
[Export controls] should be targeted only on those technologies or
products directly essential to the development and/or manufacture
of [chemical] weapons.482
Arguing that modifying the current system is likely to be more
481. ScHMrrT REPORT, supra note 433, at 184.
482. Id. at 182.
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effective than starting anew, the Schmitt Panel set out criteria for
evaluating their plan:
[1.] Policy issues [must be] resolved in a timely manner and policy
decisions [must be] enforced by the executing agency.
[2.] View of relevant departments [must be] heard and considered,
and resolved cases presenting significant policy issues [must be]
taken to a senior-level inter-agency group for prompt resolution.
[3.] The system [must be] made simpler, more open, and internally
consistent so that policymakers, administrators and United States
and foreign business can more easily understand it and work with
it.
[4.] The development of export control policy [must be] well bal-
anced, and industry and other affected parties [must] have appro-
priate opportunities for input into policy formulation, including
regulatory changes and list development. 48 3
These four criteria represent an excellent test of a revised export pol-
icy control regime.
D. A Proposed Alternative Plan
The Schmitt Panel discussed the heart of the export control pol-
icy problem. Their report illustrates the deficiencies in United States
policy . The Schmitt Panel's assessment of the problem and some of
its recommendations are excellent. However, the Schmitt Panel did
not go far enough. The following suggested changes would better
serve the goals set out by the Schmitt Panel.
1. A Single Agency
Export control must be brought under the auspices of a single
agency. The agency should be neither exclusively influenced by the
executive nor the legislative branch. In order to meet the Schmitt
Panel's overall objective of tailoring "the particular circumstances to
specific proliferation threats," the agency must be free of political
tinkering for the purposes of advancing foreign policy by the Presi-
dent and domestic interests by the Congress.
Industry and technical groups must advise the single agency.
That agency should harmonize the goals of the executive agencies-
Commerce, State and Defense-which traditionally influence export
policy. But that agency must remain independent. Such indepen-
dence is only possible if Congress through its legislative power, not
483. Id. at 178-79.
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the President through the National Security Directive power, pro-
vides the enabling authority for this independent agency. That en-
abling authority must possess at least a ten year life-span before
congressional renewal in order to reduce political "tinkering."
Following the example of the organization of the Federal Re-
serve Board, the President should appoint a director and a board
whose terms would overlap administrations. All board members
should be confirmed by the Senate. Sitting ex-officio on this board
would be an Under-Secretary of State, Commerce, and Defense, as
well as a representative of the United States Customs office to serve as
the enforcement arm of this new agency.
2. A Single List
If economic security takes precedence over foreign policy as the
primary objective of export policy, then list-making must return to
the historical assumption that all commodities are candidates for un-
restricted trade to any destination. In other words, the United States
should scrap all the previous lists-Munitions, Commodity Control,
dual use, and restricted destinations. A single, simplified list should
then be reconstructed with no item or destination revived unless it
passed muster under a set of concrete criteria for inclusion. The as-
sumption must be that the entire list is temporary, thus fulfilling the
Schmitt Panel's goal of targeting only those technologies and prod-
ucts directly essential to the development and manufacture of
weapons.
Items and technologies with clear military applications would
certainly be revived from the Munitions List but without the vague
"including but not limited to" categories. Specific destinations involv-
ing nations which present clear threats to the security of the United
States, its allies, or vulnerable nations and peoples would also be re-
vived from the collection of lists presently in place. The list of com-
modities and technologies having both commercial applications and
the potential for chemical weapons development-or any other weap-
ons development potential within the larger scope of export control
reform-would be reconstructed with guidelines developed from cal-
culations made with "renegade-side" thinking, a variation of current
"red-side" thinking. Thus, the single list will advance the Schmitt
Panel's goal of making the entire system more simple, open, and inter-
nally consistent.
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3. Single Set of Monetary Sanctions
With a single list must come a single set of sanctions, and a single
process for adjudication entirely within the federal system of civil jus-
tice beginning with an administrative proceeding and advancing to
federal district court upon appeal. Criminal penalties would be re-
served exclusively for cases of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.
Sanctions would be exclusively monetary with no threat of losing
export privileges. The monetary sanctions, however, would be signifi-
cant, ranging from $100 thousand for minor infractions to $10 million
for serious breaches. Parent corporations would only assume liability
for the actions of their subsidiaries if the offending subsidiary is un-
able to pay a levied penalty.
4. Quick Response Guidelines
The primary charge of the new agency should lie in developing-
under the informal rule making procedures of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 4 4-a set of guidelines that will allow commodities and
destinations to be removed from the agency's jurisdiction as quickly as
they are included. A swift response to changing geopolitical climates
would provide a measure of flexibility that the Bush Administration
insisted the executive branch must maintain. A quick response would
also reassure industry that it will not be encumbered with export con-
trol. A quick response would, finally, foster the multilateral coopera-
tiveness of other countries.
5. System of Incentives
Sanctions enforce restrictions but do little to encourage the sort
of domestic and international cooperation necessary to discourage the
proliferation of chemical weapons. Incentives represent the better
course.
a. Incentives to Governments
For friendly governments, the United States should provide eco-
nomic incentives from its collection of foreign assistance programs.
However, for Third World countries not participating in the Conven-
tion, the United States and other participants should devise a program
to encourage nations to destroy their stockpiles of chemical weapons
in an environmentally safe manner.
484. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988).
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Nonetheless, the single most significant deterrent to chemical
weapons use is the gas mask and protective clothing. The United
States and the Conference participants should launch, through the
United Nations, a worldwide program to make protective gear and
information readily available, not only for military, but for civilian
use.
b. Incentives to Industry
A nagging problem of chemical weapons proliferation is the
existence of an unregulated market for precursor chemicals and tech-
nology outside of the government-to-government market. Industry is
the principal supplier. To short-circuit the intensity of supply and
demand economics, industry must receive greater incentives to dis-
courage proliferation than to sell to renegade buyers. In short, partic-
ipation in an antiproliferation regime must be made profitable enough
to guarantee industry's long term cooperation.
1. Incentives to Clean Up
Just as oil well fire fighting companies arrived in Kuwait follow-
ing the Gulf War to exploit the urgent need to extinguish fires set by
the retreating Iraqis, chemical disposal teams will have plenty of work
helping the Iraqis destroy their stockpiles of mustard, Tabun, and
Sarin safely. Moreover, the United States should encourage the
chemical industry to develop methods by which countries can dispose
of their stockpiles now that the Convention is ratified. For example,
Lockheed, Olin and Babcock & Wilcox apparently see a lucrative
market. Newly incorporated as International Disarmament Corpora-
tion, they submitted a proposal to the Defense Nuclear Agency in
hopes of capturing some $400 million appropriated by Congress for
the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons in the former Soviet
Union. 485
In addition, as Third World countries decide to take advantage
of the incentives to destroy their stockpiles, the need for environmen-
tally safe procedures will grow. The United States should create tax
incentives and government grants to encourage the chemical industry
to develop those procedures and reap the global profits.
485. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Mar. 1992, at 16.
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2. Environmental Clean-Up
In tandem with chemical demilitarization development, there
should be an emphasis on general environmental clean up. Besides
the need to clean up the post-war debris in Kuwait and Iraq, there is a
generation's worth of environmental clean up waiting for attention in
Eastern Europe. The United States could direct much of the chemical
industry's energy into an environmental "Marshallization" of nations
newly entering the free world. It could compel the governments of
those countries to bring in modern technology for the purpose of
cleaning up ecological toxins left by former communist regimes.
3. Convention Verification
The chemical industry has already demonstrated its ability to
provide direction to the Convention deliberations with its willingness
to embrace verification. The chemical industry in the United States
overcame its reticence about surprise searches of facilities and demon-
strated that the major stumbling block to an efficient and fair global
chemical weapons ban was not impossible to remove.
E. Prospects for the Immediate Future
Negotiations at the Convention suddenly became energized in
the summer of 1992. By September 1992, the Convention submitted
the final draft to the 47th Session of the United Nations General As-
sembly. At the formal signing in Paris in January 1993, then Secre-
tary of State Lawrence Eagleburger declared:
We have seen the international community liberate itself from half
a century of gridlock and paralysis and move beyond the rhetoric
of democracy to achieve real democracy; move beyond the rhetoric
of disarmament and achieve real reductions in weapons of mass
destruction.
4 86
Within days of the Convention's opening in January 1993, 137 na-
tions became signatories. This immediately triggered formal activa-
tion of the treaty, which only required 65 signatories. 487
The final hours of negotiations were not without some snags,
however. In a monograph released by The Committee for National
Security on July 29, 1992, Brad Roberts, a Research Fellow at the
486. Chemical Weapons Convention Signing Ceremoney, STATE DEP'T BULL., Jan. 18,
1993 (statement of See. Eagleburger).
487. Alan Riding, Signing of Chemical Arms Pact Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993, at
A 16.
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Center for Strategic and International Studies, painted a cautiously
optimistic picture of the Convention negotiations during 1991.488 In
Geneva, Roberts interviewed the negotiators, including those repre-
senting the new Eastern Bloc nations.
Surprisingly, in the closing hours of negotiations, the issue of
challenge inspection did not maintain its historical priority.489
Rather, differences emerged between the Western group and G-21
over the continuing role of the Australia Group, which had grown to
22 nations.490 "G-21 viewed this as a form of double jeopardy," be-
cause they believed "that either states should be subject to one set of
rules or another but not two sets at the same time.
'491
A third issue to emerge was whether non-lethal agents should be
included within the Convention ban. Germany, the current chair of
the Chemical Arms Contol group, favored inclusion stating, "the U.S.
position is firmly that they ought not be [included]."
'492
Less amenable to compromise was the fourth problem of old and
abandoned stocks. China complained that vast quantities of undi-
posed chemical agents, 493 were left behind by the Japanese during
World War II. Disposing of these old and abandonned stocks would
"consume money that China does not feel that it has. ' 494 A deal be-
tween China and Japan for disposal might be "overly optimistic. ' 495
The fifth technical problem was a familiar one. The G-21 and
the Western voting bloc had different ideas about the structure of the
Executive Council. "Everybody wants to craft the voting rules such
that they have an ability to block votes and actions by the Council
deemed unacceptable to them, whether with a blocking majority or a
minority veto. '496 The negotiators are:
[N]early unanimous in the view that the time is now or never for
the conclusion of the Convention. Either there will be agreement
within the July-August time frame, or the odds for agreement will
begin to decline and the likelihood for agreement will begin to slip
488. BRAD ROBERTS, A STATUS REPORT ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
NEGOTIATIONS 7 (1992).
489. Id. at 1.
490. As this Article went to press, the Australia Group had officially grown to 24 mem-
bers. See id.
491. Id. at 2.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 3.
495. Id.
496. Id.
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away relatively quickly. 497
Among the Western group, there was "the slightest hint of feeling
that the importance of [the Convention] is waning .... [T]his was a
Cold War-era priority. ' ' 498 If agreement could not be reached by
1993, many countries threatened to pull their most talented negotia-
tors away from Geneva and to dispatch them to other problems which
were "more pressing. '4
99
Even President Bush's dramatic gesture in May 1991, declaring
that the United States would destroy all its chemical weapons in ten
years did not seem to give the negotiating states the will to press for-
ward to a final agreement. Reinforcements from the United States
chemical industry coupled with incentives from other nations that
serve as home bases for multinational chemical corporations provided
the missing impetus. Even the Chemical Manufacturers Association
wanted a swift "ironclad ban on chemical weapons-now and for all
time."5o
E. Conclusion
The urgency to change United States export policy may have dis-
sipated with the quick end to the war for Kuwait. The Chemical
Weapons Convention is now an accomplished fact with only the va-
garies of implementation left. Anti-proliferation legislation passed the
Senate quickly in the closing hours of the Persian Gulf war. But it
now languishes in anticipation of a rerun of the conference committee
in 1990 and another potential slugfest over whether Congress can
force the President to impose sanctions on foreign contributors. In
the meantime, the executive administrators control a vast portion of
United States export policy, including chemical weapons proliferation
measures, tipping the balance of influence within the executive branch
away from the industry-sensitive Commerce Department and toward
the Department of State, whose interests are focused beyond the eco-
nomic realities faced by the chemical industry, though no one is sure
how the "changing of the guard" to the new Democratic administra-
tion will affect the situation.
The United Nations Commission inspecting Iraqi weapons has
announced finding 50 thousand pieces of filled munitions, including
497. Id. at 5.
498. Id. at 6.
499. Id.
500. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., June 1992, at 21.
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rockets, bombs and artillery shells, 75 SCUD missile warheads
designed for chemical weapons use, and as many as 75 thousand
pieces of unfilled munitions designed for chemical weapons use. Iraq
has declared between 10 thousand and 15 thousand such munitions
but the United Nations discovered so many more, actually filled with
mustard and nerve gas, that the most critical problem now is how to
safely dispose of them.
501
At the same time, ideal conditions for deployment of the vast
stores of chemical weapons no longer in the undisputed and exclusive
possession of the former Soviet Union are materializing in pockets of
ethnic hostility around the world. In April 1992, reports from the
Azerbaijani Defense Ministry in Nagorno-Karabakh alleged that
Armenians fired a 120mm shell filled with "substances from the cya-
nide group. ' 50 2 In the same month, reports from the Yugoslav Peo-
ple's Army alleged that an unknown poison gas was used by Croatian
forces south of Stolac in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 50 3 In May 1992, Health
Minister Farhad Dzhafarfuliyev of the Nakhichevan Autonomous
Republic, insisted on the basis of blood specimens taken from casual-
ties that Armenian bombardment of the border town of Sadarak in-
cluded both cyanide and mustard gas.5°
4
As new locales for suspicion emerge, the old hot spots refuse to
be smothered. Then Central Intelligence Agency Director Robert
Gates told the House Armed Services Committee in March 1992, that
even though Iraq had surrendered vast quantities of chemical weapon
stockpiles, "we believe the regime still has more of everything-more
precursor chemicals, more bulk agent, more munitions, more produc-
tion equipment. ' 50 5
At the opening of the Chemical Weapons Convention on January
501. Rolf Ekeus, Chemical Weapons and the New Global Security Structures, CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., June 1992, at 2.
502. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., June 1992, at 19. A
workshop organized by the Swedish government in December 1992, examined all of the re-
ported uses of chemical weapons, including the recent report from Azerbaijan; "[a]fter examin-
ing alleged victims, interviewing alleged witnesses, inspecting alleged munitions and fragments
and reviewing Aseri chemical analytical procedures, the team concluded that it had found no
evidence of [chemical weapons]." Investigating Alleged Uses of Chemical Weapons, CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Dec. 1992, at 22. The same workshop announced that "defin-
itive evidence of the use of chemical weapons other than riot-control agents was obtained only
in the case of the 1984-88 UN investigations in Iran and Iraq." Id.
503. News Chronology, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., June 1992, at 19.
504. Id. at 22.
505. Id. at 15.
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13, 1993, just one week before leaving office, President George Bush
released the following statement:
For more than 20 years, the United States and many other
countries have labored to achieve a ban on chemical weapons. The
long-awaited Chemical Weapons Convention is now completed
and open for signature ....
The Chemical Weapons Convention is uniquely important in
the field of arms control agreements. It will improve the security
of all nations by eliminating a class of weapons of mass destruction
that exist in all quarters of the world and that has been used in
recent conflicts. It is a truly stabilizing and non-discriminatory
agreement ....
Much work remains to make the Convention fully effective.
The United States will cooperate closely with other countries to
bring the Convention into force as soon as possible and to ensure
that it is faithfully implemented. Only then will we be able to say
that the risk of chemical warefare is no longer a threat to people
anywhere in the world.
50 6
Hardly one month later, the specter of chemical weapons use
reappeared. On February 18, 1993, a representative from the Depart-
ment of State announced that Libya was back in the chemical weap-
ons production business on a large scale. 50 7 Unnamed intelligence
sources in the United States claimed that Libya was building an un-
derground plant near Tarhunah, forty miles southeast of Tripoli, dis-
guising it as a water project. 508 "We invite any neutral international
body and international media to visit the area," announced the Lib-
yan Foreign Ministry.50 9 "And we make this invitation to the Demo-
crats so they do not make the same errors as the previous
administration," the Libyan communique declared. 510 Those who
have followed the complex web of political parodoxes of chemical
weapons proliferation cannot help but wonder if the the struggle to
eradicate these weapons has not come full circle.
506. U.S. Signs Chemical Weapons Convention, STATE DEP'T BULL., Jan. 18, 1993.
507. Douglas Jehl, U.S. Says Libya is Building 2d Poison-Gas Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1993, at A7
508. Id.
509. Libya Says US. Can Visit Alleged Chemical Plant, REUTER LIB. REP., Feb. 20, 1993.
510. Id. See also Libya Denies Building Chemical Arms Plant, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 21, 1993,
at 26.
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